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Open Access, defined as the non-discriminatory access to an upstream bottleneck re-
source, takes a central role in information and communications technology markets
with its direct and indirect ramifications on competition and innovation. Moreover,
recent technological innovations have fundamentally affected i) the market structure
and regulatory paradigm at the infrastructure layer, where Open Access safeguards ac-
cess to communications access networks, and ii) the evolution of digital services mar-
kets, where Open Access is discussed with regard to immaterial upstream bottleneck
resources such as data or intellectual property.
This thesis investigates the competitive and cooperative interactions in these markets,
where firms require access to an essential input resource. Thereby, theoretical analyses
and experimental evaluations are employed to examine market outcomes under alter-
native regulatory institutions. In particular, experiments in continuous time are utilized
to allow for oligopoly competition with asynchronous strategic interaction. Serving as
a testbed for policy proposals, the thesis aims at identifying welfare implications of
designated regulatory institutions and informing the design of new institutions prior
to implementation in the field.
Based on a unified framework for Open Access regulation, margin squeeze regulation,
which has recently been emphasized as an alternative to wholesale price regulation
in the European Union regulatory framework for telecommunications infrastructure,
is scrutinized. The theoretical and empirical analyses in this thesis demonstrate that
in the case of infrastructure competition, margin squeeze regulation may benefit non-
integrated retailers in specific cases, but never benefits consumers. Thus, in contradic-
tion to the rationale underlying the current legislative implementation in Europe, com-
i
peting infrastructures do not represent exogenous competitive constraints, but increase
retail prices strategically in anticipation of the regulatory rules.
In the case of wholesale competition, access for a retailer may be provided competi-
tively by two vertically integrated firms. Remarkably, in a continuous time economic
laboratory experiment, wholesale and retail prices are found to be higher under whole-
sale competition than under a wholesale monopoly. The finding that consumers are
worse off under competition is rationalized by an investigation of collusion incentives.
Moreover, a complementary price commitment rule is found to substantially reduce
tacit collusion. A validation study with expert participants provides support that ex-
perimental outcomes are indeed similar to the student sample. These results point to
a dilemma of the Open Access rationale: whereas non-discrimination may provide the
basis for competition on equal terms, symmetry may facilitate coordinated behavior
among competitors to the detriment of consumers.
The effect of the number of firms on tacit collusion, a central concern in merger control
proceedings, is further examined by means of an empirical meta-analysis and two ex-
perimental studies. It is shown that tacit collusion decreases strictly with the number
of competitors in industries with two, three and four firms. Although previous experi-
mental studies could not affirm that tacit collusion is higher in markets with three than
with four firms, evidence for this fact can be provided for symmetric and asymmetric
firms, and under Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Finally, voluntary access relationships in digital services markets are explored. To this
end, the competitive effects of social logins that allow for the sharing of user and usage
data between online content providers and a social network are analyzed theoretically.
It is shown that content providers may adopt a social login even if this strategic decision
makes them ultimately worse off, i.e., they find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma-
like situation. Thus, market failures may occur due to the discriminatory access by the
social network. In this vein, voluntary access may be offered by a dominant gatekeeper
to protect its position, albeit not through exclusion, but through exploitation. This calls
for consideration of Open Access institutions at the digital services layer.
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IN the European telecommunications sector, the Open Access (OA) concept repre-sents a well-known cornerstone of the regulatory framework, established during the
liberalization and privatization of the industry (Farrell and Weiser, 2003). Guided by
the Ladder of Investment rationale (Cave and Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006a), access and
price regulation has been implemented to foster competition and investments by en-
trants such that regulation could be lifted stepwise and ultimately as a whole. Fixed
and mobile telecommunication markets quickly grew in the 1990s and early 2000s,
while entrants relying on regulated access to the incumbent’s network were able to cap-
ture significant market shares. However, these trends have slowed down significantly
or have even been reversed more recently (European Commission, 2014b). Moreover,
technological advancements in this period have tremendously improved the technical
capabilities of the network infrastructure, but have also fundamentally altered the pro-
visioning of services on top of these networks. In particular, digital convergence, i.e., the
implementation of the Internet Protocol (IP) as a uniform network standard in combina-
tion with a layered protocol architecture, modular composition of end-to-end connec-
tions, and infrastructure-transparent services, has laid the foundation for distributed
digital services and a globally connected information system.
In consequence, the telecommunications infrastructure today serves a much more gen-
eral class of digital information services rather than only communications services. On
the one hand, the success of these online information services has direct implications
for telecommunications providers’ business models and possible cooperative strate-
gies. In particular, as complementary goods they increase demand for access services
at the network layer. Yet, in contrast, as substitutes they represent additional com-
petitive constraints, especially in the case of communications services. On the other
hand, access networks may be affected indirectly by the increased public attention and
ensuing policy considerations due to their role as gateways to the Internet and to the
respective digital services (see, e.g., the public debate on net neutrality summarized by
Krämer et al., 2013). More specifically, the following stylized trends summarize how
business models and competitive strategies in the telecommunications markets have
been altered by technological progress and adjusted policy considerations. As will be
discussed subsequently, these trends question traditional regulatory practice and the
outlines of the original sector-specific regulatory framework with the advent of next-
generation access networks (NGANs). Although not complete, the listed trends call for a
v
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reconsideration of the role, the objectives and the design of regulatory OA regimes at
the telecommunications infrastructure layer.
Trends at the telecommunications infrastructure layer
1) Infrastructure competition: Based on the IP standard, different next-generation access
(NGA) platforms, which have initially been built for distinct services such as telephony
and cable television, are able to deliver digital communications and information ser-
vices to consumers at fixed locations (De Bijl and Peitz, 2008). In consequence, ensu-
ing infrastructure competition challenges the traditional notion of the fixed local access
network as a natural monopoly (Vogelsang, 2013). In addition, different geographical
footprints of those networks in combination with the emergence of regional operators
have led to a situation where the number of competitors differs geographically (Bour-
reau et al., 2015). Therefore, in densely populated areas, consumers can choose from
several operators, which are each in possession of their own distinct network infras-
tructure. The market structure in fixed telecommunications thus starts to resemble the
market structure in mobile telecommunications, where a low number of infrastructure
competitors compete strategically at the retail level and possibly at the wholesale level.
Thus, wholesale competition on the basis of infrastructure competition may facilitate
voluntary wholesale access for independent retailers and virtual network operators
(Ordover and Shaffer, 2007; Bourreau et al., 2011). The entry of network operators re-
lying on a distinct infrastructure may alleviate concerns about exploitation of market
power by a single dominant firm, but instead, tacit collusion, i.e., the implicit coordina-
tion of firms’ behavior to the detriment of consumers, may become the central concern
of regulators and antitrust authorities in an oligopolistic market structure (Parker and
Röller, 1997; Ivaldi et al., 2003).
2) Next-generation access technologies: The availability of new high-bandwidth technolo-
gies, in particular fiber optics (Kazovsky et al., 2007; Wong, 2012), as well as the devel-
opment of upgrade solutions for existing technologies, such as Vectoring (Broadband
Forum, 2012) and Fiber to the Distribution Point (Broadband Forum, 2015), allow for
transmission speeds of several orders of magnitude higher than legacy communica-
tions network technologies. At the same time, growing demand for new digital services
and continued digitization of traditional physical goods industries reinforce the need
for the rollout of NGANs based on these technologies (European Commission, 2016b).
With regard to the policy objectives that guide regulatory intervention at the European
Union (EU) level, these requirements have begun to shift the focus from competition to
a dual emphasis on both competition and investments (see, e.g., Kroes, 2012).
vi
3) Virtual network operators: The existence of different NGA technologies in practice
increases the heterogeneity of potential wholesale access products across geographic
locations (Bundesnetzagentur, 2011). At the same time, virtualization at the network
layer allows for the specification of harmonized access products across technologically
heterogeneous infrastructures, which may serve as the technological foundation for
(cross-border) competition in a European digital single market (European Commission,
2013e, 2015a). In combination, both trends have enabled new operator models and
access offers at different levels of the fixed infrastructure and network operations value
chain (Dewenter and Haucap, 2006; Banerjee and Dippon, 2009). Thus, multiple virtual
network operators and therefore competition may be sustained on top of few or even a
single infrastructure.
4) Fixed-mobile integration: Digital convergence at the network layer encompasses not
only fixed networks, but also promotes fixed-mobile integration, i.e., the technologi-
cal integration of fixed and mobile telecommunications infrastructures as well as the
bundling of respective communications services (OECD, 2015). From a supply-side
perspective, increasing wireless transmission speeds and ensuing higher data vol-
umes sent over radio interfaces require the integration of base stations into dense
and high-bandwidth concentration networks (5G PPP, 2015). At the same time, con-
sumers’ demand for communications services bundles including a seamless handover
between fixed and mobile services has significantly grown (Grzybowski and Liang,
2014). In consequence, the traditional technological boundaries between fixed and
mobile telecommunications markets blur, which is further indicated by hybrid access
products that connect to a fixed as well as a mobile access network, simultaneously
(Leymann et al., 2015). In conclusion, these developments challenge the notion of delin-
eated regulatory regimes dedicated to specific infrastructures, such as mobile and fixed
networks, and ultimately suggest the necessity of regulatory convergence irrespective of
the underlying technology. Moreover, the consolidation in the mobile telecommunica-
tions industry has effectively reduced the number of distinct infrastructures (Genakos
et al., 2015). In consequence, the market structure is becoming increasingly similar to
fixed telecommunications markets as noted above.
5) Public-sector participation: The increasing economic and societal relevance of digital
services has led to direct public intervention at the network infrastructure and opera-
tions level, especially in rural less densely populated areas. In particular, consideration
of spill-over effects and positive externalities, the universal service principle, and the
objective to end the digital divide are cited as legitimatory reasons for those state activi-
ties (see, e.g., Gómez-Barroso and Feijóo, 2010, for an overview). If public-sector partici-
pation complements private activity, most notably in the case of state aid, the effects and
trade-offs resulting from mandatory access obligations are magnified: Whereas public
intervention strengthens the rationale for non-discriminatory access offers to whole-
sale services in order to avoid the distortion of competition, such access obligations
vii
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may discourage private investments particularly in those areas where they are most
required.
6) Over-the-top communications services: The technical decoupling and logical separation
of network operations has enabled IP-based over-the-top services providers to enter
communications and digital services markets without an own infrastructure. In turn,
this diminishes returns for network operators from traditional revenue sources (Peitz
and Valletti, 2015). Yet, at the same time, these services are the main drivers of demand
for fixed and mobile access services, which however may be difficult to monetize as
illustrated by objections raised in the context of net neutrality (Krämer et al., 2013).
In consequence, authorities are challenged to decide whether the regulatory regime at
the network access layer needs to be adjusted in light of this additional competitive
pressure at the services layer in order to create a level playing field (cf. Krämer and
Wohlfarth, 2015).
In consequence, these trends raise several issues with regard to the design and imple-
mentation of regulatory institutions that can safeguard OA at the network infrastruc-
ture level. In fact, these issues are currently controversially debated with regard to
a realignment of the European regulatory framework (European Commission, 2016c).
Whereas price regulation in retail markets has been faded out from the European Com-
mission’s (2014a) recommendation on relevant markets susceptible to ex ante regula-
tion, price regulation of wholesale prices for physical and virtual access products re-
mains the recommended default and the prevalent regulatory remedy in European
markets up to date. However, with respect to the rollout of NGA technologies, some na-
tional regulatory authorities (NRAs) have attempted to depart from the commission’s
recommendation and suggested alternative regulatory regimes in lieu of cost-based ac-
cess regulation. For instance, the Austrian NRA proposed wholesale access prices on
the basis of a margin squeeze test (European Commission, 2013f), whereas the Span-
ish NRA exempted NGANs above a defined data transmission threshold from price
regulation (European Commission, 2008). This latter approach may be viewed as a
form of regulatory holidays, which has been proposed to resolve the truncation prob-
lem in the case of risky investment (Gans and King, 2003, 2004). Despite the concerns
about insufficient investment incentives due to cost-based price regulation, the Euro-
pean Commission in the past has critically scrutinized and subsequently often appealed
those proposals on the ground that they would contradict the harmonized regulatory
framework at the EU level (see, e.g., European Commission, 2013d). Instead, Euro-
pean policy makers frequently argue that static and dynamic incentives are invariably
aligned and reinforcing each other (see, e.g., Vestager, 2015), despite growing empirical
evidence (inter alia Briglauer et al., 2013; Bacache et al., 2014; Klumpp and Su, 2015)
that suggests the presence of a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency.
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Recently, several high-profile policy initiatives and legislative proposals point to an in-
creasing willingness at the European level to rethink fundamental cornerstones of the
regulatory framework as the aforementioned trends become more noticeable and ur-
gent (Bauer, 2010; Ünver, 2015). The Europe 2020 strategy, adopted in 2010, with its Dig-
ital Agenda for Europe has emphasized the need to roll out high-speed NGANs and set
ambitious coverage and adoption targets (European Commission, 2010, 2014b). There-
upon, the European Commission’s (2013a) recommendation on non-discrimination and
costing methodologies marked the first executive action at the European level diverg-
ing from the prevalent paradigm of ex ante wholesale price regulation, as the commis-
sion explicitly enabled national regulators to replace cost-based price regulation with
non-discrimination obligations. In the same year, the European Commission (2013e)
presented its Connected Continent legislative package, which aimed at strengthening the
European digital single market, offering more favorable conditions on market consoli-
dation and suggested, among others, the transition to simplified and uniform (virtual)
wholesale products across EU member states. However, the final political compromise
reached in 2015 only included new rules on international mobile roaming charges and
net neutrality (European Commission, 2015d), whereas the revision of regulatory rules
on wholesale access was postponed (see Renda, 2015, for a commentary). The latest
initiative by the European Commission (2015a), the Digital Single Market strategy reiter-
ates the need for a framework aimed at strengthening investment incentives, but has so
far not discussed any legislative changes in this regard (European Commission, 2015c).
Yet, at the latest, the upcoming review of the European Regulatory Framework will re-
quire a reevaluation and possibly a redesign of regulatory rules on wholesale access at
the European and the member states level (European Commission, 2016c).
In this context, sector-specific regulation may not be viewed and evaluated in isolation,
but should be considered within the larger competition policy and antitrust framework.
Most notably, recent decisions in merger control proceedings (Genakos et al., 2015) il-
lustrate the interdependency and interaction between both frameworks with regard to
the effects on competitiveness of oligopolistic markets. In particular, the decision on
the allowed level of consolidation and thus the number of competitors in a market has
direct ramifications on the necessity and adequacy of regulatory remedies (see, e.g.,
the discussion of merger consequences for the definition of regulatory markets by Bun-
desnetzagentur, 2015). Moreover, antitrust rules may constrain the scope of cooperative
agreements among competitors, which may be conducive to investment incentives, but
may also be to the detriment of competitors or consumers (Jorde and Teece, 1990; Bau-
mol, 2001; Schellingerhout, 2011). Finally, ex ante regulatory mechanisms and ex post
competition policy rules need to be aligned and applied consistently in particular with
respect to the enforcement of anti-competitive conduct prosecuted under both frame-
works (see, inter alia, Geradin and O’Donoghue, 2005; Hellwig, 2008).
ix
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Trends at the digital services layer
Above all, recent policy reform initiatives in the information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) context are influenced to a large extent by the developments at higher lay-
ers of the value chain: the emergence of new digital services markets and the success
of online platform business models, which in turn have allowed some of these plat-
form operators to gain significant market power in their respective markets (Peitz and
Valletti, 2015). Thus, technological progress did not only transform the infrastructure
layer, but enabled the development of new services markets on top of it. In particular,
the virtualization of goods through digitization together with the logical separation of
the services layer from the infrastructure layer have lowered supply-side barriers to
entry into services markets. Moreover, they have allowed for rapid scalability of firms’
operations due to zero marginal costs, which in turn facilitate bundling of services and
innovative pricing strategies (see, inter alia, Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999; Shampanier
et al., 2007). In addition, low distribution costs allow to serve content and services at a
global level and exploit substantial economies of scale. Although these factors, among
others, have induced the market entry of a vast number of specialized online content
and services providers and thus have significantly increased the accessible variety of
goods and services for consumers globally (see, e.g., Brynjolfsson et al., 2003), network
and feedback effects together with scale advantages have facilitated the emergence of
a few dominant firms (see, inter alia, Evans and Schmalensee, 2009, 2013). In conse-
quence, these firms have been characterized as new gatekeepers in the ICT value chain
(Baye and Morgan, 2001; Ballon and Van Heesvelde, 2011). Moreover, among these
firms, which have first emerged in a particular market, there is a continuing trend to
expand into adjacent markets, thus creating services ecosystems that encompass several
layers of the ICT value chain (Monopolkommission, 2015). In the light of the above-
mentioned developments, several of those firms have been confronted with antitrust
or regulatory scrutiny. Most notably, Alphabet (Google) with its online search and its
mobile operating system Android (European Commission, 2015b, 2016a; Nicas, 2016),
Amazon with its online retail store and its ebook platform (Budzinski and Köhler, 2015),
as well as Facebook with its social network market (Bundeskartellamt, 2016) have been
accused of abusing or leveraging their market power. At the core of these accusations,
data, more specifically user and usage data, is often referred to as the new bottleneck
resource in ICT markets (Graef et al., 2015).
Data may create economic value as the enabler of new and enhanced marketing in-
struments as well as a vital input factor for the creation and refinement of information
services. On the one hand, data-driven business models allow for indirect monetiza-
tion strategies either via two-sided pricing models, in particular advertising (see, e.g.,
Evans, 2008), or via price discrimination (see, e.g., Taylor, 2004; Acquisti and Varian,
2005). The exploitation of indirect network effects in the former case allows firms to
x
offer services to consumers possibly at a zero price. Moreover, the ability to employ
penetration pricing and thereby to subsidize a particular market side can accelerate the
diffusion of new services and thus facilitate entry into new markets (Jiang and Sarkar,
2009). In ICT markets, where services regularly represent information goods and where
quick innovation cycles are prevalent, the former ability may prove to be critical for a
firms’ success. On the other hand, (personal) data may represent an essential supply-
side input to provide and improve digital online services (cf. Levin, 2013). For instance,
online search algorithms exploit the collected data on user queries and usage traffic in
order to improve the ranking of organic search results as well as the display of spon-
sored search advertising (cf. Newman, 2014). Moreover, personalized customization of
services, a key differentiation parameter in digital services competition, depend directly
on the available data basis and data quality (cf. Acquisti and Varian, 2005; Thirumalai
and Sinha, 2013; Aguirre et al., 2015). Therefore, the access to data is viewed as a crucial
factor, not only for firms to succeed in ICT markets, but also for a policy framework that
reaches beyond the infrastructure level to include online markets (European Commis-
sion, 2015c). In consequence, this has reinvigorated the debate about OA, now in the
context of an upstream resource deemed essential for digital (online) ICT services (see,
e.g., Argenton and Prüfer, 2012). In particular, questions arise with regard to whether
OA concepts should and can be transferred to the services layer, as some have already
called for the regulation of OA to virtual facilities (see Krämer and Wohlfarth, 2015, for
a discussion).
However, as shown above, implications drawn from the infrastructure layer may not be
directly applicable to the services layer, as they differ with respect to several important
economic characteristics. In particular, externalities in the context of multi-sided plat-
forms and indirect monetization models may significantly alter competitive strategies
(cf. Haucap and Heimeshoff, 2014). Thus, traditional approaches to determine market
power and anti-competitive conduct, established in the context of one-sided markets,
may be inadequate to assess the competitiveness of these markets and to finally judge
consumer harm (Wright et al., 2004). Moreover, new incentives for cooperation may
arise together with innovative sharing mechanisms with regard to data as a digital in-
put good, that is naturally different from physical input goods, which are characterized
by large sunk cost and rivalry in use. Therefore, it is a priori unclear, whether market-
driven incentives may be sufficient to safeguard access to essential input goods as vol-
untary sharing agreements may even be agreed upon between competitors (see, e.g.,
Mantena and Saha, 2012). On the contrary, voluntary cooperative relationships them-
selves may have detrimental welfare effects for competitors and consumers (Verdier,
2013), or even for the cooperating firms themselves (see, e.g., Mantovani and Ruiz-
Aliseda, 2015). Furthermore, voluntary access offers on the provider’s discretion may
be deemed insufficient in specific cases if non-discrimination is viewed as an essen-
tial criterion. Thus, non-discrimination or neutrality obligations, which have been dis-
cussed extensively at the interface between ICT infrastructure and services, may also
xi
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be considered at the services layer (cf. Easley et al., 2015). In conclusion, these consider-
ations indicate that at first a better understanding of the incentives and implications of
access relationships at the services layer is necessary in order to evaluate the need and
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CONTINUOUS innovation and ubiquitous diffusion has put information andcommunications technology (ICT) at the center of society and the economy of
the 21st century (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Czernich et al., 2011; Cardona et al., 2013).
Numerous revolutions have been proclaimed to describe the transformations that the
ICT sector itself has undergone in response to technological progress, new business
models, and adjusted policy objectives (see Steinbock, 2005; Noam, 2010; Vogelstein,
2013; Kitchin, 2014; Jorgenson and Vu, 2016, for only a few examples). Induced by tech-
nological innovations, the outcomes of these processes are fundamentally shaped by
firms’ competitive and cooperative relationships and thus by the regulatory framework
that governs these interactions. At the same time, competition, cooperation, and regu-
lation themselves constitute the key determinants of future innovation (Dosi, 1988). In
this context, Open Access (OA) to communications infrastructure and digital informa-
tion goods, i.e., the non-discriminatory access to an upstream bottleneck resource, takes
a central role with its direct and indirect ramifications on competition and innovation
(OECD, 2013). In this regard, OA regulation may represent a major design variable to
shape market institutions and to influence and balance trade-offs between static and
dynamic effects in ICT markets (Klumpp and Su, 2010, 2015). While digitization has,
on the one hand, significantly lowered the costs to provide access, it has, on the other
hand, increased the scope and variety of potential access mechanisms. In consequence,
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existing OA institutions may need to be rethought and redesigned. Moreover, novel
OA issues may arise in the context of newly emerging bottleneck resources and even
in cases where voluntary access relationships already exist. In particular, recent tech-
nological and policy trends have fundamentally affected i) the market structure and
regulatory paradigm at the infrastructure layer, where OA safeguards access to com-
munications access networks, and ii) the evolution of digital services markets, where
OA is discussed with regard to the non-discriminatory access to immaterial upstream
bottleneck resources such as data or intellectual property.
The ongoing policy debates caused by the technological advancements in ICT markets
highlight the interplay between technical and legal determinants on the one hand, and
strategic processes and economic outcomes on the other hand. In order to design insti-
tutions, which can govern and shape competitive and cooperative processes according
to given policy objectives (North, 1991; Roth, 2002), it is paramount to understand, ex-
plain and predict the incentives and trade-offs that arise in these markets (cf. Gregor,
2006). Thereby, the virtual nature of digital goods allows for a new degree of freedom
with respect to the dimension, the type and the degree of possible policy interventions.
In consequence, this emphasizes the need for theory-informed market design and eco-
nomic engineering (cf. Gimpel et al., 2008). As goods and services themselves become
artificial and subject to deliberate design decisions, so do the institutions that encom-
pass them. Given the vital importance of technological and economic factors in the ICT
context as well as the interactions among them, research at the interface between Infor-
mation Systems (IS) and Industrial Organization (IO) is particularly suited to establish
and refine robust theories that can guide the conceptualization and implementation
of these design proposals together with their respective policy implications. In general,
this i) requires an analysis of the incentives, externalities and trade-offs that arise from a
particular design in a particular context, and ii) calls for empirical testing of theoretical
predictions and prototypical evaluation of design proposals prior to implementation
at large scale in practice. Whereas the first issue can be addressed by analytic models
based on stylized facts and the extant theoretical body of knowledge, the second issue
requires an empirical testbed that can capture behavioral effects and isolate causal re-
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lationships by controlled variation, which can be achieved by laboratory experiments.
This thesis will draw on both methodologies to address the research questions outlined
in the following.
1.1 Research questions
Across different ICT markets, this thesis examines firms’ strategic incentives to provide
access to an internal upstream resource and investigates the implications for competi-
tion and consumers. Therefore, this thesis focuses on conditions that facilitate volun-
tary access agreements, but also identifies regulatory institutions that enforce the prin-
ciples of non-discriminatory access according to the core idea of OA if market mecha-
nisms are found to fail in this respect.
At first, however, it is necessary to clarify and define what is commonly referred to as
OA. Although the term has been widely used in the academic literature (e.g., Farrell and
Weiser, 2003; Forzati et al., 2010) and in practice (e.g., European Commission, 2009b),
varying concepts of OA have explicitly or implicitly been used and different aspects
have thereby been emphasized. Therefore, a review of suggested definitions, applica-
tion scenarios and the scientific literature is crucial to establish a common understand-
ing and provide a foundation for successful implementation in practice. Moreover, a
structured policy framework classifying relevant determinants of OA applications and
identifying alternative regulatory OA regimes is necessary to inform the current debate
about OA to next-generation access networks (NGANs) with regard to the available
policy options. As policy makers and regulatory agencies are challenged to decide be-
tween alternative regulatory regimes and to design a new regulatory framework in the
context of NGANs, the relevant economic trade-offs and the implications for different
efficiency measures identified in the economic literature need to be made transparent
in order to secure the rollout and allocation of the telecommunications infrastructure,
which is deemed vital for modern economies and societies (Czernich et al., 2011). In
summary, these considerations lead to the first research question:
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1. What defines Open Access given the definitions offered by various
stakeholders in the context of telecommunications infrastructure markets? To which extent can
different regulatory regimes achieve Open Access and which trade-offs arise for the decision
between those regimes?
Margin squeeze regulation (MSR) has been proposed as an alternative regulatory insti-
tution to traditional wholesale price regulation to achieve OA to an upstream resource
supplied by a vertically integrated firm for independent retailers (European Commis-
sion, 2013a). Under such a regulatory regime, the wholesale price of a vertically inte-
grated access provider may not exceed its retail price. Whereas theoretical analyses of
MSR exist with regard to a single vertically integrated bottleneck supplier (e.g. Jullien
et al., 2014), there is no examination of the welfare implications in the context of infras-
tructure competition, which is now found in many European mobile and fixed telecom-
munications markets, with the single notable exception of Höffler and Schmidt (2008).
Therefore, it is unclear whether MSR can safeguard competitors and consumers against
foreclosure of independent retailers that rely on the access to the upstream good. Given
its relevance as an ex ante regulatory remedy as well as a stand-alone antitrust abuse in
ex post competition law, a further empirical evaluation of theoretical predictions seems
warranted in order to attain robust findings over and beyond analytic models. Next to
its application in the case of infrastructure competition with a single access provider,
welfare implications of MSR may change under wholesale competition, which is the
case in most European mobile telecommunications markets. Yet, no study has investi-
gated MSR in the context of wholesale competition. Thus, the second research question
asks:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2. What are the welfare implications of margin squeeze regulation
in the presence of several independent infrastructures that may allow for competition at the
wholesale level in addition to competition at the retail level?
More generally, the emergence of infrastructure competition in many fixed telecom-
munications markets challenges the traditional legitimation for wholesale regulation in
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principle as the bottleneck resource is in fact no longer essential (Renda, 2010). More-
over, theoretical studies show that wholesale competition in the case of two distinct
infrastructures can lead to competitive outcomes in wholesale and retail markets, al-
though monopoly-like outcomes may emerge in specific cases (Bourreau et al., 2011).
Therefore, the presence of duopolistic wholesale competition may be sufficient to en-
sure OA. However, empirical studies show that tacit collusion, which is so far not con-
sidered in the theoretical studies on wholesale competition, can significantly alter mar-
ket outcomes in oligopolies with few competitors. Thus, a controlled empirical evalu-
ation of the effects of wholesale competition is warranted to test whether it can effec-
tively sustain competitive retail markets. Moreover, this calls for a theoretical analysis
of vertically integrated firms’ incentives to tacitly coordinate in upstream and down-
stream markets (Nocke and White, 2007; Normann, 2009). With regard to these issues
the third research question considers:
RESEARCH QUESTION 3. Given infrastructure competition, is wholesale competition suf-
ficient to ensure Open Access for downstream retailers? Does wholesale competition benefit
consumers?
In the context of recent merger cases in the mobile telecommunications industry, com-
petition authorities have repeatedly been confronted with the decision whether poten-
tial efficiency gains, due to consolidation, outweigh diminished competitiveness, due
to a lower number of firms in the market. More specifically, there is the concern that
implicit cooperation among competitors in the form of tacit collusion may be facilitated
with fewer firms and thus competitiveness could be aggravated over and beyond the
concentration of market power. Thus, an evaluation of anti-competitive effects seems
of particular relevance if market concentration is reduced from four to three or even
from three to two competitors. However, the detection of tacit collusion based on field
data is generally difficult, because precise information on the cost structure is often
missing. Yet, it is even more difficult in merger control proceedings where hypothet-
ical counterfactuals have to be estimated and assessed ex ante. Therefore, economic
laboratory experiments are well suited to empirically examine the systematic effects on
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tacit collusion in a controlled environment. Although, it is often assumed that there is
a strictly monotonically decreasing relationship between the number of firms and the
competitiveness of a market (see, e.g., Potters and Suetens, 2013), a systematic evalu-
ation of number effects that also controls for different competition models is missing
so far. Moreover, the studies which examine number effects in more specific contexts
(see, e.g., Huck et al., 2004b, for homogeneous Cournot competition) do not distinguish
between behavioral effects, i.e., tacit collusion, and structural effects, i.e., equilibrium
predictions. Finally, there is no experimental analysis that extends the examination
of number effects in the context of symmetric firms to markets with asymmetric dis-
tribution of market power. Yet, this scenario is particularly relevant in cases where
incumbent operators remain in a dominant position, but competing operators have
established significant market shares such that regulatory agencies consider (partial)
deregulation (see, e.g., Ofcom, 2014; Bundesnetzagentur, 2015, for discussions of num-
ber effects in a regulatory context). In essence, the fourth research question reads:
RESEARCH QUESTION 4. What is the relationship between the number of competitors and
the competitiveness of an oligopolistic market?
Economic laboratory experiments concerned with competitive settings and firms’
strategies have traditionally been conducted in discrete time, i.e., either as a
simultaneous-move or a sequential-move game. However, fixing the timing of de-
cisions according to a pre-specified order abstracts from an important dimension of
strategic decision making in practice: the decision on the timing of an action. Re-
cently, studies have employed experimental designs with a continuous time frame-
work, among others, in the context of a prisoner’s dilemma game (Bigoni et al., 2015;
Friedman and Oprea, 2012), in a network formation game (Berninghaus et al., 2006,
2007) and in a Hotelling (1929) location model (Kephart and Friedman, 2015; Kephart
and Rose, 2015). A continuous time framework endogenizes timing decisions in the
laboratory experiments and thus extends subjects’ action space by allowing for asyn-
chronous interactions. Experimental design in continuous time may be deemed more
realistic for particular scenarios and thus may increase external validity of experimental
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results. Moreover, continuous time may encourage exploration of the action space as
restrictions on the number of decisions are lifted and also allows for shorter feedback
cycles. Yet, the effects of a continuous time framework relative to discrete time have
not been investigated in the context of oligopoly competition. The following research
question addresses these methodological considerations:
RESEARCH QUESTION 5. Does continuous time in experiments on oligopoly competition fa-
cilitate tacit collusion relative to discrete time?
In digital services markets, the upstream resource to which (open) access may be
granted is represented rather by virtual goods, such as data, intellectual property or al-
gorithms than by physical infrastructure (see, e.g., Easley et al., 2015; Krämer and Wohl-
farth, 2015). Current antitrust cases that center around online intermediaries and their
alleged market power on the basis of unique data sets and the ensuing information ad-
vantage exemplify the value that is attributed to these resources (Argenton and Prüfer,
2012). Yet, there also exist voluntary access relationships and agreements among com-
petitors (Mantena and Saha, 2012; Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda, 2015). In particular,
social logins, such as “Log in with Facebook”, enable the respective social network and
the content providers to share data, which individually improves their ability to place
targeted advertising. Whereas these mechanisms can improve a website’s user expe-
rience and therefore enjoy great popularity among content providers and users alike
in practice, it is a priori unclear how these collaborative efforts impact the competition
between content providers. In particular, data sharing may affect competition between
special-interest content providers from the same domain with regard to users’ choice
to visit the respective platform but also between a general-interest content provider
(the social network) and those content providers with regard to the display of advertis-
ing. Therefore, a theoretical microfoundation that relates the effects of data collection
and the ability to target users to ensuing advertising profits in the context of compet-
ing outlets is required. Moreover, with regard to (data) neutrality considerations it is
unknown whether voluntary agreements are sufficient to ultimately maximize users’
benefits. The sixth research question summarizes these issues as follows:
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RESEARCH QUESTION 6. What are the competitive effects of social logins that allow for re-
ciprocal access to user and usage data among online content providers?
1.2 Structure of this thesis
The remainder of this thesis addresses the above research questions and is organized
as follows. Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the concept of Open Access in the
context of the current transition to next-generation access networks at the telecommu-
nications infrastructure layer.1 Addressing Research Question 1, the chapter attempts
to reconcile the diverse views on OA by offering a definition and a conceptual frame-
work by which OA endeavors can be identified and uniquely classified. Along this
framework, the extant economic literature is surveyed with regard to aspects of com-
petition and social welfare, investment and innovation, as well as practical and legal
issues. Based on these insights, a policy guideline is developed that may assist policy
makers in identifying the appropriate OA scenario for the regulation of telecommuni-
cations infrastructure.
The methodological foundations of this thesis are laid out in Chapter 3.2 Based on
the proposal of an idealized research process cycle for microeconomically founded IS
research, it is argued how theoretical and empirical research approaches may be em-
ployed to develop and refine robust theory. Building on this framework, it is argued
how analytic models and laboratory experiments can be combined to serve as a testbed
for regulatory design proposals. Finally, Research Question 5 is investigated by an
experimental study that compares oligopolistic competition under continuous and dis-
crete time.
Chapter 4 addresses Research Question 2 and considers a game-theoretic model of
margin squeeze regulation in a market with horizontally differentiated competition be-
1Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Jan Krämer (Krämer and Schnurr, 2014).
2Section 3.1 is based on joint work with Jan Krämer (Krämer and Schnurr, 2016). Section 3.3 is based on
joint work with Niklas Horstmann and Jan Krämer (Horstmann et al., 2015).
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tween two vertically integrated firms and one non-integrated retailer, whereby the non-
integrated firm relies on wholesale access provided by one of the integrated firms.3
On the basis of the methodological foundations set out in Chapter 3 and the theoretical
analysis in Chapter 4, Research Questions 2 and 3 are examined empirically in Chap-
ter 5.4 More specifically, Chapter 5 employs a continuous time economic laboratory ex-
periment with both student and expert participants to compare market outcomes under
different modes of wholesale competition as well as under an OA regulation prevent-
ing a margin squeeze. A theoretical explanation for the obtained experimental results
is provided based on a comparative analysis of collusion incentives among vertically
integrated firms in the cases of a wholesale monopoly and wholesale competition.
Next, Chapter 6 conducts a meta-analysis of the literature on oligopoly experiments
and two economic laboratory experiments to address Research Question 4.5 Therefore,
the number of firms as well as the mode of competition are systematically varied in an
experimental analysis of symmetric firms. Furthermore, number effects between three
and four firms are examined for asymmetric distributions of market power.
Chapter 7 focuses on voluntary access relationships at the services layer of the ICT
value chain and addresses Research Question 6.6 Therefore, content providers’ strate-
gic decisions whether to offer and/or adopt a social login are scrutinized and feasible
market outcomes are identified. Thus, the incentives and fundamental trade-offs that
drive adoption decisions and impact the profitability of content providers are examined
based on a stylized model of horizontal competition between special-interest content
providers, and advertising competition between special-interest content providers and
the general-interest content providers.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes and discusses limitations of this thesis together with
promising avenues for future research.
3Chapter 4 is based on joint work with Niklas Horstmann and Jan Krämer (Horstmann et al., 2016a).
4Chapter 5 is based on joint work with Niklas Horstmann and Jan Krämer (Horstmann et al., 2016c).
5Chapter 6 is based on joint work with Niklas Horstmann and Jan Krämer (Horstmann et al., 2016b).




A Unified Framework for Open Access
Regulation
W ITH the Digital Agenda 2020 the European Commission has set ambitioustargets for its member states and the European telecommunications indus-
try. The requirements stipulate that until 2020 every household in the European Union
(EU) should be covered by a broadband connection offering at least 30 Mbit/s of band-
width. Moreover, a penetration rate of above 50% is envisioned for 100 Mbit/s con-
nections. In contrast to the ambitious political goals, the implementation status is far
behind schedule. For instance, by mid 2013 only 2% of European households have al-
ready subscribed to a connection offering 100 Mbit/s or more (European Commission,
2013b). Thus, large investments are needed to upgrade the existing broadband net-
works to the desired level. Especially, the deployment of NGANs represents the most
substantial share of these investments.
At the same time, European network operators experience declining revenues and prof-
its facing strong competition by alternative infrastructures and Internet Protocol (IP)-
based services. In particular, former incumbent operators have criticized the current
regulatory regime as heavy-handed and hostile to any investment strategy, portraying
This chapter is based on joint work with Jan Krämer (Krämer and Schnurr, 2014).
11
Chapter 2 A Unified Framework for Open Access Regulation
the European regulatory framework as the underlying root cause for the industry’s bad
performance (ETNO, 2013).
In July 2012, Commissioner Neelie Kroes announced her plan to enhance the broad-
band investment environment signaling her willingness to lighten the regulatory bur-
den. The industry and various analysts have viewed this promise as a paradigm shift
of the European Commission’s stance towards access regulation. While it will likely
not lead to a complete withdrawal of the regulatory framework, the balance between
static and dynamic efficiency goals is going to be readjusted. Addressing the slow up-
take of next-generation networks in Europe compared to Asian countries and the US,
Kroes declared establishing an investment-friendly environment as the primary goal.
While only a year before, the Commission postulated strict unbundling rules based
on cost-based pricing, Kroes now advocated in favor of an approach based on non-
discrimination rules. In addition, she promised to abstain from further price cuts of
wholesale access charges to legacy copper networks and to establish a harmonized sta-
ble price floor across Europe (Kroes, 2012).
The first action of the European Commission in light of this announcement is the recom-
mendation on non-discrimination and costing methodologies, which was published in
September 2013. The recommendation outlines the conditions that would allow Euro-
pean regulators to replace cost-based price regulation with non-discrimination obliga-
tions, even in the presence of significant market power (European Commission, 2013a).
During the consultation process that followed the draft recommendation, discussions
have evolved around the implementation of non-discrimination. Most of all, contrary
views have been stated on what actually defines a level playing field between the in-
cumbent’s subsidiary and competitors, besides a uniform wholesale price. In particu-
lar, network operators oppose an equivalence of input regime, that prescribes equality in
terms of the used infrastructure and processes. Instead they argue in favor of equiva-
lence of output that abstracts from the actual infrastructure and is concerned with equal
functionality. Thus, the debate illustrates the difficulties and conflicts that are hidden
behind the intuitive notion of non-discrimination.
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Previously, in Europe the idea of non-discriminatory access has been discussed under
the notion of Open Access and in the context of public-sector participation (European
Commission, 2009b). It has frequently been stated that OA could provide a balance
between static and dynamic efficiency (e.g., Klumpp and Su, 2010; OECD, 2013). Yet,
OA has been used to describe a very diverse set of access concepts. While there is no
explicit definition given by regulators or legislators, the term has been used in various
contexts of access regulation, state aid and voluntary provision of wholesale access
provision. Despite the widespread use, there is no common understanding of the term
among scholars, regulators and industry practitioners. Therefore, a clarification of the
actual OA notion and the related concept of non-discrimination is needed. In particular,
a structured evaluation of the diverse applications is required in order to allow for
precise policy conclusions that can guide the search for a new European regulatory
framework.
With regard to this ongoing discussion, this chapter is concerned with the application of
OA at the network infrastructure level as well as with current regulatory issues and use
cases that have influenced the European debate. At the same time, the history of OA
as a regulatory remedy goes back for several decades and encompasses applications in
telecommunications, but also in other industries such as the media sector. Policy de-
bates about appropriate access provisions within the US have coined and significantly
shaped the understanding of the OA principle. While covering the details of these his-
toric applications is beyond the scope of this study, information drawn from the US
is included when it can be applied to and interpreted in the European NGAN context.
Moreover, this chapter does not explicitly address the net neutrality controversy (which
is, e.g., surveyed by Krämer et al., 2013) nor a comparison of both concepts (which is,
e.g., discussed by Hogendorn, 2007). However, the proposed framework may serve as
the basis for further refinements and extensions that focus particularly on quality of
service (QoS) characteristics and requirements in access relationships among network
operators as well as between network operators and application services providers. On
top of the telecommunications network infrastructure, digital convergence is likely to
raise new questions whether traditional network concepts should be applied to higher
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layers of the value chain. Therefore, the discussion at the end of this chapter points to
potential applications of OA at the services level of the ICT value chain.
Along these lines, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In Section 2.1
the various notions of OA that were proposed by different stakeholders are presented
and subsequently reconciled into a unified definition. Moreover, a conceptual frame-
work is developed that allows for the classification of the diverse OA application sce-
narios. Based on this classification, in Section 2.2 the extant economic literature is re-
viewed and policy implications are derived for each OA application scenario. Sec-
tion 2.3 relates the various OA applications to each other and presents an overreaching
policy guideline for the OA regulation of NGAN. Finally, Section 2.4 discusses the main
results and identifies possible limitations and extensions.
2.1 The concept of Open Access
There is a fundamental lack in common understanding what actually defines an OA
policy and along which dimensions OA regulation can be structured. For example,
while OA has been used to describe access obligations including price regulation in
the US (Speta, 2000; Farrell and Weiser, 2003), the European Commission’s understand-
ing of OA refers to mandated access in the case of state aid (European Commission,
2013c), and on the other end network operators have put emphasis on voluntary access
(Deutsche Telekom, 2011).
In the following, the definitions of OA proposed by the European Commission, the Ger-
man telecommunications industry, and proponents of the open access network model
are presented. The definitions indicate that there is common ground in referring to
non-discrimination as the central criterion, but they also illustrate that stakeholders
highlight different additional aspects. As mentioned above, these aspects differ with
respect to how open access terms shall be reached (mandated or voluntary), but also
with respect to which access levels of the value chain are concerned and whether the
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notion of OA requires a specific organizational form of the access provider (vertical
separation, public-sector participation).
2.1.1 Open Access in the context of public-sector participation
The emphasis on the European context is founded in the European Commission’s use
of the actual term in the State Aid Guidelines in 2009, thus introducing OA as a legal
criterion that European network operators have to fulfill when they receive state aid
(European Commission, 2009b). Since the European Commission has refrained from
giving an explicit legal definition, various stakeholders have subsequently engaged in
interpretations and new definitions of the term, in particular in the context of public-
sector participation, but also with regard to a potentially larger application scope.
The implicit definition that can be derived from the State Aid Guidelines is summa-
rized by the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC,
2011, p.8):
“The term ‘open access’ [...] refers to mandated wholesale access whereby
operators are offered effective, transparent and non-discriminatory
wholesale-access to the subsidized network(s).”
The notion of non-discrimination is defined in Article 10 of the European Access Direc-
tive and requires equality between the integrated downstream subsidiary and an inde-
pendent retailer as well as between two independent retailers (European Commission,
2002). However, this does not prohibit differentiated access offers in general. In par-
ticular, different prices can be charged if this differentiation is based on objectively jus-
tifiable reasons. The recommendation on non-discrimination explicitly mentions that
volume discounts and/or long-term access pricing can be compatible with the non-
discrimination criterion (European Commission, 2013a). In order to safeguard effective
implementation in the context of such volume discounts, the recommendation stipu-
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lates that favorable conditions to the subsidiary are not allowed to exceed the highest
discount offered to independent downstream firms.
In the US context, OA has been mentioned, on the one hand, in association with state-
owned municipal networks (Lehr et al., 2004), where OA was seen as an instrument to
ensure non-discriminatory access and may be adopted voluntarily or mandated. On
the other hand, OA has frequently been used interchangeably with mandated price-
regulation (Speta, 2000).
2.1.2 Voluntary Open Access
In Germany, OA has played a prominent role in the debate about potential regulatory
regimes governing NGANs. In the context of regional deployment of NGA networks
and in the advent of new business models, OA has been seen as a solution to drive rapid
construction, fast penetration and interoperability. The Federal Network Agency, Ger-
many’s national regulatory authority (NRA), established the “NGA-Forum" with the
goal to promote the standardization of access products which it views as a prerequisite
for symmetric OA. In contrast to the European Commission, which has characterized
OA as mandated wholesale access, network operators here have tried to establish OA
as a concept that relies on the voluntary decision by the particular access provider. A
definition representing the consensus among network operators was presented at the
German IT-Summit (2010, p.4):
“Open Access in FTTB/FTTH-Networks refers to the voluntary, non-
discriminatory access at different levels of the value chain.”
2.1.3 The Open Access network model
Already prior to the State Aid Guidelines, a strand of literature emerged based on a
notion of OA which not only requires non-discrimination, but also functional separa-
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tion between network operators and the services companies. The OA network model
is hereby characterized by the separation of roles between the service provider and the
network owner. Battiti et al. (2005) stipulate the belief that vertical integration of com-
munication networks is the main reason for “high costs of services and barriers of com-
petition" (p.1). While a further economic analysis or elaborated reasoning to back the
hypothesis of hindered innovation due to vertical integration is often neglected, propo-
nents instead point to public infrastructure such as roads in the case of transportation
as a proven benchmark. In their view, a concept relying on mutual control and shared
usage of physical access networks is able to lower costs for deployment and usage of ac-
cess networks, while providing users with a greater choice and service providers with
more freedom (Battiti et al., 2005). This line of argument focuses rather on aspects of
static efficiency of network operations, e.g., fair competition among service providers,
than aspects of dynamic efficiency as actual investment for building networks is be-
lieved to be facilitated by technological innovation, e.g., wireless networks (Bogliolo,
2009). A summarizing definition of OA as viewed by this strand of the literature is
given by Forzati et al. (2010, p.1):
“In the open access network model, the roles of the service provider and
the network owner are separated, and the service providers get access to
network and the end customers on fair and non-discriminatory conditions.”
As can be seen by the manifold definitions, the criterion of non-discrimination is central
to the concept of OA. However, there is a diverse understanding among stakeholders of
how the goal of non-discriminatory access is effectively and efficiently achieved. There-
fore, the definitions differ according to the requirements they postulate and whether
OA should be established as a voluntary or regulated regime.
Based on these insights the following unifying definition is proposed:
Definition 2.1 (Open Access Regulation). Open Access regulation refers to the mandated
or voluntary provision of access to an upstream resource which must be based on the principle
of non-discrimination. The concept may apply to publicly or privately owned access providers
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that are vertically separated, integrated or represent a cooperative of multiple entities. Open
Access regulation usually refers to the network layer, but may also be applied to other layers of
the telecommunications value chain.
Considering this definition, it becomes clear that non-discrimination may be achieved
by various approaches. In fact, even price-regulation can be included as a specific ver-
sion of mandated OA that attempts to implement non-discrimination by setting a reg-
ulated access charge. In the narrow sense, however, Open Access refers to mandated
non-discrimination, where the upstream provider may freely set the terms of access, but
is forced to provide access on a non-discriminatory basis. Thus, following the previ-
ous discussion, the proposed definition also reconciles the different meanings of OA
in Europe and the US. As a consequence, scholars analyzing OA have to be aware of
the large scope that the concept actually comprises and derived implications need to be
explicitly related to a particular application of OA.
2.1.4 A conceptual Open Access framework
In order to allow for the classification of results obtained by the extant economic litera-
ture and in order to be able to derive coherent policy conclusions, a conceptual frame-
work is offered that structures the further analysis of particular OA relationships and
allows for a subsequent comparison of different OA models. The OA classification
framework (Figure 2.1) is based on three dimensions that are deduced from the key
characteristics of the presented definitions and represent the major determinants of ac-
cess relationships in the NGAN context.
The vertical structure denotes how ownership in the access network (the upstream mar-
ket) and activities in the services market (the downstream market) are related. Of
course, the actual degree of integration may not only be defined by common owner-
ship, but also by additional dimensions such as task integration, knowledge integra-
tion and coordination integration (Jaspers and van den Ende, 2006). While being aware
of the fine-granular spectrum of vertical organization models, the subsequent analysis
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is structured by referring to the most relevant cases, i.e., i) an integrated firm that is
also active in the downstream market, ii) a separated wholesaler, or iii) a cooperative
undertaking between several downstream competitors (co-investment).
Ownership denotes the ownership structure and the goals of the access provider that
vary with the influence of the public sector. The access provider may be entirely state-
owned, as in the case of municipal public utilities or public access networks (e.g.,
the Australian National Broadband Network), represent a public-private-partnership
(PPP) or a private-sector, profit-oriented corporation. PPP models again can be differen-
tiated according to the allocation of responsibilities concerning financing, design, con-
struction and operation of the access network (European Commission, 2011). The goals
of the organization according to its ownership structure may range from pure profit-
maximization to non-profit pursuit of public interests. A further differentiation may be
needed in the case of a private network operator specifying whether the firm is subject
to price-regulation or whether it is unconstrained in setting its wholesale prices.
The access level, finally, indicates at which level of the value chain access is given to
downstream competitors. In this vein, the concept is readily applicable to a wide and
diverse set of access relationships. Since the emphasis of this article is on NGANs, the
following analysis is particularly concerned with access levels to “Internet infrastruc-
ture services", i.e., Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers one through three, ac-
cording to the terminology introduced by Jordan (2009). While most incentive-based ar-
guments concerning vertical integration and public ownership apply equally to higher
levels of the Internet value chain, specific characteristics of “Internet application ser-
vices" (Jordan, 2009) need to be considered in addition.1 The set of feasible access op-
tions to network facilities may differ across access technologies (e.g., coaxial, copper,
fiber networks) and depend as well on the network architecture (e.g., point-to-point
and point-to-multipoint). Access may also be granted at different geographical loca-
tions. Moreover, the introduction of QoS and respective traffic classes may increase the
technical and commercial possibilities of further differentiation in access agreements
1Section 2.4 discusses how the framework can also be applied to higher access levels. Chapter 7 presents
an analysis of voluntary (open) access to user and usage data in online content markets.
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between network operators. Eventually, the access level defines the degree of control
and the potential quality differentiation that the access seeker can achieve. Therefore,
this dimension reflects also a well-known concept in telecommunications regulation:
the Ladder of Investment (Cave and Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006a). Figure 2.1 illustrates
potential access levels in the case of a fixed NGAN. A more elaborate discussion of the
Internet layers as well as architectural principles can be found in van Schewick (2010).
Claffy and Clark (2013) point to a further important differentiation when considering
access to (infrastructure) platforms in convergent networks, namely the distinction of
the platform’s intended use (closed vs. open to complementors) and its construction
(single- vs. multi-firm formation). Thus, their framework is especially suited to guide
consistent regulation of emerging specialized or managed services and coexisting open
systems like the Internet that are based on identical physical networks.
FIGURE 2.1: OA classification framework: vertical structure (impact on downstream market),



















Based on these three dimensions bilateral access relationship can be characterized, but
also more complex ventures (as, e.g., proposed by Forzati et al., 2010) can be illus-
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trated by displaying the distinct and potentially heterogeneous individual relation-
ships. Note, however, that access relationships are primarily defined by the vertical
structure and the ownership, whereas the access level defines the spectrum of this par-
ticular relationship. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider the dimensions of vertical
structure and ownership to distinguish four general settings of potential OA applica-
tions (as illustrated by Figure 2.2).
1. Vertically integrated network and services providers that are typically repre-
sented by national incumbents or regional operators of NGANs. In this context,
an obligation to provide non-discriminatory access may be seen as an alterna-
tive instrument to cost-based price regulation. Further discussions have evolved
around the question whether OA could be realized as a voluntary concept.
2. Vertically separated, profit-maximizing network operators including organiza-
tions that were established by vertical separation of formerly integrated operators
(e.g., Openreach in the UK ) and cross-industry entry of companies that are active
in other markets such as energy utilities (e.g., RWE Germany). OA is envisioned
to stimulate wholesale agreements by means of transparency and standardization
resulting as a consequence of the non-discrimination condition.
3. Cooperative undertakings by private-sector organizations including risk- and
network-sharing contracts as well as agreements on geographically complemen-
tary investments. Here, OA may serve as a regulatory tool to govern ex-ante
access to the cooperative or ex-post access to the network.
4. Public-sector participation including local and nation-wide initiatives, state aid,
public outsourcing, and public-private joint-ventures where the physical network
is designed, built and maintained by the public entity while private firms operate
the active network facilities and provide services. In this context OA is usually
seen as an instrument to minimize the distortion of competition by state activity
and is in general stipulated as a mandatory obligation.
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Based on the preceding classification, each of the identified OA applications is assessed
from an economic perspective. To this end, implications for each of the respective forms
of vertical structure and ownership are derived by surveying the extant economic lit-
erature. A particular emphasis is put on the presentation of the prevailing effects that
have been identified by scholars as determinants of static and dynamic efficiency. In
addition, regulatory and legal aspects that follow from particular characteristics of the
access provider are noted. More precisely, the following list comprises the set of effi-
ciency measures and determinants that are used throughout the assessment:
  Static efficiency is measured by social welfare and constituted by allocative and
productive efficiency. Relevant determinants include the presence of transaction
costs, economies of scale and scope, price and non-price discrimination, foreclo-
sure, intensity of competition, and externalities.
  Dynamic efficiency encompasses technological progress and innovation, i.e., im-
provements in productive efficiency, which can be measured by social welfare
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over time (Kolasky and Dick, 2003; Viscusi et al., 2005). The literature on telecom-
munications has employed several proxies in order to quantify dynamic effi-
ciency, such as the magnitude of investments, coverage, innovation, or the ex-
tent of infrastructure-based competition. In vertically related industries these out-
comes are affected by the degree of coordination between upstream and down-
stream segment, and by the prevailing investment incentives of the incumbent as
well as potential entrants.
  Regulatory and legal requirements describe the necessary degree of information and
monitoring capability, accountability, task complexity and effectiveness.
2.2.1 Vertical integration and separation of the access provider
Liberalization in the telecommunications sector was driven by the perception that tele-
phony service and long-distance networks could potentially be served by multiple com-
peting firms. In contrast, the access network was still seen as a natural monopoly by the
consensus opinion. Accordingly, questions concerning vertical separation have mostly
been analyzed by assuming a monopolistic supplier that serves an oligopolistic or com-
petitive downstream market. Addressing doubts about the natural monopoly assump-
tion due to new access technologies (mobile, fixed-wireless), the recent literature on
investment and regulation (see, e.g., Vareda, 2011) and on price discrimination (Inderst
and Valletti, 2009) has extended the conventional model by allowing for potential repli-
cation of the upstream resource through market entry.
In general, the literature can further be distinguished according to whether the up-
stream firm possesses freedom in setting wholesale prices or if prices are set by the reg-
ulator. Particularly, the impact of price regulation on investment incentives has been
thoroughly analyzed by a recent strand of literature. The results and remaining re-
search questions of this literature are covered in a survey by Cambini and Jiang (2009),
and therefore, they are not included in this overview. Further summaries that deal
with specific aspects of the vertical structure in the telecommunications industry can
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be found in Tropina et al. (2010), Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst (2008), Gonçalves
and Nascimento (2010), and Yoo (2002).
Riordan (2008) presents a summary of the major theories explaining benefits and weak-
nesses of vertical integration in terms of static efficiency. It is shown that the percep-
tion about vertical integration as a beneficial or worrying practice has changed repeat-
edly since the 1950s according to the predominant theory at a particular epoche. Ma-
jor insights have been obtained by the structure-conduct-performance theory dealing
with vertical foreclosure and leverage of market power, the Chicago School stipulat-
ing the theories of single monopoly profit and elimination of price markups (Spen-
gler, 1950), Transaction Cost Economics developing the theory of incomplete contracts
(Whinston, 2003), and Post-Chicago Economics by pointing out to incentives on restor-
ing monopoly power (Rey and Tirole, 2007b).
The general question what actually determines firms’ boundaries and the degree of ver-
tical integration is adressed in the first part of an extensive review by Lafontaine and
Slade (2007). The authors present the most prominent theories along with prototypical
analytical models and investigate whether derived predictions are supported by empir-
ical findings. First, there is strong empirical support for the hypotheses derived from
Transaction Cost Economics with regard to backward-integration. High asset speci-
ficity, transaction complexity and uncertainty are identified as drivers of integration
between suppliers and manufacturers. Second, moral-hazard arguments established
by agency theory seem to explain forward-integration between manufacturers and re-
tailers very well, with the exception of the empirically observed negative relationship
between downstream risk and vertical integration. The second part of the survey sum-
marizes the observations made by the empirical literature which has studied the effects
of vertical integration on firms’ performance and on consumer surplus. The obtained
conclusions are included separately hereafter in order to relate the empirical findings
to the respective underlying theoretical concept.
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The Single Monopoly Profit Theorem (SMPT) The theorem stipulates that an up-
stream monopolist will generally not inefficiently leverage its market power to comple-
mentary or downstream markets since it can generate the monopoly profit only once.
Due to the incentive to maximize output of the complementary downstream products,
the monopolist will decide to integrate forward only in the case if the downstream
market is inefficient. However, this conclusion is subject to a number of exceptions as
presented by Farrell and Weiser (2003) and builds on the following assumptions. First,
the monopolist must have the ability to make enforceable multilateral commitments as
shown by the theory of restoring monopoly power (Rey and Tirole, 2007b). Second, the
monopolist must posses sufficient freedom to set wholesale charges in order to extract
the monopoly rent. This is prohibited by most regulatory regimes that implement price
regulation on a cost basis. In fact, it is the goal of regulated industries to prevent the
monopoly profit in the first place. Moreover, the SMPT fails if the upstream monopoly
is under threat itself by potential “two-level entry" and may be protected by foreclosing
the downstream market.
Restoring monopoly power Rey and Tirole (2007b) show that the ability by a monop-
olistic supplier to fully extract the monopoly profit breaks down if the wholesale firm
is unable to commit to multilateral contracts. The monopolist has an incentive to offer
a lower marginal access price to at least one downstream firm while taking a higher
fixed premium. The downstream firm will accept the deal if the competitive advan-
tage of the lower input price outweighs the additional fixed cost. Since downstream
competitors anticipate this incentive to discriminate, the supplier is unable to set the
monopoly price in the first place. The network infrastructure, therefore, exhibits char-
acteristics of a durable good (Coase, 1972). The commitment problem can be resolved
and monopoly power can be restored by the supplier entering the downstream mar-
ket through an own subsidiary. Alternatively, the separated monopolist may circum-
vent the commitment problem by negotiating an exclusive agreement with one of the
downstream firms. Paradoxically, monopoly power may also be restored by regulatory
activity. Rey and Tirole (2007b) show that a non-discrimination criterion (other than a
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most-favored-customer clause) will prohibit the supplier from providing preferential
treatment to a downstream firm and bind the supplier to the uniform (monopolistic)
access charge.
Raising rivals’ costs (RRC) Critics of vertical integration have frequently raised the
concern that a monopolistic supplier that is active in the upstream and downstream
market has an incentive to distort downstream competition by raising rivals’ costs. An
assessment of this anti-competitive behavior has first been conducted by the seminal
work of Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987) and was followed by extensive analysis of
RRC in the context of specific characteristics of network industries. In general, the
integrated firm is able to raise costs either directly via the access charge (price dis-
crimination) or through sabotage in the process of providing the input good (non-price
discrimination). The former approach differs from the latter by the additional direct
income effect for the upstream firm due to a higher wholesale price. In both cases the
integrated firm may benefit from a competitive advantage in the downstream market
derived from lower marginal costs. At the same time, decreasing market shares of in-
dependent retailers will lead to a diminished wholesale profit. Therefore, the decision
to raise rivals’ costs is always associated with a trade-off between upstream and down-
stream profits. In general, the empirical evidence with respect to observed foreclosure
and RRC behavior according to Lafontaine and Slade (2007) is mixed, but there are
several studies that uncover evidence of foreclosure in the case of industries character-
ized by natural monopolies, most notably in Cable TV. However, several studies point
to the fact that efficiency gains due to vertical integration may outweigh the costs of
foreclosure and could therefore benefit consumers through lower prices.
Price discrimination Assessing the incentives and welfare implications of price dis-
crimination in the case of a regulated upstream market, Vickers (1995) shows that the
integrated firm has an anti-competitive incentive to favor its subsidiary. Since entry
in the downstream market is assumed to be costly in terms of duplication costs, it is
concluded that price discrimination may also have a positive effect on total welfare by
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reducing inefficient entry. Likewise, Reitzes and Woroch (2009) find that the integrated
input monopolist will engage in price discrimination against downstream rivals. How-
ever, the integrated monopolist may also set an input price above marginal cost to its
downstream affiliate.
For an unregulated industry, the ability to discriminate in wholesale prices leads to con-
trary results depending on whether upstream firm faces the threat of demand-side sub-
stitution. DeGraba (1990) shows that under the assumption of an unconstrained mo-
nopolist, the more efficient downstream firm is optimally charged higher input prices.
However, with respect to dynamic efficiency a ban of price discrimination increases in-
vestment incentives of retail firms. When introducing the possibility for demand-side
substitution these results are reversed (Inderst and Valletti, 2009). In particular, more
efficient firms receive a discount compared to their less efficient competitors. Thereby,
price discrimination hurts consumers in the short-run, but improves investment incen-
tives, thus creating long-run benefits.
Non-price discrimination The literature on sabotage distinguishes between cost rais-
ing strategies that increase rivals’ per-unit costs on top of the wholesale rental charge,
and degradation of quality that lowers the demand of downstream competitors (Brito
et al., 2012). Under a linear demand structure cost-raising and demand-reducing sabo-
tage are indistinguishable (Reitzes and Woroch, 2009). Examples of non-price discrim-
ination include poor quality of interconnection, delay in processing orders, creation
of incompatibility, bundling of complements (Economides, 1998), or preferential treat-
ment of affiliated content (Brito et al., 2012).
Incentives for sabotage emerge only in the presence of binding input price regulation
(Beard et al., 2001; Reitzes and Woroch, 2009) and in the case that downstream firms
can reap profits, i.e., that the downstream market is not perfectly competitive (Mandy,
2000). If prices are regulated, the input monopolist has to weigh higher downstream
profits against lost upstream earnings when deciding whether to engage in non-price
discrimination. While raising rivals’ cost will lead to an increase in downstream prices
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and higher output by the integrated affiliate, the reduced market share of independents
will reduce the demand for input (Economides, 1998). The theoretical literature has
shown that while in most cases the integrated firm has an incentive to discriminate,
there are exceptions in particular settings.
The results of the many theoretical models developed by scholars differ according to
some key modelling decisions and assumptions about the market structure. As sum-
marized by Mandy (2000), the incentive to discriminate is altered by the downstream
market structure (degree of product differentiation, costs of sabotage to the perpetrator,
presence of scale economies, relative efficiency of competitors, competition intensity),
characteristics of the upstream segment (upstream margin, potential upstream competi-
tion), and the model of the integrated firm (separated or common profit maximization).
Some key results are highlighted in the following.
Economides (1998) stipulates that the sum of the three described income effects in-
curred by non-price discrimination is generally positive, and that the monopolist raises
costs until competitors are forced out of business. According to this model, the result
remains unaffected by a cost advantage or disadvantage of the monopolist’s subsidiary
compared to independent downstream firms.
Mandy (2000) concludes that the integrated monopolist abstains from sabotage if a) the
downstream market is competitive (low degree of double marginalization), b) there is
a sufficient upstream profit margin, and c) the monopolist’s subsidiary is substantially
less efficient compared to its competitors. Referring to the latter aspect, Weisman and
Kang (2001) highlight that the incentive to discriminate is most pronounced in the sit-
uation where integration is highly efficient. Thus, the regulator is presented with the
challenge to choose between productive and allocative efficiency. Symmetric considera-
tions hold for the upstream market: If the monopolist would be required to decrease its




In the case that the upstream monopolist integrates forward and represents a new en-
trant into the downstream market, Sibley and Weisman (1998) stipulate that for initially
low market shares, the integrated firm has no incentive to raise rivals’ costs. Analyz-
ing the impact of downstream competition, Mandy and Sappington (2007) confirm the
stated results for cost raising strategies in quantity-setting (Cournot) and price-setting
(Betrand) competition, as well as cost raising sabotage in quantity-setting competition,
but find opposing results for quality reducing behavior in price-setting competition.
Brito et al. (2012) analyze quality degradation in the presence of product differentiation.
The authors show that the integrated firm has an incentive to discriminate, if the com-
petitor provides an inferior product compared to its own subsidiary and the upstream
margin is sufficiently low. They further show that a disparity in quality and low access
prices may also lead to discrimination in the separation case, since the upstream firm
benefits from a larger market share of firms that produce superior quality products.
With regard to regulated upstream prices, the integrated firm has an unambiguous in-
centive to discriminate if the access charge is set equal to marginal costs of providing the
input (Sibley and Weisman, 1998; Kondaurova and Weisman, 2003; Reitzes and Woroch,
2009). Obviously, the monopolist will engage in sabotage since there are no opportu-
nity costs in terms of lost wholesale profits. Only in the case of price competition this
result may be reversed (Mandy and Sappington, 2007).
Reitzes and Woroch (2009) highlight the fact that pricing parity in the form of cost-based
regulation incentivizes the upstream firm to provide excessive quality to its integrated
affiliate, allowing it to charge higher access fees to its downstream competitors while
degrading their input quality.
Double marginalization A well known beneficial effect of integration in terms of con-
sumer and total welfare is the elimination of markups that may exist in a vertically
separated industry. Except for the case of a perfectly competitive downstream mar-
ket, double marginalization leads to the contraction of output and higher retail prices
29
Chapter 2 A Unified Framework for Open Access Regulation
if price discrimination is difficult. In contrast, if the upstream monopolist is able to dis-
criminate, e.g., by two-part tariffs, no double marginalization occurs, but at the costs of
full monopoly profits. Under integration, i.e., common ownership, the subsidiary will
consider the actual upstream production costs instead of the access price as marginal
costs (Brito et al., 2012). Thus, double marginalization is also prevented in the case of
linear tariffs (Riordan, 2008).
Economies of scale and scope Proponents of vertical integration point out that sep-
aration prohibits the exploitation of substantial economies of scale and scope. In fact,
empirical analyses in adjacent network industries have obtained mixed results. While
other utility industries may have rather different technological characteristics and the
magnitude of efficiencies may depend on the historical development of the sector, they
share the necessity of high sunk upfront investment costs in the upstream market that
have to be geared to the needs of the downstream services. In a conceptual comparison
of the vertical structure in infrastructure sectors Pittman (2003) discusses the respec-
tive magnitude of vertical economies, but concludes that rapid technological change in
the telecommunications sector complicates the formulation of a universal hypothesis
about the extent of these efficiencies. Thus, in the light of the following ambivalent
empirical results obtained for other infrastructure industries, one should abstain from
a per se hypothesis that vertical economies are exceedingly high in general. Kwoka
(2002), finds evidence for economies of scope in the US electricity sector. In particular,
economies of coordination between generation and distribution are identified as the
main drivers of integration. These findings are in accordance with the early work of
Kaserman and Mayo (1991) and similar results were replicated for the Spanish electric-
ity market (Jara-Dıaz et al., 2004). However, it is further shown by Kwoka that there are
potential instruments besides integration to achieve effective coordination. In particu-
lar, holding companies above a certain size can adequately substitute the coordination
function of the integrated firm. In contrast to these studies, Nemoto and Goto (2004)
find almost no economies of vertical integration for a set of Japanese utilities, while
Garcia et al. (2007) show that no significant technological integration economies can be
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observed in a sample of the US water industry. Lafontaine and Slade (2007) report on
the results of four studies that have investigated the effect of mandated separation in
the gasoline refining and sales industry. They find an unambiguous negative impact
on consumer surplus through higher costs and prices. Based on a conceptual analy-
sis, De Bijl (2005) argues that separated operators face higher financing costs due to
a lower scale compared to the integration scenario. Crandall and Sidak (2002) argue
that mandated separation will create arbitrary and artificial boundaries that lead to
inherently inefficient organizations. Furthermore, they refer to the indivisibility of in-
tangible assets such as customer loyalty and goodwill. Additional costs are induced
when separation is imposed on an initially integrated firm. Functional as well as own-
ership separation require costly structural reorganizations and the redesign of business
processes (Cave, 2006b).
Dynamic incentives Several scholars have argued that a lack of coordination has a
negative impact on the efficiency of investments (De Bijl, 2005; Crandall and Sidak,
2002; Tropina et al., 2010). In a more differentiated analysis, Iossa and Stroffolini (2012)
show that integration is particularly beneficial when little demand information is avail-
able, infrastructure cost is low, or investment is highly risky. Moreover, Crandall et al.
(2010) has stated that separation creates a hold-up problem due to the inability to spec-
ify complete contracts. In contrast, Cadman (2010) argues that the hold-up problem is
resolved by a sufficiently competitive downstream market.
Farrell and Katz (2000) have shown that integrated firms may have an incentive to
engage in an “investment squeeze", forcing downstream competitors to engage in ex-
cessive investments. In fact, investment incentives in the downstream market may be
strengthened by vertical separation. Since firms expect less discriminatory behavior in
this case, perceived uncertainty is reduced and relationship-specific investment may be
increased (Cadman, 2010).
With respect to the incentive to duplicate infrastructure, the consensus indicates that
separation will diminish the incentives for future entry in the upstream market (De Bijl,
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2005; Tropina et al., 2010). To some degree, this can be seen as the consequence of
mitigated incentives for anti-competitive behavior by the upstream monopolist.
Regulatory and legal aspects The literature has described several advantages of ver-
tical separation from a regulatory perspective. The break-up into two separate or-
ganizations increases transparency, therefore making it significantly easier to oversee
the behavior of the upstream monopolist (Cadman, 2010; Pittman, 2003). Moreover,
the separation of business activities prevents distortion of competition through cross-
subsidization. Even in the case of vertical integration, the ability to impose separation
alone can be an effective instrument to motivate the monopolist to adapt its behavior
to regulatory rules (De Bijl, 2005). On the other hand, the decision to impose separation
may be approached with caution. Due to the high costs of separation, the process is
considered to be irreversible (Teppayayon and Bohlin, 2010). Especially in the case of
high uncertainty about the outcome of separation, regulators should therefore abstain
from mandated separation.
Implications Static efficiency effects in integrated telecommunications industries
have been thoroughly examined by the economic literature. Integrated operators are
shown to benefit from economies of scale and scope as well as low information costs
between the retail and wholesale division. The inherent incentive to price-discriminate
has traditionally been countered with regulating wholesale prices, which in turn raises
the issue of non-price discrimination, e.g., by raising rivals’ costs through sabotage. At
the same time the implementation of regulatory control is faced with imperfect infor-
mation.
OA, in the narrow sense, may represent an opportunity to take a first step towards
deregulation by abstaining from price regulation. Non-discrimination obligations may
facilitate regulatory monitoring by equivalence of input conditions or more easily ob-
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TABLE 2.1: Summary - Vertical Integration & Separation.
Description Int. Sep. Description & References
Static efficiency
Double Marginalization (+) (–) The subsidiary of an integrated firm considers the actual marginal
costs of upstream production (Riordan, 2008; Brito et al., 2012).
Restoring monopoly power (–) (0/–) Through integration the upstream monopolist can overcome its
commitment problem. (Rey and Tirole, 2007b).
Price discrimination (0/–) (0/–) In the absence of regulation, integrated firms may have incentives
to engage in a price squeeze (Vickers, 1995; Farrell and Katz, 2000;
Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). Under separation this anticompeti-
tive incentive is eliminated, however, an uncontested upstream
monopolist will charge more efficient firms a higher price. (De-
Graba, 1990; Inderst and Valletti, 2009).
Non-price discrimination (0/–) (0) In the case of price-regulation, the integrated operator is likely to
distort downstream competition, but particular exceptions exist
(inter alia: Economides (1998); Mandy (2000); Brito et al. (2012)).
Economies of scale (0/+) (–) Larger scale decreases financing costs (De Bijl, 2005).
Economies of scope (0/+) (–) Empirical evidence of scope advantages in the electricity indus-
try (Kwoka, 2002; Jara-Dıaz et al., 2004). Contrary results in the
case of Japanes utilities (Nemoto and Goto, 2004) and the water
industry (Garcia et al., 2007).
Separation costs (0) (–) Redesign of business processes (Cave, 2006b). Artificial bound-
aries lead to inefficient organizations (Crandall and Sidak, 2002).
Dynamic efficiency
Coordination of investments (+) (0/–) A lack of coordination may lead to inefficient investment (De Bijl,
2005; Crandall and Sidak, 2002)
Hold-up problem (+) (0/–) Separation and incomplete contracts lead to opportunistic ex-post
behavior delaying investments (Crandall et al., 2010). Resolved
by a sufficiently competitive downstream market (Cadman, 2010).
Investment squeeze (–) (0) Integrated firms may force downstream competitors to engage in
excessive innovation (Farrell and Katz, 2000).
Upstream investment incen-
tives
(+/–) (–) Ambivalent effects under integration (Cambini and Jiang, 2009).
Reduced incentives for infrastructure-based competition in the
case of separation (Tropina et al., 2010; De Bijl, 2005).
Downstream investment in-
centives
(–) (+) Trust induced by separation decreases perceived uncertainty
(Cadman, 2010).
Regulation
Transparency (–) (+) Separation facilitates regulatory oversight (Cadman, 2010;
Pittman, 2003; Economides, 1998) and prevents cross-
subsidization (De Bijl, 2005).
Coercion (0) (+) The regulator’s ability to impose separation can be used as coer-
cive instrument (De Bijl, 2005).
Irreversibility (0) (–) The decision to separate can not be reversed ex-post, while effects
may be uncertain ex-ante (Teppayayon and Bohlin, 2010).
Note: The signs (+), (0), and (–) qualitatively indicate the consensus of the surveyed literature on whether the issue has
a positive, neutral, or negative impact, respectively, on the efficiency goals or the regulatory and legal requirements.
For instance, the first row indicates that static efficiency is increased (decreased) due to double marginalization under
integration (separation). (+/–) points to contradictory theories or evidence while (0/+) or (0/–) represent intermediate
measures. This notation applies equally to the subsequent tables.
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tained benchmarks for margin squeeze tests.2 Moreover, imposing OA in the case of an
integrated access provider can potentially increase the transparency of wholesale offers
and prices, therefore lowering transaction costs for wholesale agreements and entry
barriers to service-based competition. However, further research is needed in order to
decide whether particular OA implementations can contain opportunistic behavior by
the integrated operator.
Ensuring OA by imposing separation of upstream from downstream activities repre-
sents an effective instrument to counter non-price discrimination by removing the un-
derlying incentives to discriminate against particular downstream firms and by sim-
plifying regulatory oversight. However, the regulator has to be aware that these gains
come at the costs of double marginalization, increased transaction costs, substantial
separation costs, and diseconomies of scale.
The literature on dynamic efficiency points to ambivalent effects with respect to up-
stream investment incentives. Further research is expected in this area in order to clar-
ify and quantify particular investment incentives. For instance, the coordination of
investments by internalizing incentives of the downstream market is generally stated
as a strong argument in favor of integration. However, this proposition may have to
be reevaluated in the context of NGANs. Due to a layered architecture founded on
the universal IP standard and the perception that fiber technology will not present an
“innovation bottleneck” soon, the negative impact on innovation may not be that sub-
stantial in the short term.
2.2.2 Co-investment
Bourreau et al. (2012a) present a brief summary of the advantages and disadvantages
of co-investment. Accordingly, cost-sharing and risk-sharing rules have the potential
to increase NGAN coverage and enhance consumer surplus. They point out that the
2See Chapter 4 for a theoretical and Chapter 6 for an experimental analysis of margin squeeze tests in the
context of infrastructure and wholesale competition.
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frequently mentioned benefits of cost sharing are directly associated with sharing the
subsequent revenues. Therefore, the business case of the particular investment project
does not improve, unless the co-investment approach leads to more product differenti-
ation in the downstream market, subsequently inducing a demand expansion effect.
Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) characterize risk-sharing as an alternative to regulatory
instruments such as cost-based price-regulation (more specifically long-run incremen-
tal costs (LRIC)), fully distributed costs regulation, and regulatory holidays. In the case
that there is no access regulation or risk-sharing agreement, no access to the down-
stream market is provided to the entrant ex-post. Risk-sharing is found to induce the
strongest degree of competition compared to all other regulatory regimes and to attain
a higher level of investment than the LRIC approach.
Rey and Tirole (2007a) discuss different rules that govern the access to cooperative
undertakings for future entrants. In particular, they compare the models of non-
discriminatory and fully discriminatory cooperatives. While the former allows later
members to join an existent cooperative and use the established infrastructure by pay-
ing a cost-based access charge, the latter charges an entry fee in addition to the access
charge. It is shown that investment is discouraged by an “open access" policy since
future entry will marginalize profits to zero. In contrast, investment is encouraged by
a “closed access" model, but at the same time, excessive restriction of access leads to a
suboptimal outcome from a welfare standpoint. Therefore, Rey and Tirole conclude
that the access model involves the essential characteristics of the trade-off between
static and dynamic efficiency (see, e.g., Gayle and Weisman, 2007). In order to im-
prove social welfare, the authors suggest to either constrain the market power of closed
cooperatives or to give open cooperatives an instrument to protect their investment
partially.
Krämer and Vogelsang (2016) investigate collusive behavior in cost-sharing undertak-
ings in an experimental setup. The authors find that co-investment affects retail prices
by two contrary effects with a similar magnitude. On the one hand, co-investment in-
creases prices by facilitating tacit collusion in downstream markets. On the other hand,
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reduced investment costs due to co-investment are passed on to consumers. Moreover,
the communication between firms, a necessary prerequisite to co-investment, is found
to have a positive impact on investment.
Inderst and Peitz (2012) show that ex-ante access contracts reduce the incentive to du-
plicate infrastructure, but increase the area that is covered by at least one network com-
pared to investment under ex-post contracts. At the same time, they show that reduced
duplication allows the access provider to engage in price discrimination against inde-
pendent downstream firms under the general assumption that aggregate demand of
the market is price-dependent. Consumers are therefore harmed by potentially higher
downstream prices, but may benefit from ex-ante contracts making investment prof-
itable in the first place. The authors also mention that ex-ante contracts will naturally
mitigate the hold-up problem, since the ex-ante commitment prohibits ex-post haggling
by the access seeker.
Bourreau et al. (2013) agree that ex-ante cooperative agreements can potentially in-
crease coverage, but qualify these results subject to particular conditions. The authors
show that the results hold only in the presence of a demand-expansion effect, high
cost savings from joint investment or a combination of both. While the former may
be induced by high service differentiation the latter is especially pronounced in the
case of high uncertainty. Under mandated access regulation, investment incentives are
reduced since the agreement to an ex-ante contract is now presented with a forgone
option in the future. As in the case of unilateral investment, coverage decreases with
lower access prices. On the contrary, under a voluntary access regime, coverage is in-
creased at the cost of a less competitive downstream market.
Implications In summary, the literature indicates that the cooperative undertakings
face a similar trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency with regard to access as
in the case of unilateral investment. The introduction of a temporal dimension, how-
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TABLE 2.2: Summary - Co-investment.
Effect Description & References
Static efficiency
Cost reduction (+) Instrument to lower financing costs, lower up-front
costs per operator but joint production may exhibit dis-
economies of scale (Bourreau et al., 2013).
Collusion (–) Experimental evidence of tacit price collusion (Krämer
and Vogelsang, 2016).
Downstream Competition (+/–) Multiple firms in downstream market while avoiding du-
plication and regulation, ex-ante contracts can be used to
dampen competition (Inderst and Peitz, 2012).
Dynamic efficiency
Uncertainty (+) Spreading overall risk facilitates investment (Bourreau
et al., 2013).
Investment incentives (+/0) Strong incentives for closed cooperatives, weak incentives
for open cooperatives (Rey and Tirole, 2007a). Ex-ante con-
tracts increase coverage and decrease duplication (Inderst
and Peitz, 2012). Coverage only increases if there exists a
demand expansion effect (Bourreau et al., 2013).
ever, may present opportunities to balance this trade-off. The regulator may prescribe
(open) access ex-ante, i.e., before the investment, but not ex-post. The results obtained
by Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) point towards this direction, but need further assess-
ment and robustness tests in more general settings (Inderst and Peitz, 2012). In par-
ticular, this raises the question about adequate parameters to balance this trade-off in
the context of co-investment. For instance, what would be the necessary number of
co-investment participants to secure downstream competition while abstaining from
access regulation. This is related to the more general issue currently debated in Eu-
ropean mobile telecommunications market: What is the minimum number of market
participants that is necessary to establish a competitive market? This latter question is
addressed in Chapter 6.
The context of cooperation opens the analysis to a broader behavioral evaluation. The
results obtained by Krämer and Vogelsang (2016) point to several effects that are ne-
glected by theoretical models. This includes especially the analysis of tacit and implicit
collusion during the investment phase and the setting of downstream prices. Identi-
fying the behavioral cause of particular effects may also present new approaches to
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support regulatory practice. For example, the significant impact of communication it-
self suggests that improving coordination of investments besides the formation of joint
undertakings may already increase dynamic efficiency. Going further, behavioral ap-
proaches may not only be suited to identify these effects, but facilitate the design of
instruments to govern the interactions as will be shown in Chapter 5.
2.2.3 Public-sector participation
In order to provide a brief introduction into the vast literature on the general role of
public-ownership, this sections commences with a reference to an overview of the fun-
damental theories established within and a summary of several empirical surveys on
the observed effects of public ownership. Thereupon, two more specific issues that have
been related to OA and the deployment of NGANs are reviewed, namely the activities
of municipalities and the formation of PPPs.
Summarizing the fundamental insights of the economic literature on private and state
ownership, Shleifer (1998) concludes that private ownership should be the preferred
option whenever innovation or cost efficiency represent major criteria. The static per-
spective and the exclusive concern about prices of state ownership deteriorate dynamic
incentives and endanger social welfare in the long-run. Instead, government contract-
ing and regulation are qualified as suitable instruments to ensure public goals that
avoid an excessive role of the state sector. Moreover, Shleifer (1998) refers to the re-
sults presented by the public choice theory which highlight the adverse incentives for
government and administration officials under state ownership.
Megginson and Netter (2001) survey the empirical literature on privatization and the
relative performance of privately owned firms compared to state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). Based on studies from numerous countries, which employ different method-
ological approaches, the authors are able to offer a number of general and robust con-
clusions. The empirical literature largely confirms that “privately owned firms are more
efficient and more profitable than otherwise comparable state-owned firms" (Meggin-
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son and Netter, 2001, p.380). Furthermore, the consensus is that privatization leads
to an improved operating and financial performance of former SOEs. Particularly, out-
put, efficiency, profitability and capital investment spending increases in non-transition
economies, while leverage significantly decreases.
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) contribute to the empirical evidence that state-owned
firms are significantly less profitable than privately owned firms. The dataset is based
on Fortune magazine’s list of the 500 largest firms worldwide in the timespan from 1975
to 1995. 147 of the 1369 firm-years sample are for government-owned firms, which are
mainly located in Europe. Interestingly, in a survey of privatization procedures no evi-
dence is found that the actual transfer of ownership leads to an increase in profitability.
In fact, profitability is primarily increased prior to privatization, while afterwards no
significant increase can be observed. This points to a structural transformation of the
organization, conducted in advent of privatization, as the actual source of improved
profitability.
Examining the privatization of national telecommunication companies, Bortolotti et al.
(2002) provide specific empirical evidence for the telecommunications sector based on a
global sample of 31 firms in 25 countries. The data set includes full and partial privati-
zations through public share offerings from 1981 and 1998. In line with the results of the
general empirical literature on privatization, significant improvements of financial and
operating performance are found. Efficiency gains are explained by better incentives
and productivity, while significant cost reductions are also the dominant reason for in-
creased profitability. Again, these improvements cannot solely be attributed to owner-
ship change in most cases, but are also related to accompanying regulatory changes.
In an empirical study of US municipal utilities, Gillett et al. (2006) investigate the de-
terminants that induce these utilities to expand their operations into telecommunica-
tions services. The ability to exploit economies of scope stemming from the provision
of internal communications services, and the location in markets with limited existing
competition are found to be significant variables that lead a municipal electric to enter
the telecommunications market. In contrast, rules that aim to impede municipal entry
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are found to be effective in reducing municipal activity. The finding that rural areas are
less likely to be served by a municipal utility is linked to substantial backhaul costs as
a constraining factor. Due to the ambiguous impact of demographic variables, Gillett
et al. (2006) conclude that the motivation of municipal utilities differs from private or-
ganizations. In particular, municipal supply may be motivated by the economic devel-
opment of financially less attractive areas. Next to their empirical results, the authors
stipulate several arguments in favor of a municipal approach: Utilities are depicted as
early adopters that can accelerate the growth of NGANs and may represent a supe-
rior governance mechanism compared to regulation of a private network operator, if
infrastructure-based competition is in fact infeasible.
Ford (2007) presents empirical support for the hypothesis that public investment in
communications networks stimulates entry of private telecommunications firms, as op-
posed to crowding out private activity. The survey is based on a set of municipalities in
the state of Florida, USA, of which a subset provides electricity and in some cases com-
munications services. Private activity is measured by the number of competitive local
exchange carrierss (CLECs) that are active in the particular market. While the pres-
ence of public supply (electricity only) is associated with a lower number of private
communications firms, the provision of communications services by the municipality
increases the activity in the communications sector above the levels of cities that abstain
from self-supply and municipals that provide electricity.
Using a comprehensive dataset that covers the US market from 1998 to 2002, Hauge
et al. (2008) investigate market characteristics that may promote entry by municipal
telecommunications providers relative to the motivation that may induce entry by
CLECs. Based on their empirical analysis, the authors reject the hypothesis that mu-
nicipal providers base their entry decision solely on expected profits. Interestingly, this
is contrary to what the authors find with respect to CLECs. While CLECs are more
likely to be located in urban areas with higher income and higher revenue possibil-
ity, municipal providers tend to serve complementary areas with higher cost structures
and characteristics that predict lower demand. On the other hand, the results indi-
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cate a positive, but insignificant relationship between CLEC market participation and
the presence of a municipal provider. Hence, the crowding out hypothesis, that the
presence of a municipal provider impedes entry by a CLEC, cannot be rejected. In con-
clusion, the authors imply that municipalities do not represent a significant competitive
threat to CLECs and do not impede private market entry.
Troulos and Maglaris (2011), in a qualitative survey of local broadband strategies in
Europe, highlight the ability of municipal initiatives to stimulate demand for NGANs.
The deployment of Metropolitan Area Networks connecting public institutions, imple-
mentation of e-Government services, price subsidization, and strengthened civil partic-
ipation are presented as public instruments to boost network rollout. The role of munic-
ipal broadband as a complementary provider of basic infrastructure in rural areas and
as a stimulator of private investments is emphasized. In line with Gillett et al. (2006),
utilities which can exploit economies of scope are shown to be a major driver for the de-
cision to provide municipal communications services. Supplementary, European-wide
subsidies are seen as a public instrument to resolve the fragmentation and heterogene-
ity created by municipal approaches. Moreover, accompanying state aid regulation
may introduce neutrality as the central principle for supply of access network. On the
other hand, the authors mention the discouraging effect of state-owned network in-
frastructure on duplication incentives, crowding out private investment at the physical
infrastructure level.
In a meta-analysis, Hodge and Greve (2007) review the effectiveness of PPPs, in particu-
lar, long-term infrastructure contracts with a focus on Europe. The analysis is preceded
by a criticism of the extant literature, which highlights the lack of an actual evalua-
tion of PPPs and calls for more empirical analysis which objectively quantifies costs
and gains of such collaborations. Previous studies provide contradictory evidence on
the performance of PPPs, raising doubts whether promised benefits of PPPs can ac-
tually be delivered in practice. Moreover, the results suggest that sector-specific vari-
ables have a substantial impact on the performance results. This gives rise to concerns
about the accountability in PPPs, due to limited transparency, complexity of the negoti-
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ated deals and restricted public participation. In addition, administrative and political
decision makers are incentivized by short-term gains, while long term contracts asso-
ciated with infrastructure projects limit the future flexibility to rectify mistakes or to
adapt to a changing environment. With regard to these issues, the authors highlight
the importance of different organizational structures and the allocation of responsibil-
ity. The cross-country analysis indicates that PPPs in the UK and the Netherlands are
implemented as top-down approaches, whereas undertakings in the North European
countries and Germany are organized in a more decentralized way.
Gómez-Barroso and Feijóo (2010) summarize the historical and current debate about
the respective roles of the public and the private sector in the telecommunications do-
main in their conceptual classification of recent contributions to the debate on private-
public interplay. The authors state that public activity in the telecommunications in-
dustry is supported, although not demanded by the consensus of modern economic
schools, due to the presence of market failures. The hypothesis that markets are in any
case superior with regard to static efficiency is rejected, and instead, a pragmatic logic
(Linder and Rosenau, 2000) is endorsed: PPPs should be considered whenever require-
ments differ from obviously private or public responsibilities. At the same time, the
authors are cautious about the performance of PPPs, referring to the results by Rose-
nau (2000) that PPPs display weaknesses in the long-run and by Yescombe (2011) that
PPPs introduce additional complexity.
Developing a theoretical model of incomplete contracts, Hart (2003) draws the conclu-
sion that PPPs should be preferred over individual outsourcing contracts, whenever
it is difficult to specify the quality of the infrastructure, but easy to specify the qual-
ity of the services. Since a PPP internalizes the operational expenditures, it engages in
higher productive investment, reducing these costs, but also in excessive unproductive
investment. In the opposite case, when infrastructure quality is easily specified, public
outsourcing yields superior results, since it avoids unproductive investment. In conclu-
sion, Hart emphasizes the role of contracting costs and criticizes the general perception
that the private sector represents a cheaper source of financing than the state.
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Based on a conceptual analysis, Given (2010) studies the reinvigorated role of the public
sector and the impact of PPPs in the Australian and New Zealand telecommunications
sectors. He finds that the proposed PPPs in telecommunications are not motivated by
conventional reasons such as private financing and expertise, but rather by the willing-
ness to assert the pursuit of the public interest. Thus, the drastic steps of separation and
nationalization are consequences of the concession that regulation as well as functional
separation have proven to be insufficient instruments in ensuring public goals.
Implications Participation of the public sector in its various forms can boost cover-
age and speed of network deployment. However, well-known concerns about cost
efficiency, complexity and imperfect information should restrict the scope of public ac-
tivity. Local initiatives and bottom-up approaches are likely to reduce these mentioned
concerns. Moreover, municipal activity is capable of stimulating demand and extend-
ing the scope of viable investment cases due to the consideration of societal spill-over
effects.
Besides the role as a financing facilitator, the public entity is likely to achieve its high-
est potential at the civil infrastructure level. Since civil infrastructure costs represent
the largest share of total costs (Hoernig et al., 2012), exploiting economies of scope by
providing infrastructure such as ducts can reduce deployment costs significantly.
Mandated OA, as stipulated in the European State Aid Guidelines, can help to keep
distortion of competition through the crowding-out effect at a minimum. In the context
of state-owned access networks, the Australian case will give an indication whether OA
can represent an effective alternative to regulation by ensuring the public interest while
promoting efficient service-based competition on a neutral basis. However, while di-
rect public control may facilitate the implementation of non-discriminatory access, the
literature raises concerns about the adverse incentives of public decision makers and
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TABLE 2.3: Summary - Public-sector participation.
Effect Description & References
Static efficiency
Economies of scope (+) Utilities that provide internal communications infrastruc-
ture are more likely to expand their services (Gillett et al.,
2006).
Economies of scale (–) Municipal approaches are unlikely to serve rural areas due
to backhaul costs (Gillett et al., 2006).
Cost efficiency (–) Private ownership is superior in containing costs (Shleifer,
1998). State-owned firms are found to be significantly less
profitable (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Bortolotti et al.,
2002).
Dynamic efficiency
Stimulation of demand (+) Municipal initiatives can stimulate demand (Gómez-
Barroso and Feijóo, 2010).
Crowding-out effect (+/–) Municipal utilities substitutes private market entry (Gillett
et al., 2006). Number of CLECs increases if a munici-
pal provides communications services (Ford, 2007). Mu-
nicipal providers serve complementary areas relative to
CLECs (Hauge et al., 2008).
Quickness of deployment (+/0) Public utilities may serve as early adopters (Troulos and
Maglaris, 2011).
Viability of investment (+) Public investors take into account spill-over effects to ad-
jacent industries (Troulos and Maglaris, 2011).
Hold-up problem (+) Anticipation of the long-term socio-economic benefits
(Troulos and Maglaris, 2011).
Innovation (–) State ownership neglects dynamic incentives (Shleifer,
1998).
Regulation
Neutrality (+) State aid rules as a regulatory instrument to mandate non-
discrimination (Troulos et al., 2010; Troulos and Maglaris,
2011).
Accountability (–) Limited transparency and public participation (Hodge
and Greve, 2007).
Public interest (+/–) State ownership as an instrument to ensure public goals
representing an alternative to regulation (Given, 2010).
Adverse incentives of government and administrative of-
ficials (Shleifer, 1998).




a lack of transparency and accountability in collaborations between state and private
organizations.
2.3 Policy guideline
Up to now the discussion was concerned with the specific effects of a single OA ap-
plication. Based on these results, this section addresses how the presented applications
relate to each other. The preceding survey of the economic literature has shown that de-
cision makers face multiple trade-offs when deciding for a particular regulatory regime.
Therefore, in the context of NGANs, regulators are required to implicitly or explicitly
weigh conflicting goals. Figure 2.3 illustrates the decision process proposed to assist
regulators in choosing the most appropriate policy instrument, given their primary ob-
jective, observed market conditions, and their experience from previously implemented
approaches. Rectangles represent the different regulatory scenarios and diamonds rep-
resent the key questions that policy makers must evaluate in order to determine the
next steps and measures in the regulatory decision process. In this vein, the proposed
policy guideline allows for an assessment of the transition between regulatory regimes
when objects are not satisfactorily fulfilled, new problems or technological advance-
ments arise, or the relative order of goals is reevaluated.
In order to make transparent where the identified trade-offs are discussed in the lit-
erature, references to representative articles are indicated at the respective decision
branches. Moreover, it is highlighted whether these articles are overviews or whether
they are based on conceptual, theoretical, or empirical analysis. Since the guideline is
derived mainly from the findings within the economic literature, its scope is necessarily
incomplete and policy advice has to take into account complementary legal and tech-
nical considerations. Nevertheless, a visual representation and a predefined structure
of the decision process, as laid out in the following, may also facilitate the interdisci-
plinary discourse between stakeholders.
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FIGURE 2.3: Recommended policy guideline for OA regulation of NGANs.
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The starting point of the proposed policy guideline is the regulatory status quo, which
may either be constituted by an existing regulatory framework that is potentially to
be replaced or complemented, or by an entirely unregulated industry where new rules
are implemented based on a greenfield approach. Given a status quo, an evaluation
of whether the existing legal and regulatory framework contributes to desireable sec-
tor performance is required in the first place. Policy makers will only be willing to
make changes if there is potential room for improvement. The ensuing question of
what can and what needs to be done is the underlying question that is addressed by
the guideline. In any case, it needs to be verified whether (given the status quo) regu-
latory intervention is (still) justified at all. This is generally deemed not to be the case
if infrastructure or facility-based competition (FBC) is deemed feasible in the relevant
time horizon. This would also imply that the essential facility doctrine does not hold
(Renda, 2010), or in the case of Europe, that the three-criteria-test will fail. In these
cases, deregulation has been suggested to be the optimal choice rather than continued
regulation (Cave, 2006a; Vogelsang, 2013).3
Given the need for regulation, policy makers must now select their primary objective.
This may either be to promote competition (on existing network infrastructure) or to
promote investment into new network infrastructure. Although some scholars argue
that dynamic and static efficiency goals can be reconciled (Klumpp and Su, 2010), a
growing strand of the literature has pointed towards a definite trade-off between these
objectives (Bauer and Bohlin, 2008; Briglauer et al., 2013; Guthrie, 2006). The indication
of slowly expanding NGANs in Europe seems to support the existence of an efficiency
trade-off. Thus, policy makers must inevitably rank either competition or investment as
being more important, while of course, trying to achieve the other as good as possible
under this constraint. In this vein, this branch offers also a historical perspective. On
the one hand, the political and academic debate of the last two decades was centered
around the question of how to introduce and sustain a competitive downstream market
on the basis of existing networks (Armstrong et al., 1996; Laffont and Tirole, 2001; Arm-
3Whether infrastructure competition in combination with wholesale competition in fact induces effective
retail competition and thus also benefits consumers under no regulation is investigated in further detail
in Chapter 5.
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strong, 2002). On the other hand, more recently the need to promote investments in
new NGAN infrastructure is considered to be the main regulatory challenge and, e.g.,
in the context of vectoring (see, e.g., Bundesnetzagentur, 2013a), several regulatory au-
thorities have chosen investment over competition as their primary objective.
If competition is the primary objective, the introduction of service-based competition
(SBC) based on price regulation is proposed as the first regulatory scenario that should be
considered. The policy guideline implies that, in each regulatory scenario, policy mak-
ers must continuously evaluate whether the observed or expected market conditions
still warrant to continue the current regulatory approach. In the case of price regu-
lation, such evaluation loops are proposed with respect to investment incentives and
competition. According to the Ladder of Investment principle (Cave and Vogelsang,
2003; Cave, 2006a), appropriate price regulation may incentivize entrants to invest into
new infrastructures themselves. If this occurs, FBC may become feasible after all and
regulation can be lifted. In reverse, even under price regulation, the incumbent may
have a sufficiently large incentive to invest (Klumpp and Su, 2010), which would then
overcome the efficiency trade-off. In this case, there is, of course, no reason to deviate
from price regulation. Similarly, if sufficient competition is achieved, there is no rea-
son to change the functioning regulatory framework. If this is not the case, and the
regulatory objective is primarily to reduce retail prices, then price regulation should be
reevaluated after the access price was lowered. Otherwise, if competition is weak be-
cause of anti-competitive (non-price) discrimination, then mandated non-discrimination
should be considered as an alternative regulatory scenario.
If, however, investment is considered the primary objective, the regulator is next faced
with the question whether the private sector is in principle able to provide the nec-
essary investments on its own or whether public-sector involvement is required. Pri-
vate investment incentives may be fostered by allowing for cooperative approaches
if multiple market participants are able and willing to make partial investments. In
the case of high uncertainty, co-investment may strengthen investment incentives due
to enhanced financing conditions and improved utilization of facilities by infrastruc-
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ture sharing (Bourreau et al., 2013). With regard to competition, co-investment may be,
on the one hand, an instrument to allow for multiple competitors in the retail market
even in the absence of actual FBC or access regulation. On the other hand, regula-
tors should exercise particular caution with regard to collusive behavior in the case of
co-investment as cooperative undertakings provide additional instruments to coordi-
nate behavior among market participants (Krämer and Vogelsang, 2016). In the case of
experienced or highly probable collusion among a closed group of partners, mandated
non-discrimination that allows for OA to the cooperative undertaking may be applied
as an additional criterion. However, regulators need to be aware that these conditions,
again, have a direct effect on the incentives to form such an undertaking in the first
place (Rey and Tirole, 2007a). If co-investment is not a suitable option due to a lack
of multiple investors or due to insufficient investments, mandated non-discrimination as
a stand-alone institution may represent a regulatory alternative to conventional price
regulation.
Mandated non-discrimination comprises regulatory rules that are especially concerned
with providing equal conditions for access seekers relative to subsidiaries of vertically
integrated operators. However, instead of prescribing a uniform (cost-based) access
price, as in the case of price regulation, these rules give operators increased freedom
when setting their wholesale prices. The European Commission’s ex-ante margin-
squeeze rule (European Commission, 2013a) can be seen as one possible implemen-
tation of this principle. Although this approach is sometimes proposed as a suitable
approach to balance the efficiency trade-off, there is little evidence on the impact of
such rules with regard to the competitiveness of a market and investment incentives.
Hence, further theoretical as well as empirical analysis of the actual implementations
is required. Due to the increased pricing freedom of access providers in this scenario,
regulators need to be particularly cautious about operators’ incentives and abilities to
discriminate against downstream competitors.
If regulators are primarily concerned with issues of anticompetitive discrimination and
less intrusive regulatory rules prove to be ineffective, vertical separation may represent
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a last resort to eliminate the underlying incentives of anti-competitive discrimination.
In any case, the decision to force a vertical break-up needs to weigh the expected com-
petitive benefits against the potential losses in productive efficiency (Lafontaine and
Slade, 2007) and allocative efficiency (Brito et al., 2012) as well as the affected invest-
ment incentives (inter alia, Cadman, 2010; Crandall et al., 2010; De Bijl, 2005). If vertical
separation is still considered the best regulatory option, the question whether the up-
stream infrastructure should be provided and operated by a private or public entity,
should be guided by an assessment of the investment incentives of private organiza-
tions and by the productive efficiency of public investors regarding the specific input
good.
In general, public-sector participation should be considered as a substitute to private
activity only when there is no or insufficient private investment. In the case where
state ownership allows for the exploitation of efficiencies at specific access levels, pub-
lic activity at these stages may benefit private activity at higher layers (Ford, 2007),
thus representing an exception to the aforementioned general rule. Among the options
for public intervention, state aid represents the less intrusive and thus the primary op-
tion, when investment is the regulator’s primary objective and private investments are
not expected. In this case, state aid allows for increased spending and greater public
control, while maintaining market-driven coordination of activities and complemen-
tary resources. If state aid is insufficient to provide necessary investment incentives,
state ownership provides a more drastic alternative to increase financing capabilities and
gives public representatives full control of deployment and operations. However, well-
known concerns about low efficiency and financial performance of public investors in
general (Megginson and Netter, 2001), and the success of privatization in accordance
with liberalization in telecommunications in particular (Bortolotti et al., 2002), should
make decision makers skeptical whether the need for higher investments justifies a far-
reaching conclusion as full public control. When opting for state ownership, efficiency
issues may be mitigated by limiting public activity to the infrastructure level, enabling
service-based competition by private businesses on top.
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In contrast to state ownership, no regulation represents the other extreme on the spec-
trum of public intervention. Particularly in the case where investment is considered
the primary public objective (and competition is deemed considerably less important),
it may be the only alternative solution to public investment, if the latter is considered
ineffective. By guaranteeing expected rents above the competitive level, investment in-
centives may be increased compared to competitive scenarios, obviously at the cost of a
loss in static efficiency. According to these implications, the guideline explicitly denotes
whether the regulator is willing to reconsider its goals or whether it is willing to take
such radical measures to stimulate investment.
Of course, at each node, the decision process is not binary in reality, as suggested by Fig-
ure 2.3. For example, private investment ability and incentives are likely to differ across
geographical areas depending on household density. Thus, state aid may be made
available for rural areas, but not for urban areas. If there still remain uncovered areas,
public ownership on a municipal level represents a further alternative (Hauge et al.,
2008). Nevertheless, it is often useful to think in dichotomous categories, as depicted
in the guideline, in order to realize the inherent trade-offs. Hence, each regulatory sce-
nario is reached on the basis of some prerequisites and shall be sustained only if this
is warranted by the continuous reevaluation of known issues and expected outcomes.
Otherwise more heavy-handed regulatory scenarios may be considered. Thereby ver-
tical separation and state ownership are seen as the last resort of regulation. In reverse,
if market conditions change, regulators may evaluate the currently implemented regu-
latory scenario anew, possibly beginning from the starting point of the proposed policy
guideline. Of course, this does not imply that intermediate regulatory scenarios must
actually be implemented. The proposed decision process shall rather be understood as
guiding policy makers to ask the right questions in the right order. Overall, the pro-
posed approach thereby implements a “carrots and sticks" paradigm, equipping the
regulator with more punitive measures if market participants do not comply with the
current set of rules, and offering the ability to lift obligations on the other hand if former
obstacles are removed.
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The policy guideline also illustrates the numerous reasons that can motivate a manda-
tory non-discrimination regime, like it is currently pursued by the European Commis-
sion (European Commission, 2013a). However, to date there exists only very limited
experience on the expected consequences of this regime. In fact, there is no consen-
sus on what regulatory measures are required to ensure non-discrimination in practice.
While a margin squeeze test could serve as an instrument to counter price discrim-
ination, non-price discrimination is more difficult to monitor (Hardt, 1995). Vertical
separation has been discussed as an effective instrument to counter discriminatory in-
centives, but at the same time raises severe adverse effects on dynamic incentives as
well as productive and allocative efficiency.
With regard to the role of the public sector at the supply side, the policy guideline
implies that governments should adhere to the principle of subsidiarity. Only when in-
vestment is identified as an urgent and absolute primary need that cannot be provided
by the private sector, public ownership on a large scale should be considered as a viable
option. In such a case, vertical separation should restrict public activity to the infras-
tructure level, allowing for private activity on higher stages of the value chain. The
case of Australia has demonstrated that such a regulatory scenario is a real option. Dis-
satisfaction with the performance and anti-competitive behavior of integrated network
operators have led the Australian government to take over full control of the access
network infrastructure and to provide connectivity at the last mile as a public service
(Given, 2010). Representing less invasive instruments, state aid, PPP, and municipal
activity can serve as transitory and complementary instruments that should be imple-
mented if they are likely to incentivize further private activity. On the other hand, the
public sector has the general ability to stimulate network deployment by demand-side




The investment challenge in the advent of NGANs has introduced a variety of new
business and organizational models as well as regulatory governance mechanisms.
Within the last ten years the role of the public sector in telecommunications has again
taken a turn, increasing its activity through municipal initiatives, PPPs and the deploy-
ment of state-owned network infrastructure. In the context of these developments, OA
was suggested by regulators, scholars and industry stakeholders alike as a means to
balance the inherent trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. However, mutu-
ally contradictory interpretations, implementations in different contexts, and a lack of
an explicit definition have prevented a common understanding of the precise meaning
of OA, which in turn may have precluded the rise of such regulation.
By proposing an integrative definition and a structural framework to classify OA ap-
plication scenarios, this review contributes to a common understanding and a differ-
entiated view on the particular OA concepts. In particular, the survey of the extant
economic literature highlighted that public-sector participation can potentially stimu-
late network investment and foster private activity. In contrast, concerns about cost
efficiency and accountability should limit state activity to lower access levels where
economies of scope are most significant. In this context, OA regulation can be imple-
mented to minimize competitive distortion on higher access levels. Co-investment may
represent an additional instrument to strengthen investment incentives in cases of high
uncertainty. In this context, OA governing ex-ante access to cooperative approaches
may equip regulators with a new instrument to balance static and dynamic efficiency.
In the case of vertical integration, OA may provide an alternative to price regulation.
In this vein, economies of scope and scale may be exploited while anti-competitive be-
havior can be contained. At the same time, incentives of non-price discrimination and
the effectiveness of a margin squeeze regulation have to be assessed by the regulator
through empirical analysis. Vertical separation is likely to reduce non-price discrim-
ination, but comes at the costs of structural reorganization and is expected to reduce
incentives for facility-based competition.
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At last, possible extensions and limitations of the herein proposed conceptual frame-
work and policy guideline are pointed out. First, it must be noted that the presented lit-
erature survey and decision framework are necessarily incomplete as they are focused
on regulatory instruments that fall under the proposed definition of OA. For example,
the current outline does not include geographically segmented regulation or regulatory
holidays, which, similar to state aid, co-investment and mandated non-discrimination,
represent additional deviations from traditional access regulation that could foster in-
vestment in NGANs. However, it can be argued that these policy instruments are rather
complementary to the considered regulatory scenarios. Hence, it should be possible
to include them in the proposed policy guideline. Yet, research on the interaction be-
tween these instruments and the different OA scenarios is scant, particular with respect
to geographic segmented regulation. Thus, future research is required before such an
extension can be proposed comprehensively. Moreover, NRAs need to complement the
presented analysis, which is based on economic arguments, by considering legal and
technical issues that have not been discussed in this chapter.
Second, the proposed policy guideline highlights that there generally exists a trade-off
between static and dynamic efficiency. However, it is worth mentioning that this trade-
off is not necessarily linear. For instance, empirical findings by Aghion et al. (2005)
suggest that the relationship between competition and innovation is characterized by
an inverted-U shape, i.e., innovation is the greatest for intermediate levels of competi-
tion. On the other hand, the general validity of this relationship is questioned by other
studies (see, e.g., Sacco and Schmutzler, 2011).
Third, for the sake of clarity, the previous discussion was based on only two of the three
identified dimensions of the OA framework. Evidently, each OA scenario can be sub-
divided again with respect to the level at which access is provided. Generally, access to
lower network layers (representing high rungs of the ladder of investment concept), al-
low for a higher degree of quality differentiation and innovation by entrants, since this
enables them to exert more physical control over their resources. Consequently, the ac-
cess level also has an immediate impact on investment incentives and the scope of non-
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price discrimination, for example, which may then influence the evaluation at different
nodes of the proposed policy guideline. Currently a set of different technologies and
architectures are implemented in order to realize NGANs, establishing a heterogeneous
landscape at the physical access level. However, at the same time, NGANs implement
IP as the uniform interface at the network layer. This enables widespread availability
of bitstream access, which provides logical unbundling of data flows on the identi-
cal physical connection. Since standardization of access products across technologies
may play a large role in platform competition comprising telephony networks, cable
networks and mobile solutions, bitstream access could significantly decrease transac-
tion and integration costs. Furthermore, given the tremendous increase in transmission
capacity that can be achieved by NGANs, there is reason to believe that bitstream ac-
cess provides a sufficient access level for vital competition and quality differentiation.
Finally, bitstream access as an infrastructure technology-transparent interface may pro-
vide a means to specify a harmonized access product across EU member states, which
could represent as a key regulatory instrument to realize an integrated European digital
single market as suggested in the initial proposal for the Connected Continent legisla-
tive package by the European Commission (2013e).
Fourth, the discussion of the proposed OA framework was exemplified on the basis
that the monopolistic bottleneck, to which access shall be warranted, is constituted by
the network layer. However, considering the entire ICT value chain, additional bottle-
necks may exist further downstream. These may then not be under the control of the
incumbents, but rather be controlled by so-called over-the-top content providers. In
particular, such bottlenecks can be constituted by platforms (e.g., app stores or social
networks). In this context, it is noted that the proposed framework may also be applied
to characterize (open) access relationships at the application layer, using the same basic
dimensions (ownership, vertical structure, access level), but, of course, with different
characteristics of each dimension. For instance, in the case of platforms, the access level
may be differentiated according to features of the application programming interface
(API) that is provided. Nevertheless, mandating access at higher levels of the telecom-
munications value chain is obviously only warranted in case there is a significant mar-
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ket failure, e.g., due to inefficient pricing and a lack of replicability. On the one hand,
two-sided platforms have an inherent incentive to price efficiently (cf. Rochet and Ti-
role, 2006) which implies that market failures are unlikely to occur. On the other hand,
network effects may constitute substantial entry barriers that limit replicability. Thus,
the case for mandating access at the application layer must be closely scrutinized.
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Theoretical Foundations and Experimental
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THIS chapter elaborates on the methodological foundations for theoretical and ex-perimental investigations carried out in this thesis. First, Section 3.1 touches on
basic questions in the field of philosophy of science from an applied perspective and
discusses the virtue of theory and theoretical analysis in the field of IS as well as the
interplay between theoretical and empirical research in the context of market design.
Specifically, it is argued that a microeconomically founded research approach is well
suited to guide scientific inquiries in the field of IS in general, and to answer the pre-
sented research questions in this thesis in particular. Therefore, an idealized research
process cycle is proposed, which demonstrates how IS and IO research may comple-
ment each other in the task to guide the theory-informed design of markets and regu-
latory institutions. Building on the presented research ideal, Section 3.2 substantiates
how theoretical models and economic laboratory experiments can be employed to serve
as a testbed for the validity and robustness of theoretical predictions as well as new de-
sign proposals. Finally, Section 3.3 explores a particular methodological question in the
context of laboratory experiments and examines the various time frameworks that have
been employed in experimental settings. Thus, the section compares decision making
under continuous and discrete time, and in particular considers oligopoly competition
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under continuous time, which allows for real-time, asynchronous strategic interaction.
In order to assess the methodological implications of oligopoly competition in contin-
uous rather than discrete time, a laboratory experiment studies the effects on tacit col-
lusion under both time frameworks, taking into account the mode of competition and
the number of competitors.
3.1 Microeconomically founded research in Information
Systems
Arguably, the main purpose of IS research, like most other research disciplines, should
be the development of robust theories, which can then inform society about the likely
answers to research questions. Notable, although not unique, about IS research is that
the research questions that are pursued are not only concerned with the understanding,
explanation and possibly prediction of real world phenomena, but also with how the
institutions (North, 1991; Roth, 2002) that govern these phenomena in order to achieve
a certain goal (cf. Gregor, 2006) can be shaped. In this regard, IS research takes a theory-
guided engineering perspective.
In this vein, design in the IS domain does not only refer to the creation and evaluation of
software artifacts, but encompasses a much broader scope. In particular the economic
context including markets and competitive interactions that evolve around ICT systems
represent a major determinant for the success of information systems (Gimpel et al.,
2008). Taking into account this dimension is vital to reap and maximize the benefits
from advancements of communications and information technology. More specifically,
with regard to the domain of ICT markets, it is of particular interest why an observed
(e.g., technology induced) market behavior occurs, which market outcomes are likely
under a given scenario, but also how markets and the respective regulatory framework
should be designed in order to achieve a desirable outcome.
This section is based on joint work with Jan Krämer (Krämer and Schnurr, 2016).
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In this section, an idealized microeconomically founded IS research process cycle, de-
picted in Figure 3.1, is presented, which suggests how analytical and empirical research
approaches may complement each other as building blocks to advance robust theory
development. In particular, it is emphasized that fruitful IS theories can be built upon
formal, analytic models. Such models are in turn founded upon both, stylized facts
that are derived from empirical regularities observed in reality, as well as the existing
body of knowledge stemming from robust theories. Here, reality refers to the object
and processes of investigation that research intents to describe or understand. Scien-
tific inquiries are either concerned with realizations of the past or with potential future
states. Researchers perceive reality through empirical observation and data gathering,
which is naturally constrained and imperfect. Models, which in themselves are the
foundation of theory, can then be used to explain, predict and design instances of the
real world. Finally, models, and thus also theory, are evaluated and refined with respect
to their ability to inform society about past or future real world phenomena. This can be
achieved in field or laboratory studies either by validating or falsifying theory-guided
hypotheses, comparing a theory’s predictions with actual future outcomes or by eval-
uating the success of theory-informed design proposals and engineering approaches in
actual applications.
The herein described research process ideal is more specific than (but not contradictory
to) more general IS research approaches (cf. Frank, 2006), such as design science (cf.,
e.g., Hevner et al., 2004). Nevertheless, it is argued that theories developed under this
framework are suitable to pursue all four fundamental goals of IS research, namely
analysis, explanation, prediction, and prescription/design (cf. Gregor, 2006). It is not
the intention, however, to evaluate or judge different IS research approaches, but rather
to motivate why the proposed microeconomically founded research framework can
serve as one of several appropriate means to rigorously develop relevant IS theories,
in general, and to provide a theoretical foundation for the methodological approaches
employed in the subsequent studies, in particular.
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Subsequently, the building blocks of microeconomically founded theory development
are described in further detail: Subsection 3.1.1 elaborates on the conception of theory,
Subsection 3.1.2 reflects on the role of (analytic) models and Section 3.1.3 examines
the role of empirical research methods. Finally, Subsection 3.1.4 discusses concerns of
whether there is in fact too strong of an emphasis on theory in scientific practice (cf.
Hambrick, 2007).
3.1.1 Theory as a set of models
In general, theory has been characterized as the “basic aim of science”(Kerlinger, 1986,
p.8) and is often referred to as “the answer to queries of why” (Kaplan and Merton cited
by Sutton and Staw, 1995, p.378). According to Weick (2005) a theory may be measured
in its success to “explain, predict, and delight” (p.396).
The precise understanding of theory here is based on the premise that the main task
of theory is the integration of findings of individual studies into a modular, but co-
herent body of knowledge that connects research agendas based on a shared terminology
60
3.1 Microeconomically founded research in Information Systems
and which provides a microfoundation. Revision and extension of theory is achieved
in iterative steps through new or modified models that may either re-investigate cen-
tral assumptions, thus deepening theory’s microfoundation, or create meta-models by
further abstraction based on the existing body of knowledge. By this means, a micro-
founded theory serves as an anchor (Dasgupta, 2002) and provides building blocks for
new research projects and further theory-building.
According to this view, robust theories are the result of deduction and induction from
a host of formal models. Therefore, theory can be viewed as a classified set or series
of models (Morgan and Knuuttila, 2012). In philosophy of science this integral role of
models as a part of the structure of theory has been supported by the Semantic View and
has been further emphasized by the Pragmatic View (Winther, 2015). Consequently, a
clear distinction between theory and its models is difficult in general, and even more so
if the analysis of theoretical models is deemed as the central part of scientific activity.
At the extreme, a single model may already be the foundation of a theory, although
probably not a very robust one. In this regard, the understanding of a robust theory in
the social sciences may differ from the understanding of a robust theory in the natural
sciences, because theory in the social sciences can be very context dependent, as subjec-
tivity of decision makers, i.e., their beliefs, information, and view of the world substan-
tially shape their choices and actions (Hausman, 2013). For example, Dasgupta (2002)
noted that “the physicist, Steven Weinberg, once remarked that when you have ‘seen’
one electron, you have seen them all. [...] When you have observed one transaction,
you have not observed them all. More tellingly, when you have met one human being,
you have by no means met them all” (p.63). This is why a robust theory in the social
sciences should regularly be built upon a set of models, each of which takes a different
perspective on a particular issue and explores a slightly different set of assumptions,
such that the boundaries of the theory become transparent.
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3.1.2 Models as mediators between theory and reality
This understanding of theory shifts the attention to the development of suitable mod-
els. Models as idealizations (Morgan and Knuuttila, 2012) serve as representations of re-
ality that are obtained by simplification, abstraction (see, e.g., the work of Cartwright,
2005; Hausman, 1990) and/or isolation (Mäki, 1992, 2012). But they may also be created
as pure constructions, i.e., exaggerated caricatures (Gibbard and Varian, 1978), fictional
constructs (Sugden, 2000) or heuristic devices that “mimic [...] some stylized features of
the real system” (Morgan and Knuuttila, 2012, p.64). Gilboa et al. (2014) suggested that
economic models serve as analogies that allow for case-based reasoning and contribute
to the body of knowledge through inductive inference rather than through deductive,
rule-based reasoning. The use of formal, analytic models in this context can be advo-
cated, because such models allow to make the assumptions transparent that may lead
to a proposition and possibly a normative statement upon which a robust theory, and
ultimately a robust explanation or prediction can be built. Note that mathematical for-
malization is a sufficient, but not a necessary prerequisite to develop a formal model,
because it allows to precisely formulate its subject domain, making it an “exact science”
(Griesemer, 2013, p.299). Moreover, Dasgupta (2002) argued that in building a theory
“prior intuition is often of little help. That is why mathematical modeling has proved
to be indispensible” (p.70f). The analytic approach provides researchers with a toolbox
to deal with especially hard and complex problems. By the means of logical verifi-
cation, propositions can be shown to be internally true with regard to the underlying
assumption.
In general, the goal of a model is to “capture only those core causal factors, capacities
or the essentials of a causal mechanism that bring about a certain target phenomenon”
(Morgan and Knuuttila, 2012, p.53). Such an abstraction is the prerequisite for conduct-
ing a deductive analysis within a particular scenario of interest. What is considered
to be particularly important in order to develop relevant models is that a model’s mi-
crofoundation should contain elements of both theory and reality. On the one hand,
a model’s assumptions should reflect stylized empirical facts that are well grounded in
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observed empirical regularities or relevant future scenarios. Such empirical facts can be
derived directly from gathered data (most likely with measurement error), may already
be the result of extended data analysis, e.g., in the form of detected patterns or correla-
tions, or may be identified by means of a literature review (Houy et al., 2015). However,
stylized empirical facts need not (yet) be supported by any theory. Thus, it is also pos-
sible to incorporate insights of theory-free empirical analysis (particularly (big) data
analytics or machine learning) into formal models, which may then lead to a theory
that can explain the empirical regularities.1 On the other hand, a model’s assumptions
may also be derived from the existing body of knowledge, i.e., from theory. This exem-
plifies the dual view on the relationship between models and theory: Although models
are used to advance theory, theory is also used to produce and inform models.
A main line of attack against analytic models is to argue that they are not realistic and
thus, model-driven theory is useless, because there is nothing to learn about reality.
This criticism is amplified in the field of social sciences, where models are context de-
pendent, as argued above. This naive understanding, however, falls short. First, as
mentioned above, “good” models should be grounded in stylized empirical facts. Sec-
ond, there is an inherent trade-off between accuracy and generality, achieved trough
simplicity (Gilboa et al., 2014). Scholars experienced in the domain of modelling gener-
ally agree on the fact, that too much complexity in fact impedes the explanatory power
and the interpretability of models. For example, Schwab et al. (2011) stated that in order
“to formulate useful generalizations, researchers need to focus on the most fundamen-
tal, pervasive, and inertial causal relations. To guide human action, researchers need to
develop parsimonious, and simple models that humans understand” (p.1115). In the
words of Lucas (1980) “a ‘good’ model [...] will not be exactly more ‘real’ than a poor
one, but will provide better immitations” (p.697). In this context, the statistician George
1In this context, it is worth mentioning that although data analytics may be able to predict what will
happen in a specific context, similar to a theory, it is still theory-free, because it is generally not able to
explain why it happens. Without theory, however, it must remain unknown whether these predictions
can be generalized and and to what extent they are robust to other application scenarios. Therefore,
data analytics differs from the traditional paradigm of empirical analysis, which centers around the
falsification or validation of hypotheses, which again requires a theory (although not necessarily in
the same sense as proposed here - see, e.g., Diesing (2008) for a more elaborate discussion of the re-
lationship between empirical and formal theory) from which these hypotheses are derived in the first
place.
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Box coined the famous phrase that “all models are wrong, but some are useful” (Box,
1979, p.2), clarifying that a model must inherently be unrealistic in a dogmatic sense
(see Mäki, 2012, for a discussion), but that models in fact enable one to understand real
phenomena by abstracting from the complexity of reality. To exemplify this, Robinson
(1962) argued that “a model which took account of all the variegation of reality would
be of no more use than a map at the scale of one to one” (p.33). Of course, an inter-
esting model must also exceed a pure tautology, i.e., the results that can be deduced
from its assumptions are usually not a priori clear, but may represent surprising results
(Koopmans, 1957; Morgan and Knuuttila, 2012). This requirement can be paraphrased
by a quote that is supposedly due to Einstein: “Everything should be made as simple
as possible, but not simpler” (cf. O’Toole, 2011).
Furthermore, it is emphasized that over and beyond the explanatory function of formal
models, the modelling process itself may prove to exhibit value for understanding a
particular scenario. Moreover, a model is an instrument to express an individuals’ per-
ception of a problem and may therefore serve as a communication device. Gibbard and
Varian (1978) stated that “perhaps, it is initially unclear what is to be explained, and a
model provides a means of formulation” (p.669).
3.1.3 Empirical analyses as the means to evaluate theory
According to this theory-centric research view, empirical analysis serves two core func-
tions: i) As described above, empirical analysis is a means to derive stylized facts in
order to motivate model assumptions, or likewise, to evaluate the plausibility of pro-
posed assumptions. ii) As will be described next, empirical analysis is also a means to
evaluate the quality of a theory as a whole. In the context of IS research, three main
ways in which evaluation of theory can be done are conceived.
First, empirical analysis, foremost field and laboratory studies, can be employed in or-
der to falsify (in the spirit of Lakatos and Popper (Hausman, 2013; Backhouse, 2012)),
and more ambitiously to validate, theoretically derived hypotheses. Whereas field
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studies have the advantage of high external validity, they can be generally challenged
on the premise that it is difficult to establish causal effects due to problems of (un-
observed) confounding variables and endogeneity. At a fundamental level, this gives
rise to doubts whether empirical observations are able to falsify (a fortiori validate)
theory at all. These concerns are magnified due to the context-specific nature of field
studies and a lack of control over the environment that encompasses investigations.
Laboratory experiments may be able to mitigate some of these concerns through sys-
tematic variation of treatment conditions, randomization of subjects and augmented
control of the researcher. Based on a high internal validity, although at the cost of lack
of external validity, isolation of causal relationships is facilitated and falsification of
theoretical propositions is more easily justifiable (Guala, 2005). Furthermore, labora-
tory experiments facilitate the process of de-idealization (Morgan and Knuuttila, 2012),
i.e., the generalization of the model context beyond its well-defined assumptions by
successively relaxing the assumptions until the theory’s established hypotheses begin
to break down. Ultimately, however, laboratory and field studies are complementary
means to a similar end.
Second, empirical analysis can evaluate the accuracy of theory-driven predictions over
time. Although hypotheses may also be regarded as model predictions, the focus here
lies less on falsification of suggested causal relationships, but more on the correct qual-
itative assessment of the impact of future scenarios. With regard to its ability to predict
future states of reality (in the sense of Friedman, 1953), a microfounded theory draws
from its ability to explain observations at the macro level, based on an understanding
of the underlying mechanisms and the necessary conditions. By this means, theory-
driven predictions are likely to be more robust to changes of real systems as underly-
ing causes can be identified and theory can be modified accordingly (Dasgupta, 2002).
Moreover, formal analysis allows for experimentation and evaluation of counterfactu-
als. Two remarks should be made in this context: First, it must be noted that there exists
an inherent trade-off between a theory’s simplicity and its predictive accuracy. While
a simple model or theory may apply more generally and is able to make more robust
qualitative predictions, it will also almost certainly be too simple to make accurate quan-
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titative predictions. In turn, the reverse holds true for complex models. This is akin to
what is known as the bias-variance-trade-off in statistics (cf. Hastie et al., 2009). Sec-
ond, even if a theory’s prediction may be accurate, this does not “prove” in a deductive
sense that it is valid. One may only apply what is known as abductive inference here,
that is one can infer that a theory was sufficient to predict the phenomenon of interest,
but not that it was necessary, i.e., the only possible theory to be sufficient.
Third, and particularly relevant for this thesis, empirical studies can serve as a testbed
for theory-driven design proposals. In this context, laboratory experiments can be seen
as an intermediate economic engineering step, similar to a wind tunnel in traditional
engineering, where the design proposals (e.g., a proposed market design or regulatory
institution) can be evaluated under idealized conditions that mirror those assumptions
under which the theory was developed. If the proposed design performs well (relative
to the intended goal) in the laboratory then it should be taken to the field for further
evaluation. If, however, the proposed design already fails to perform in the laboratory,
then there is little reason to believe that it would perform well in the field (Plott, 1987).
Consequently, the design, and most probably also the underlying theory, would need
revision already at this stage.
3.1.4 Discussion
Several scholars in the fields of management (Locke, 2007; Hambrick, 2007) and IS (Avi-
son and Malaurent, 2014), among others, have criticized excessive adherence to theory
and argue that a scientific contribution can also be made without the need for theory.
Whereas this raises important issues with regard to the research process and scientific
institutions that are necessary to develop theory, these views still can be reconciled with
the belief that the development of robust theories is at the core of scientific endeavour.
Above and beyond, the arguments set out above suggest that these models and theories
should be both, i) well grounded in stylized empirical facts that are the result of induc-
tive research efforts, as well as ii) evaluated and refined through empirical analyses
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based on field studies and laboratory experiments. To this end, a microeconomically
founded IS research process ideal that is deemed suitable to develop theories that are
rigor and relevant has been motivated and discussed. In this spirit, the long term goal
of microeconomically founded IS research is the development of robust and stable the-
ories that have been established and refined through several repetitions of the depicted
research process cycle.
3.2 Theoretical modeling and experimental evaluation
Technological innovations, new business models, and adjusted policy objectives have
significant effects on firms’ strategic incentives, on the market structure, and thus on the
competitiveness of markets as outlined in the preceding chapters. In consequence, es-
tablished grounds for ex ante regulation and ex post competition policy may no longer
be justified. Thus, sector-specific rules such as in the telecommunications industry need
to be repeatedly evaluated and adjusted accordingly (see the current review of the Eu-
ropean framework by the European Commission, 2016c). Similarly, competition policy,
which closely interacts with the regulatory regime specifically in the case of merger con-
trol and antitrust, needs to adjust to a changing environment. Although competition
authorities decide on a case-by-case basis, investigations and verdicts follow general
policy objectives, assumptions, and procedures, which are explicitly codified in guide-
lines or implicitly given by the history of previous decisions (for evidence that decisions
are not exclusively determined by case-specific facts and considerations see, e.g., Mc-
Gowan and Cini, 1999; Duso et al., 2007). Therefore, both regulatory and competition
authorities require systematic and robust evidence on the effects that result from these
changes under specific market characteristics and alternative institutions.
Authorities, assigned with the task to identify and design new regulatory mechanisms
in the light of these environmental changes, face significant challenges. On the one
hand, they have to assess the impact of changing external conditions, while also taking
into account the probability of further change. Thereby, the effects of external factors
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may not always be easily inferred from the observed outcomes in practice, because
these effects likely interact with the current policy framework. On the other hand, reg-
ulatory mechanisms—designated to address the new circumstances—may be untested,
as they have just become available due to technological innovation (see for example the
Layer 2 bitstream access product for cable networks standardized by the Bundesnet-
zagentur, 2013b) or fundamental changes in the market structure. Even if institutions
have already been implemented in other contexts, e.g., in another geographical region,
it is often unclear whether implications transfer to the considered scenario of inter-
est. In summary, high uncertainty together with high societal costs in case of a failed
implementation call for the theoretical investigation and the controlled assessment of
such policy proposals and regulatory institutions prior to the implementation in the
field. In this vein and in the spirit of Section 3.1, analytic modeling and experimental
evaluation are proposed as the primary research methods in this thesis to examine the
performance of alternative regulatory institutions under varying market structures and
different market characteristics.
Based on the proposed research process ideal, this section first expands on why analytic
(game-theoretic) models are well suited to address the research questions in this thesis.
Therefore, on the basis of Morgan and Morrison (1999) and Morgan (2002, 2005), the fol-
lowing four functions of models in the context of theoretical and experimental analyses
are discussed: 1) models as representations, 2) experimentation on models, 3) theory testing,
and 4) experiments with models. Subsequently, the use and advancement of models in
this thesis is outlined. Finally, the shortcomings of a purely theoretical model-based
approach are highlighted and it is discussed how those issues may be resolved by com-
plementary experimental analyses.
1) Models as representations and a collection of stylized facts Whereas new models
may also be deduced based on theoretical considerations exclusively (Friedman, 1953;
Wong, 1973), this thesis is concerned with the design and evaluation of institutions
in an applied context. Therefore, models as mediators (Morgan and Morrison, 1999,
Chapter 2) combine theory, i.e., the existing body of knowledge, with empirical regu-
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larities (stylized facts), i.e., observations of reality. In consequence, a model implicitly
represents the decisions about what is deemed relevant about a particular delineated
aspect of reality from a theoretical point of view. As mentioned in the previous Section,
this gives rise to the trade-off between representational accuracy and generality, but in
practice also tractability (Lawson, 2008). Whether the model adequately captures and
thus represents the relevant characteristics of reality in its assumptions critically deter-
mines the power of back inference, i.e. whether results and implications from a model
carry over to reality (Morgan, 2002).
2) Experimentation on models Morgan (2005) characterizes models as autonomous
instruments of investigation that allow for experimentation. In this vein, “modeling
work is creative and exploratory” (Morgan, 2002, p.50) as a model based on a set of
axioms and assumptions can be examined with respect to its attributes and interior
mechanics, the outcomes and solutions that can be derived, and its generality and lim-
its. Thus, the manipulation of economic models—representing a set of stylized facts of
the status quo—allows to assess modifications of established institutions theoretically
and to compare hypothetical counterfactuals. The creation of an artificial world and
its analysis (Morgan, 2002) constitutes a basis to address research questions even if no
empirical basis is available. However, the (external) validity of the obtained results
and inference from the model hinges critically on the realism of the assumptions that
are most relevant to the investigated scenario. As argued above, the representativeness
of a model can thus have direct ramifications for the epistemic power of its deduced
results, emphasizing the importance of aligning a model’s assumptions with empirical
stylized facts.
3) Empirical theory testing on a model basis Given the research process ideal out-
lined in Section 3.1, the validity of a model’s assumptions and the robustness of its
results are subject to empirical evaluation. Economic laboratory experiments allow for
a high degree of control regarding the variation of treatment variables and the ran-
domization of influencing (confounding) factors, which yields a high internal validity
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(Guala, 2005). Hence, experiments are well suited to provide a first test on whether
the model’s hypotheses hold under the stated assumptions if they are transferred from
an artificial world to a domesticated version of reality (Harré, 2003). Furthermore, the
experimental design allows to test the robustness of insights and to isolate the causal
factors that yield a particular result by incremental and factorial treatment compar-
isons. Moreover, experimental studies are able to quantify effect sizes and trade-offs,
which is often infeasible based on purely theoretical work with abstract models. Obvi-
ously, the specification of the experimental design and the transformation of an abstract
model into an operational format require parameterization, i.e., a de-idealization of the
underlying generalizing assumptions (Morgan and Knuuttila, 2012). Thus, the design
of an experiment offers a considerable degree of freedom over and beyond the underly-
ing model specification. Naturally, these specific design decisions limit the theory test
to a narrower application scenario than that for the abstract model, which in turn may
question the robustness of the findings of an individual study. In combination with
concerns regarding the validity of statistical assessments, this has raised momentum
for replication studies and meta-studies in several scientific disciplines (see Chapter 8
for a concluding discussion). In this vein, Chapter 6 conducts a meta-study of num-
ber effects on the competitiveness in oligopolistic markets which integrates individual
studies that are based on different model assumptions. On the contrary, degrees of free-
dom with respect to the parametrization of an experimental design can be exploited to
control for behavioral effects, which are considered out of scope for the particular test
of theory. For example, all experimental studies in this thesis parameterize the under-
lying competition model in a way that participants face identical graphical interfaces
across treatments in order to avoid behavioral framing effects.
4) Experiments with models Analytic models may be employed as experimental in-
struments even when the model itself is not the object of investigation (Morgan, 2002).
Thereby, some outcome or process of an experiment is realized by the instantiation of a
theoretical model instead of the controlled interaction between experimental subjects.
For instance, in an experimental market subjects may only represent sellers, whereas
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demand is computed based on a theoretical model of a representative consumer that
reacts to the sellers’ offers. Here, behavior and outcome is controlled by the model’s as-
sumptions instead of experimental variation (Morgan, 2002). Hence, experiments with
models may be particularly useful if the investigated scenario is characterized by high
complexity, and thus experimental control would be difficult to ensure. In this vein, all
experimental studies in this thesis employ stylized competition models as experimental
instruments and thus explicitly abstract from details of real transaction processes.
Use and advancement of models in this thesis
Based on these diverse functions, this thesis draws on oligopoly theory and employs es-
tablished models of strategic price and quantity competition to investigate the research
questions of interest. Theoretical analyses in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine access
relationships based on a model of vertically related upstream and downstream mar-
kets, building on the recent literature on wholesale competition (Bourreau et al., 2011,
2015; Höffler and Schmidt, 2008). In these models, the retail demand structure is based
on the representative consumer suggested by Shubik and Levitan (1980), whereas ho-
mogenous Bertrand competition is employed at the upstream level. Exploring these
models analytically (in the sense of Morgan, 2005), this thesis adds to the theoretical
body of knowledge by analyzing Open Access regulation regimes under infrastructure
and wholesale competition. The models’ theoretical equilibrium predictions with re-
spect to wholesale competition and open access regulation are then tested experimen-
tally (Chapter 5). Experimental analyses of oligopoly competition in Section 3.3 and
Chapter 6 employ models as experimental instruments and exploit the duality of the
theoretical demand model proposed by Singh and Vives (1984). To this end, the exper-
imental studies build on the model’s generality, its well-known theoretical predictions
and its previous application in numerous theoretic analyses (inter alia López and Nay-
lor, 2004; Garella and Petrakis, 2008) as well as in an experimental meta-study (Suetens
and Potters, 2007).
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Whereas the theory on oligopolistic competition in one-sided markets is fairly mature
due to its long history and central role in economic literature, theory-building in the
context of digital media and services markets is still in a relatively early stage, although
advancing quickly in the recent decade. In particular, competition between online con-
tent platforms is likely to be multi-sided (Rochet and Tirole, 2006; Armstrong, 2006;
Hagiu and Wright, 2015) due to the presence of indirect network effects (cf. Parker and
Van Alstyne, 2005) and users’ ability to multi-home, i.e., to use services of different
providers at the same time (cf. Choi and Kim, 2010). These characteristics are especially
relevant for the competition between online content providers that monetize users’ eye-
balls through advertising (Evans, 2008). Although there is a rich theoretical literature
on advertising competition in offline markets (see, among others, Anderson and Coate,
2005), there is currently no model framework for online advertising competition that
easily relates online advertising prices and publishers’ ability to track and target con-
sumers. Thus, Chapter 7 offers a theoretical microfoundation for this scenario based on
stylized empirical facts and thereby proposes a new model building block to the grow-
ing theoretical literature on the competitive effects of data collection and data analysis
in online markets (see, e.g., Athey and Gans, 2010; Asdemir et al., 2012; Athey et al.,
2014; Montes et al., 2015).
Complementary use of models and laboratory experiments in this thesis
As outlined in Section 3.1, theoretical model analysis and empirical evaluation nat-
urally complement each other as research methodologies. Conversely, several issues
arise if the analysis is exclusively restricted to a single approach. In this vein, the main
shortcomings of game-theoretic solution concepts, which are regularly utilized in the
theoretical analysis of strategic settings, are highlighted in the following. First, behav-
ioral aspects that are neglected by conventional (one-shot) equilibrium solution con-
cepts may considerably affect market outcomes. Specifically, tacit collusion, which has
been found to significantly affect firm behavior in markets with few competitors (Parker
and Röller, 1997; Engel, 2007; Potters and Suetens, 2013) and is deemed a critical factor
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in the oligopolistic telecommunications markets considered here (cf. BEREC, 2015), is
currently only rationalized in an infinitely-repeated game context by mainstream eco-
nomic theory (see, e.g., Nocke and White, 2007; Normann, 2009). Yet, it is well-known
that coordinated behavior is also frequently experienced in experimental oligopoly set-
tings that resemble a finitely-repeated game context (see, e.g., Huck et al., 2004b; Orzen,
2008). Moreover, theoretic analyses may predict a multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes
for a given scenario and model (see, e.g., Bourreau et al., 2011, for multiple equilib-
ria in the context of wholesale competition). In such cases, it often remains unknown,
which of the identified equilibria is more likely to arise. It is thus infeasible to quantify
or at least indicate the probability to arrive at a particular outcome in practice. The
equilibrium selection problem may be reduced or solved by introducing additional as-
sumptions. In many cases, however, this would only defer the problem to a preceding
stage of the modeling process, because it is still unclear which assumption indeed ap-
plies to the context of interest. In fact, it may more generally be even unknown which
solution (equilibrium) concept is most adequate in the respective scenario (cf. Binmore,
1987). Furthermore, game-theoretic equilibrium solution concepts per definitionem ne-
glect out-of-equilibrium behavior as part of a possible outcome, which may consider-
ably impact strategic behavior and outcome in actual market practice (cf. Arthur, 2006).
Although there are theoretical concepts to test the robustness of equilibrium outcomes,
such as trembling-hand equilibria (Selten, 1975) and quantal response equilibria (McK-
elvey and Palfrey, 1995), these concepts in turn require additional assumptions about
such behavior. In summary and more abstract terms, the listed issues stem from one
of the main advantages of theoretical models as artificial worlds: the explicit and total
control over the assumptions. Either these must be explicitly and completely specified
a priori or the model may abstract from specific issues entirely, but there is never a
“theoretical” approach to let them be determined implicitly.
In contrast, laboratory experiments that provide the “potential for independent action”
(Morgan, 2005, p.325) due to a controlled “degree of freedom on the part of partici-
pants” (Morgan, 2005, p.325) can leave assumptions unspecified and let them be de-
termined implicitly in the experiment. On this basis, Harré (2003) argues that exper-
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iments allow for stronger back inference. In turn, this leads Morgan (2005) to argue
that economic experiments exhibit greater epistemic power than theoretical models,
because experiments may yield “results that may be unexplainable within existing the-
ory” (p.317). According to this view, experiments may not only falsify theory or provide
empirical support, but may represent—like theoretical modeling—an “explorative cre-
ative activity” (Morgan, 2005, p.318), which yields unexpected observations that enable
the conceptualization of new theories. Moreover, laboratory experiments as a comple-
mentary methodology can be exploited to refine theoretical predictions, especially in
the case of multiple equilibria (cf. Abbink and Brandts, 2008). Laboratory experiments
according to this understanding may thus serve two purposes within the idealized re-
search process cycle (cf. Figure 3.1): Empirical validation or falsification of theoretical
hypotheses as well as observation of (isolated) empirical regularities, which inform the
formulation of new or refined theories.
Laboratory experiments are at the core of scientific endeavor, most notably in the phys-
ical and life sciences. In comparison, economic laboratory experiments have emerged
relatively late, but their role and adoption have significantly grown over the recent
decades (Falk and Heckman, 2009). Due to high internal validity (Guala, 2005), they
are well suited to identify systemic effects and to isolate and measure their causal de-
terminants through controlled variation of exogenous variables. Firm and oligopoly
experiments, as surveyed by Potters and Suetens (2013), have therefore been estab-
lished as an important research approach to test theoretical predictions and to collect
observations on empirical regularities in the context of strategic competitive interac-
tion. Moreover, laboratory experiments are utilized to examine the policy implications
of institutions which may have not (yet) been implemented in the field and to bench-
mark the results against designed counterfactuals (see Normann and Ricciuti, 2009, for
a survey of laboratory experiments that address economic policy issues). In this spirit,
the experimental studies in this thesis make use of the freedom with regard to the exper-
imental design as well as with regard to experimental behavior of participants to address
the research agenda outlined in Chapter 1. In particular with regard to the issue of tacit
collusion, which is notoriously hard to detect in field studies, laboratory experiments
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can provide insights by analyzing in- and out-of-equilibrium strategies and respective
market outcomes relative to benchmark equilibria predicted by economic theory. In
this vein, economic laboratory experiments may be seen as a cost-efficient testbed for
the evaluation of theoretical hypotheses and the comparison of alternative mechanisms,
which is particularly relevant in the context of regulatory institutions.
Whereas theoretical models may suffer from “problems of realism” (Morgan, 2005,
p.321), experiments may lack external validity, i.e., it remains unclear whether the exper-
imental results apply beyond the laboratory context in the relevant domain of investi-
gation (see Schram, 2005, for a discussion). Despite findings that offer support for the
external validity of economic experiments with student subjects (Ball and Cech, 1996),
there remain concerns particularly with respect to laboratory experiments that study
strategies and behavior at the firm level. Most commonly, critics suppose that labora-
tory experiments are not able to capture the complexity of “real markets”. Instead, em-
pirical evaluation should be carried out immediately in the field. However, as pointed
out before, there often may exist no field implementation with regard to the issues ad-
dressed by this thesis. Moreover, field studies face several challenges themselves with
regard to the generalizability of findings and endogeneity concerns as further discussed
in Section 6.1. In fact, the lack of control and randomization in many conventional field
studies have introduced the experimental design as a desired benchmark and led to
the emergence of empirical studies that exploit quasi-experiments (Angrist and Pis-
chke, 2010). In summary, these issues highlight the complementary nature of empirical
evaluation methods in contrast to the notion of a unique gold standard. In the interest
of robust theory-building it therefore seems valuable to employ heterogenous empiri-
cal methods, which each may examine different aspects of a theoretical prediction. In
this vein, methodological limitations together with the implications for future empirical
work for each individual study will be provided in the respective chapters. Finally, con-
cerns regarding the external validity of laboratory experiments are further addressed
by a validation study in Chapter 5, which replicates an experimental treatment with
expert subjects and compares results to the student sample.
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In a further effort to foster external validity and to facilitate decision making in complex
strategic settings, the study on wholesale competition in Chapter 5 employs an exper-
imental framework in continuous time. In contrast to the vast majority of oligopoly
experiments, which have employed experiments in discrete time, a continuous time
framework does not prescribe any exogenous timing order nor the number of actions
that can be undertaken by the subjects. In the spirit of Morgan (2005), this design fea-
ture is believed to foster epistemic power because it endogenizes the decision over the
timing of actions and thus extends the degree of freedom for subject behavior. By ab-
staining from a fixed timing structure, experiments in continuous time are able to test
the underlying theoretical model’s assumptions of a specific timing structure. More-
over, by allowing for continuous decision making and thus the freedom to constantly
observe, revise and adapt decisions, subjects’ task to understand and act in complex
experimental settings is arguably facilitated. Discrete time frameworks inherently re-
strict the number of actions and often employ only a relatively low number of periods,
which may lead to findings that rather resemble laboratory artifacts than stable long-
term behavior (see, e.g., Friedman et al., 2015; Oechssler et al., 2016, for a comparison of
short-term and long-term experiment horizons in a discrete setting). In contrast, con-
tinuous time frameworks do not constrain the number of decisions and may thus also
encourage exploratory strategies. This may be of particular importance if theoretical
models predict a multiplicity of equilibria and the experimental design needs to ensure
that all equilibria are in fact discovered by the subjects.
Despite these advantages, there may be concerns that the design of experiments in con-
tinuous instead of discrete time may significantly affect subjects’ behavior and thus
influence experimental findings in an unknown direction. Yet, only few studies have
investigated the effect of an experimental real-time setting that runs continuously and
in which players, per definitionem, hold onto their actions until they change them ex-
plicitly. Comparative studies have been conducted in the context of prisoner’s dilemma
games (Bigoni et al., 2015; Friedman and Oprea, 2012) as well as in a Hotelling (1929) lo-
cation model (Kephart and Friedman, 2015; Kephart and Rose, 2015). However, no sys-
tematic investigation on the effect of continuous versus discrete time framing on price
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and quantity competition in oligopoly experiments exists to date. Therefore, the fol-
lowing section scrutinizes whether prices and profits differ in discrete and continuous
time competition, i.e., whether one of the two time frameworks facilitates cooperation
and the ability to tacitly collude relative to the other.
3.3 Oligopoly competition in continuous time
Decision-making is, by its nature, a continuous process. Individuals but also organiza-
tions monitor their environment continuously and may act or react according to their
observations at any time. Especially in electronic markets, e.g., online retail or financial
markets, sellers and buyers may react promptly to decisions by other market partici-
pants. However, the reaction time by decision makers can also be chosen strategically
(e.g., strategically delayed), or actions may be taken only for a very short period (e.g.,
to send a “signal" to the competitor or to retaliate a competitor’s action). In continuous
time, the reaction time or duration of an action is chosen endogenously by the decision
makers and thus offers a richer set of strategies than if actions can only be taken at fixed
points in time.
However, most economic laboratory experiments have so far employed a discrete time
framework and have thus relied on the assumption that players move simultaneously
or sequentially in a pre-defined and ordered sequence. Consequently, subjects in the
experiment have a given (limited or infinite) amount of time to decide on their actions.
By this means, these experiments abstract from the decision makers’ choice with regard
to the timing of an action and thus implicitly restrict the space of potential strategies.
This study examines the effects when the restrictions imposed by a discrete time frame-
work are removed and decision making is allowed to take place in a continuous time
framework. Thereby, this study makes the following two contributions to the litera-
ture: First, it provides an examination of non-cooperative game settings in continuous
time, a time framework that captures more elements of reality than discrete time but
This section is based on joint work with Niklas Horstmann and Jan Krämer (Horstmann et al., 2015).
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for which theoretical predictions are scarce and ambiguous. Second, it is tested empiri-
cally whether the degree of tacit collusion differs between experiments in discrete and
continuous time. By doing so, the results may inform future experimental designs as
well as the appraisal of previous findings from discrete time experiments on oligopoly
competition.
Taken to the laboratory, continuous time implies that the length of a period in the re-
peated game is so small that subjects cannot observe distinct periods, i.e., the reaction
time of the experimental software is lower than the human reaction time. In the context
of oligopoly competition, a continuous time framework thus allows subjects to set and
change prices freely at any time (asynchronous-move), whereas a discrete time setting
requires subjects to decide about prices at fixed points in time (synchronous-move).
This study is not the first to employ a non-discrete time framework and previous com-
parisons of discrete and continuous time in lab experiments have been conducted for
specific contexts (see Subsection 3.3.1 for an overview). However, it is the first experi-
mental study concerned with the emergence of tacit collusion under oligopolistic com-
petition in continuous time and the first to systematically investigate the differences
in outcomes between continuous and discrete time oligopoly experiments. In sum-
mary, the findings suggest, irrespective of the underlying competition model (Bertrand
or Cournot) and the number of firms (two or three), that firms can coordinate better
on collusive outcomes in discrete time oligopoly experiments than in continuous time
oligopoly experiments. This is in sharp contrast to the experimental study by Friedman
and Oprea (2012), who find higher levels of coordination in continuous time (repeated)
than discrete time (one-shot) prisoner’s dilemma games. In conclusion, the nature of
the game seems to be particularly relevant for whether a continuous or discrete time
setting facilitates cooperative behavior.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Subsection 3.3.1, the extant
literature on (near-)continuous time experiments is reviewed and a framework to clas-
sify different experimental time frameworks is offered. Subsection 3.3.2 describes the
design and procedures of the conducted experiment in detail. Empirical results of the
78
3.3 Oligopoly competition in continuous time
laboratory experiment are derived in Subsection 3.3.3. Finally, Subsection 3.3.4 dis-
cusses methodological and policy implications of the experimental findings.
3.3.1 Timing in experiments
Economic laboratory experiments are used to evaluate theoretical predictions or to as-
sess the implications of economic market designs prior to their application in the field.
For this purpose, human participants face repeated decisions in a given experimental
scenario. In experiments that study competition between firms, repetition is usually im-
plemented as a (fixed or random) number of successive (and otherwise independent)
periods. A period does not start before all subjects have made a decision in the previous
period. This yields synchronous (simultaneous) decision-making by the firms, which
however does not resemble most strategic interactions in reality such as competition
between firms in a market. Instead, firms may make decisions about their products
and prices at any given time and respond to their rivals’ actions accordingly, i.e., de-
cisions are asynchronous. In consequence, experimental economists may often apply
a discrete time framework to model situations in which decisions are actually made in
continuous time.
Since the computerization of economic lab experiments, researchers have implemented
different timing schemes. However, there is little—although recently growing—
evidence on how decision-making in the lab differs between experimental setups in dis-
crete and continuous time (Berninghaus et al., 2007; Friedman and Oprea, 2012; Oprea
et al., 2014; Kephart and Friedman, 2015; Kephart and Rose, 2015). In lack of a con-
sistent definition, it is unclear which aspects constitute a discrete time framework and
consequently, non-discrete time frameworks in economic lab experiments. Therefore,
a classification of discrete and non-discrete time experiments is proposed, before the
extant literature is reviewed.
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A classification for continuous and discrete time experiments
First, it is defined what is commonly meant by a discrete time experiment: discrete time
is a synchronous-move repeated games framework with an unbounded period length.
A period, i.e., a discrete time step, ends only after all subjects have confirmed their
decisions. All experimental modes that deviate from this set-up are classified as exper-
iments in non-discrete time and are reviewed subsequently. Among the non-discrete
time experiments there exists a variety of modes that can be distinguished further.
The classification of non-discrete time experiments into continuous time and near-
continuous time experiments is motivated by Freeman and Ambady (2010), who show
that the human reaction time for very simple computerized tasks as measured by the
time needed to process information presented on the screen and to perform a mouse
click is above 0.5 seconds. Thus, in the most conservative way, continuous time exper-
iments are defined as those with rapidly repeated periods (of fixed time length), in
which the length of each period is below the threshold of the human reaction time,
i.e., 0.5 seconds or below. Technically speaking, as computers are designed to perform
operations in discrete steps, a computerized experiment is said to run in continuous
time if the transaction time (period length) between the experimental server and the
clients is smaller than the subjects’ reaction time. In continuous time experiments an
action becomes profit-relevant instantaneously and can be observed by other subjects
accordingly. Thus, the (potential) consequences of an action cannot be tested prior to
making the decision. Moreover, it is virtually impossible for subjects to make deci-
sions simultaneously. Consequently, in continuous time experiments the order or time
of decision-making is not exogenously given and thus, inter-period asynchronous in-
teraction emerges naturally. Subjects can act and react upon each others’ moves at a
self-specified time. Profits and other outcome variables become flow values. Thus, the
key aspect of a continuous time framework is that it endogenizes the timing of decisions
and thereby captures asynchronicity in decision-making as in many real-world strate-
gic interactions, i.e., decision-making that is neither simultaneous nor sequential.
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Continuous time experiments need to be distinguished from near-continuous time exper-
iments, which employ a synchronous-move repeated games framework with constant,
finite period lengths above the human reaction time, during which subjects have to
decide on their action in the subsequent period. As in continuous time experiments,
individual decisions are transferred from one period to the next, and hence, “doing
nothing” results in choosing the same action as before. Without communication be-
tween subjects, decisions by rivals do not become public and profit-relevant before the
end of a period. Therefore, as the reaction time is above the human decision threshold,
interaction is potentially synchronized and decision-making is simultaneous. Hence, as
under discrete time, inter-period asynchronous interaction or even sequential-moving
may occur behaviorally, but not naturally.
The advantages of near-continuous time in comparison to discrete time experiments
are a high control over the length of the session and the possibility to collect a large
amount of data in relatively short time. Thereby, patterns of repeated decisions may
occur that would not have been observable in a discrete time experiment (with fewer
periods). However, this time framework also bears two potential problems. First, dif-
ferent cognitive and physical abilities of human participants may have a greater in-
fluence on experimental results than in an experiment run in discrete time, i.e., some
subjects may not be able to change actions fast enough and hence, data on intended
decisions would be lost. Second, the repetition of short periods with a fixed length may
induce an aspiration to “use the time given” and change one’s decision every period.
Both caveats generally apply to continuous time experiments as well. However, since
profit is a flow value in continuous time experiments, a small difference in subjects’ re-
action times has only a relatively small impact on profits as subjects can react promptly
to a rival’s decision. For example, in a duopoly the additional profit gained by de-
fecting from a cooperative state is linear in the rival’s reaction time with a continuous
time framework but step-wise constant with a near-continuous time framework. Con-
sequently, for the same rival’s reaction time below the near-continuous period length,
(myopic) profits from defection are higher in near-continuous than in continuous time.
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A potential problem of the continuous time framework is that the theoretical prediction
of the repeated game may change due to its dynamic nature (see Subsection 3.3.2).
Finally, the continuous time framework needs to be distinguished from a clock or dead-
line mechanism, which is a synchronous-move repeated games framework with con-
stant, finite period lengths under which subjects’ current actions are common knowl-
edge and may be changed (freely), but do not become binding, until a clock runs out
or a deadline is reached. The action chosen in the very last moment before the end of
the deadline is reached becomes binding and constitutes the subject’s profit-relevant
decision for the next period. Consequently, the current action of a subject may be in-
terpreted as an intention for the final decision in the period but is profit-irrelevant, and
thus, cheap talk. Subjects can react to each others’ actions during a period, which can
be referred to as intra-period asynchronous interaction. As Roth (1995) points out, this
experimental design gives some indication of how “last-minute agreements” (p.324)
in negotiations evolve.2 With respect to experimental design, the clock or deadline
mechanism is a hybrid of the continuous time framework and the near-continuous time
framework. Whereas intra-period interaction between subjects (i.e., cheap talk before
the deadline) is asynchronous, inter-period interaction between subjects (i.e., decision-
making at the deadline) is synchronized. See Roth (1995) for an overview on the effects
of the clock or deadline mechanism and proposed models to explain these effects.
Review of non-discrete time experiments
Table 3.1 lists non-discrete time experiments in the extant literature and classifies them
according to the definitions given above. Next to the type of game that was run in the
laboratory, the length of a period, the mode of asynchronous interaction (i.e., between
2There are two further strands of experiments that implement a variant of this clock or deadline mecha-
nism. The first strand (Dorsey, 1992; Goren et al., 2003; Ishii and Kurzban, 2008) introduces restrictions
on how actions may be adjusted during the period, e.g., individual contributions in a public good game
may only be increased but not decreased over time. Kurzban et al. (2001) compares public good exper-
iments in a clock framework with and without revocable contributions. In the second strand (Levati
and Neugebauer, 2004; Murphy et al., 2006), prior to a clock running out, the period may end by other
means such as a player dropping out of an auction or exiting a market. Both strands may be viewed as
extensions to the basic clock/deadline mechanism.
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or within a period) and the classification to one of the non-discrete time frameworks
are reported for each experimental study. In the following, a period in the context of
repeated games is denoted as the amount of time a subject has to decide on a binding
action. Note that this is identical to the minimum amount of time that a binding deci-
sion by a subject holds. Thus, a supergame is defined as a complete sequence of a fixed
or random number of periods.
Feeley et al. (1997), Berninghaus and Ehrhart (2003), and Berninghaus et al. (1999, 2006,
2007) were among the first to conduct continuous time experiments with period lengths
below the human reaction time and a fixed supergame length of several minutes up to
half an hour.3 More recently, Cheung and Friedman (2009), Friedman and Oprea (2012),
Oprea et al. (2014), Bigoni et al. (2015), Kephart and Friedman (2015), and Kephart
and Rose (2015) ran experiments in continuous time with supergame lengths from 20
seconds to four minutes. Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998), Deck and Wilson (2002, 2003,
2008), Davis (2009), Davis and Korenok (2009), Davis et al. (2009, 2010), and Friedman
et al. (2015) conduct near-continuous time experiments with a high number of rapidly
repeated periods. The clock or deadline framework is employed by Roth et al. (1988),
Güth et al. (2002), Goren et al. (2004), and Deck and Nikiforakis (2012).
Of the continuous time experiments, only Berninghaus et al. (2007), Friedman and
Oprea (2012), Oprea et al. (2014), Kephart and Friedman (2015), and Kephart and Rose
(2015) compare outcomes under both discrete and continuous time. Berninghaus et al.
(2007) study network formation and network effects in social and economic networks
in which connections to other players are beneficial but costly. They find that the for-
mation of a certain star structure, which is the unique Nash equilibrium, prevails under
both time frameworks. However, subjects are found to alternate the coveted position
of the center player in the star network in continuous time but not in discrete time.
Berninghaus et al. (2007) suggest that their results may be explained by inequity aver-
sion. As the discrete treatment is composed of only 15 periods whereas the continuous
3Note that Millner et al. (1990) already followed a continuous time approach with output variables given
as flow values. However, technical constraints of the PLATO software used for the computerization of
the experiment resulted in a transaction time between clients and server of about five seconds, which
lies one order of magnitude above the suggested threshold of 0.5 seconds.
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TABLE 3.1: Economic laboratory experiments in non-discrete time.
Study Type of game Period length† Async. interaction
Continuous time
Feeley et al. (1997) Prisoner’s dilemma n/a†† Inter-period
Berninghaus et al. (1999) Population 1/10 seconds Inter-period
Berninghaus and Ehrhart (2003) Evolutionary 1/10 seconds Inter-period
Berninghaus et al. (2006) Network formation 1/10 seconds Inter-period
Berninghaus et al. (2007) Network formation 1/5 seconds Inter-period
Cheung and Friedman (2009) Coordination 1/2 seconds Inter-period
Knigge and Buskens (2010) Network formation n/a†† Inter-period
Friedman and Oprea (2012) Prisoner’s dilemma 1/20 seconds Inter-period
Oprea et al. (2014) Public good 1/10 seconds Inter-period
Bigoni et al. (2015) Prisoner’s dilemma 16/100 seconds Inter-period
Kephart and Friedman (2015) Hotelling 1/20 seconds Inter-period
Kephart and Rose (2015) Hotelling 1/20 seconds Inter-period
Chapter 5 Wholesale competition 1/2 seconds Inter-period
Near-continuous time
Millner et al. (1990)††† Posted offer 5 seconds Inter-period
Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998) Public good 10–90 seconds Inter-period
Deck and Wilson (2002) Posted offer 3 seconds Inter-k-periods-block
Deck and Wilson (2003) Posted offer 3 seconds Inter-20-periods-block
Deck and Wilson (2008) Posted offer 1.7 seconds Inter-period
Davis (2009) Posted offer 7 seconds Inter-period
Davis and Korenok (2009) Posted offer 7–70 seconds Inter-period
Davis et al. (2009) Posted offer 12 seconds Inter-period
Davis et al. (2010) Posted offer 12–18 seconds Inter-period
Friedman et al. (2015) Cournot competition 4 seconds Inter-period
Clock/deadline mechanism
Roth et al. (1988) Bargaining 9–12 minutes Intra-period
Dorsey (1992) Public good 180 seconds Intra-period
Kurzban et al. (2001) Public good 90 seconds Intra-period
Güth et al. (2002) Public good 3 minutes Intra-period
Goren et al. (2003) Public good 60–90 seconds Intra-period
Goren et al. (2004) Public good 60–90 seconds Intra-period
Levati and Neugebauer (2004) Public good  50 seconds Intra-period
Murphy et al. (2006) Trust dilemma  45 seconds Intra-period
Ishii and Kurzban (2008) Public good 90 seconds Intra-period
Deck and Nikiforakis (2012) Minimum-effort 60 seconds Intra-period
† Period length is defined as the minimum time that a binding decision by a subject holds.
†† The transaction time of the software is not stated, but assumed to be below 0.5 seconds.
††† The experiment uses the PLATO software. Period length is determined as its estimated latency.
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treatment runs for 30 minutes, subjects may find it easier to equalize payoffs among
themselves in the latter.
Recently, Oprea et al. (2014) compared contributions to a public good in discrete time
and continuous time over ten minutes. In the continuous time treatments, contributions
could be changed in real-time. In the discrete time treatments, subjects decided on their
contributions once a minute, i.e., they played ten periods with a fixed length of one
minute. In this setup with few discrete periods (of a limited period length), the authors
find no differences in contributions between the two time frameworks.
By contrast, Friedman and Oprea (2012) compare cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s
dilemma in discrete and continuous time and find that the continuous time framework
fosters cooperation among the players relative to discrete time. More precisely, the
authors compare continuous and discrete variants of the prisoner’s dilemma in su-
pergames with a constant length of 60 seconds. In continuous time, they find a median
mutual cooperation rate of 90 percent over the supergames’ duration. With the dura-
tion of each supergame being fixed, the number of periods is decreased to eight in 60
seconds and finally to one in 60 seconds, i.e., a one-shot game.4 The main finding of
the study is that cooperation decreases as the number of periods decreases so that the
median rate of mutual cooperation is zero in the one-shot treatments. In other words,
cooperation is higher in a continuously repeated prisoner’s dilemma than in a one-shot
(discrete) prisoner’s dilemma. Friedman and Oprea analyze the subjects’ individual
behavior in the continuous time treatments and identify different strategies. A model
of e-equilibria (Radner, 1986; Bergin and MacLeod, 1993) is found to predict their find-
ings very well. A key aspect of their experimental design is “that period lengths and
potential payoffs are kept constant across [...] treatments” (Friedman and Oprea, 2012,
p.343). However, this is only achieved by implicitly changing two treatment variables
in the transition from continuous time to the one-shot (discrete) treatment at the same
time. The first treatment variable is obviously the time framework of a repeated game,
4Comparably, Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998) varied the number of periods (10, 30, and 90) in a public
good game of a total fixed session length of 15 minutes and found that cooperation increases with the
number of repetitions.
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i.e., continuous or discrete, and the second treatment variable is the repetition of the
game itself, i.e., repeated game or one-shot game.
Both Kephart and Friedman (2015) as well as Kephart and Rose (2015) compare a dis-
crete time and two continuous time variants of the Hotelling (1929) spatial competition
model with and without vertical differentiation. Kephart and Friedman (2015) find
that under continuous time location choices resemble the static Nash equilibrium more
closely than under discrete time. With vertical differentiation and an additional choice
on price, Kephart and Rose (2015) find some support for the notion that continuous
time increases cooperation. Whereas subjects may decide instantaneously in one of the
continuous time treatments, they may change their decision only gradually at a speci-
fied “speed” in the other continuous treatment. However, under discrete time, subjects
have to decide on location (and price in case of Kephart and Rose, 2015) during a three
second time interval. Note that with respect to the timing classifications outlined above,
these discrete time treatments clearly fall under the near-continuous time framework.
3.3.2 Experimental framework
The following experiment studies the impact of continuous time relative to discrete
time on the outcome of experimental oligopoly competition. In an attempt to foster
the robustness of findings, symmetric differentiated Bertrand as well as Cournot com-
petition in duopolies and triopolies each are considered. Thereby, the experiment ex-
amines three dichotomous treatment variables (discrete vs. continuous time, Bertrand
vs. Cournot competition, duopolies vs. triopolies) in a full-factorial design, resulting
in a total of eight different treatments. The labels used to refer to the treatments in the
following sections are stated in Table 3.2 by appending abbreviations from left to right,
e.g., RB3 refers to the continuous (real-time) Bertrand triopoly treatment.
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TABLE 3.2: Treatment variables and their values.
Time framework Competition model Number of firms
Discrete time (D) Bertrand (B) Duopoly (2)
Continuous time (real-time) (R) Cournot (C) Triopoly (3)
Oligopoly competition
Price competition à la Bertrand and quantity competition à la Cournot are the two
workhorse models of IO. When comparing different designs in experiments on firm
behavior, they serve as good proxies for a large share of models on oligopoly competi-
tion. As homogeneous price competition yields a discontinuous demand function and
the empirically observed Bertrand paradox is often deemed unrealistic, the model by
Singh and Vives (1984)—which generalizes the Hotelling (1929) model to exploit the
duality between price and quantity competition in differentiated goods—is utilized for
the experiment. More precisely the model’s generalization (Häckner, 2000) to more
than two firms is employed (see, e.g., Suetens and Potters, 2007, for a previous applica-
tion in the context of oligopoly experiments).
Consider a market with n 2 N firms. Each firm k 2 {1, ...,n} produces a single good.
The firms’ goods are differentiated horizontally but are homogeneous in vertical qual-
ity and have identical demand elasticity. Thus, firms are assumed to be symmetric.
Note that asymmetric (inverse) demand may result in additional behavioral effects in
the experiment which are not in focus here, but are further analyzed in Chapter 6 in an
asymmetric application of the model. In the following, a brief sketch of the propensi-
ties of the model is provided, while a detailed analysis of the theoretical predictions is
relegated to Appendix A.1.
For the Cournot treatments of quantity competition, the inverse demand for firm k is
given by
pk = w   l
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with w,l > 0 and the degree of substitutability q 2 [ 1,1]. If q < 0 goods are com-
plements, if q = 0 goods are independent of one another, and if q = 1 they are perfect
substitutes. For non-perfect substitutes (q < 1), the corresponding demand function for
firm k in the Bertrand treatments is given by






l(1 + q(n   1)) ,
L =
1 + q(n   2)
l(1   q)(1 + q(n   1)) ,
Q =
q(n   1)
l(1   q)(1 + q(n   1)) ,
and n as the number of firms with non-negative demand, i.e., firms that have not exited
the market due to a too high price. If qk < 0 firm k exits the market, its quantity is set to
zero, and n is decreased by one. Normalizing costs to zero, firm k’s profit is Pk = pkqk.
For the subsequent empirical analysis, three benchmark outcomes for Bertrand and
Cournot competition are considered, respectively. Note that, although goods are differ-
entiated, equilibrium prices and quantities are the same for all firms. First, under the
Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium firms are assumed to be price-takers so that they
maximize their profit irrespective of their rivals’ decision. Second, the Nash equilib-
rium assumes that firms choose a price (quantity) such as to maximize their own profit
given their rivals’ prices (quantities). Third, under the collusive outcome firms are as-
sumed to cooperate and hence, employ joint profit maximization (JPM) acting as a sin-
gle monopolist. It is straightforward to show that PJPM   PNashCournot   PNashBertrand   PWalras
for all valid parameter combinations. If goods are substitutes (g > 0), which will be as-
sumed subsequently, Nash prices and profits are higher under Cournot competition
than under Bertrand competition.
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TABLE 3.3: Scaled theoretical benchmarks of oligopoly competition for each treatment as dis-








































For the experiment, the parameters of the oligopoly competition model are w = 100,
l = 1, and q = 23 . Consequently, G =
300
2n+1 , L =
6n 3
2n+1 , and Q =
6n 6
2n+1 . Table 3.3 shows the
corresponding scaled theoretical benchmarks of the one-shot game for each treatment
as displayed in the experiment.
In a further effort to maximize comparability between treatments and to prevent any
source for behavioral effects other than the treatment, input and output variables are
scaled in the following way. The action space of prices in Bertrand treatments and
quantities in Cournot treatments is equally set to [0,100] with a minimum increment of
one and the joint profit maximizing action at a price or quantity of 50. This ensures that
the collusive action is not more or less “behaviorally attractive” across treatments and
that the search costs of finding the collusive action are the same in all treatments. With
a similar intention profits are scaled so that they would be equal in Nash equilibrium.
Thereby, a subject playing the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game—given that its
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competitors play Nash as well—would make identical profits in all treatments. Alto-
gether, this precludes confounding effects of the experimental design and parametriza-
tion. Furthermore, perfect information was ensured in all treatments, i.e., subjects got
individual feedback about each competitor’s price, quantity and profit.
Repeated games in discrete time and continuous time
Moving from the one-shot game introduced above to the repeated game implemented
in the experiment, several experimental design implications are inferred from the ex-
tant literature. First, in contrast to Friedman and Oprea (2012), repeated games are
employed in the discrete time treatments as well as in the continuous time treatments.
Second, the discrete time treatments are composed of 60 periods—much more than
in Berninghaus et al. (2007) or Oprea et al. (2014)—to reduce differences to continu-
ous time solely due to a longer time horizon of the experiment (Friedman et al., 2015;
Oechssler et al., 2016). Third and contrasting Kephart and Friedman (2015) as well as
Kephart and Rose (2015), in the discrete time treatments the time provided to subjects
for their decision-making process in each period is not limited. Fourth, discrete time
sessions were ran first and the duration of the continuous time sessions was then set to
equal the average duration of the discrete time sessions, which was about 30 minutes.
Hence, the total session length is similar across all treatments and one period in dis-
crete time corresponds to 30 seconds in continuous time. The period length in the dis-
crete time treatments is infinite and 0.2 seconds in the continuous time treatments, i.e.,
considerably below the conservative threshold of 0.5 seconds. Under the continuous
time framework, current profit represents a flow value of time. In order to maximize
comparability between treatments, the profit displayed in the experimental software
is thus scaled to the profit that subjects would earn if the current prices or quantities
would be held constant for 30 seconds, ceteris paribus. Thereby, given the same prices
or quantities in one of the discrete time treatments and the corresponding continuous
time treatment, the information presented to the subjects is not only qualitatively equal
but also visually identical.
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The model of differentiated Bertrand and Cournot competition considered in this ex-
periment has a unique strict Nash equilibrium in the one-shot (stage) game. In discrete
time, this also constitutes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the finitely re-
peated game. In continuous time, however, the theoretical prediction is not straightfor-
ward. Maskin and Tirole (1988a,b) consider two different continuous time frameworks
with endogenous timing in duopolistic price and quantity competition and show that
equilibrium behavior is similar to a sequential-move infinitely repeated duopoly. In
particular, continuous time is modeled as a fine grid of periods in a sequential-move
game, where firms are committed to a price or quantity for a deterministic or stochas-
tic length of time. Whereas the deterministic variant may rather apply to repeated
games that were classified as near-continuous time, the stochastic variant does capture
the asynchronous nature of continuous time quite well. Irrespective of the time vari-
ant, a collusive equilibrium emerges for discount factors close to one. In their model,
Maskin and Tirole assume that the Markov property holds, i.e., that future states of
the stochastic process only depend on the current state and not the sequence of states
that preceded it. In a comparable fashion, Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) model con-
tinuous time as “a discrete time model, but with a grid that is infinitely fine” (p.1171)
and thereby suggest a more general definition of games in continuous time. Friedman
and Oprea (2012) point out that this model predicts mutual cooperation at all times in
a prisoner’s dilemma, which may be viewed as a highly abstracted variant of homoge-
neous Bertrand competition. In sum, theory predicts that, if anything, asynchronous-
move continuous time is more prone to tacit collusion than simultaneous-move discrete
time. Additionally, Bigoni et al. (2015) find that a deterministic ending rule facilitates
cooperation even more than a stochastic ending rule under continuous time, whereas
other experimental evidence indicates that the opposite may hold under discrete time
(Dal Bó, 2005). Theses findings add further support to the conjecture that the continu-
ous time treatments in this experiment are expected to exhibit more tacit collusion than
the discrete time experiments.
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Measuring the degree of tacit collusion
As Nash prices, quantities, and profits do not coincide under Bertrand and Cournot
and are additionally dependent on the number of competitors, these values are not ad-
equate to compare cooperative intentions, i.e., tacit collusion, across treatments. This
study therefore combines indices for the degree of tacit collusion used by Engel (2007)
and Suetens and Potters (2007) to compare tacit collusion between treatments irrespec-
tive of different theoretical predictions. Thereby, the degree of tacit collusion is mea-
sured as the relative deviation of a price, quantity, or profit from the theoretical pre-
diction towards the joint profit maximizing price, quantity, or profit. With respect to
Bertrand (Cournot) competition, a price (quantity) set by a firm can be unambiguously
converted to a degree of tacit collusion. Hence, for means of comparison between treat-
ments, firms may be assumed to decide on a certain degree of tacit collusion instead of
a price or quantity. In a similar fashion, a firm’s profit as well as average profit of firms
in a market may be expressed as a degree of tacit collusion. Therefore, a degree of tacit
collusion based on model input, i.e., price in Bertrand and quantity in Cournot, as well
as a degree of tacit collusion based on model output, i.e., profit is considered. Formally,





xJPM   xE ,
with x 2 {p/q,P} and E 2 {Nash,Walras}, resulting in four different measures de-
pending on the theoretical benchmark (Nash or Walrasian equilibrium) and on the in-
put or output variable (price/quantity or profit). Figure 3.2 illustrates the degree of
tacit collusion based on prices as measured relative to the Nash equilibrium, given the
observed price p. If jEx = 0, the value of x corresponds to the theoretical prediction by
the equilibrium concept E. If jEx = 1, the market is completely collusive and competi-
tors behave as a single monopolist. Note that jEp/q may exceed one as joint profit is not
monotonic in price or quantity, but jEP  1.
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FIGURE 3.2: Normalized degree of tacit collusion based on prices relative to the Nash equilib-





With respect to the technical requirements of continuous time and to ensure high con-
trol over the correct scaling of time in all treatments, the experiment was computer-
ized with Brownie, a newly-developed Java-based experimental software (Müller et al.,
2014).5 All sessions were run at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Karlsruhe,
Germany between October and December 2014. First the four discrete time treatments
with 60 periods were ran. Without the first period, in which subjects familiarized them-
selves with the experimental software and decided on their initial price or quantity, the
discrete time sessions took on average roughly 30 minutes. This amount of time was
used to parametrize the length (again, without the phase of deciding on initial price
or quantity) of the subsequently run continuous time sessions. Note that no practice
periods with interaction between subjects were run and thus, no learning confounds
may occur. The matching of subjects was constant throughout a session (fixed part-
ner matching). In total, 240 students of economic fields participated in the experiment.
Subjects were recruited via the ORSEE platform (Greiner, 2015) and participated only
in one of the treatments (between-subject design).
The protocol for each session follows five steps. First, upon entering the lab, subjects
are randomly assigned to a chair, from which they can neither see nor speak to any
other participant of the experiment. Second, after everyone has been seated, the exper-
imental instructions are handed out to the participants in print and read aloud from
5Recently, further experimental software that captures continuous time was introduced by Pettit et al.
(2014), particularly for experimenters with limited programming skills, and by Hawkins (2015) for
web-based experiments.
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a recording.6 The recording ensures that any confounding effect of the reader’s voice,
accent, or intonation is identical across sessions from the same treatment and as simi-
lar as possible across treatments. Therefore, identical paragraphs across treatments are
recorded once and the recording is used in all treatments. Third, prior to the beginning
of the experiment, each participant has to complete a computerized test of questions
regarding the comprehension of the instructions. It is only allowed to proceed to the
next question after the correct answer to the current question is entered. Fourth, after
all subjects have successfully completed the test, the experiment starts automatically.
Over the course of the experiment participants wear ear protectors so that they are not
influenced by clicking noises of computer mouses or other disturbing noise. Fifth, fol-
lowing the end of the experiment, each participant is paid out the profits accumulated
during the experiment privately and in cash. Following this protocol, the total length
of a session from subjects’ entering to leaving the lab was about one hour. The average
payoff per subject was EUR 16.85.
3.3.3 Results
The experimental data amounts to 12 independent duopolies or triopolies in each treat-
ment. Due to no-shows, two exceptions are the RB3 treatment for which there are only
11 triopolies and the RC3 treatment for which there is data on 13 triopolies, because
the number of no-shows required an additional session. For each cohort there is data
on market variables over 60 periods in a discrete time treatment and on 9,000 ticks (at
an interval of 0.2 seconds each) for each market in a continuous time treatment. In
the following the experimental data is first analyzed on the level of independent co-
horts, followed by a panel analysis that considers observations at the tick and period
level. Table 3.4 reports degrees of tacit collusion across treatments averaged over co-
horts and gives a first impression on treatment effects.7 Most notably, in stark contrast
6As an example, the experimental instructions of the RB3 treatment together with a screenshot of the
experimental software are provided in Appendix C.1.
7To reduce distortions by start- and end-game effects, the first and last sixth of periods have been dropped
before computing cohort averages. For comparison to Table 3.4, average degrees of tacit collusion over
the entire time horizon across treatments are reported in Appendix B.1.
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TABLE 3.4: Average degrees of tacit collusion across treatments.







DB2 12 0.860 0.861 0.930 0.965
(0.285) (0.326) (0.142) (0.081)
DB3 12 0.659 0.683 0.773 0.859
(0.352) (0.327) (0.235) (0.145)
DC2 12 0.674 0.532 0.918 0.971
(0.574) (0.994) (0.143) (0.062)
DC3 12 0.473 0.364 0.789 0.898
(0.551) (0.785) (0.220) (0.126)
RB2 12 0.769 0.736 0.885 0.934
(0.371) (0.468) (0.185) (0.117)
RB3 11 0.555 0.505 0.703 0.780
(0.329) (0.350) (0.219) (0.156)
RC2 12 0.842 0.760 0.960 0.985
(0.279) (0.374) (0.070) (0.023)
RC3 13 0.424 0.233 0.770 0.877
(0.516) (0.784) (0.206) (0.125)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
to the hypothesis, the degree of tacit collusion based on Nash profits is significantly
higher under discrete time than under continuous time in a non-parametric one-tailed
Mann-Whitney U test without controlling for the competition model or the number of
competitors (z = 1.77, p = 0.038).
In order to allow for a comparison of panel data from both time frameworks, the exper-
imental data from the continuous time treatments is mapped to the 60 periods of the
discrete time treatments. In particular, for each discrete period, the degree of tacit collu-
sion in the continuous time treatments is averaged over 30 seconds, i.e., 150 consecutive
ticks of 0.2 seconds. Thereby, the first 30 seconds correspond to the first discrete period,
the next 30 seconds correspond to the second discrete period, and so on. The mean is
used as a single proxy for the behavior over 30 seconds as it has the advantage that
a maximum of information about the distribution is preserved and that it is, loosely
speaking, merely a reduction in data resolution rather than a reduction in data itself. In
contrast to the median or other point statistics, changing the value of any single data
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point inevitably changes the mean as well. For a direct comparison of the two time
frameworks using the mean is therefore arguably most conservative.
RESULT 3.1. The degree of tacit collusion based on profits is significantly higher under discrete
time than under continuous time.
A firm’s profit is determined not only by its own decisions but also by the decisions of
its rivals. One firm’s profit in a period is hence not independent from its rivals’ prof-
its. Therefore, the degree of tacit collusion based on profits is measured on the market
level, i.e., calculating the average of each firm’s profit in a duopoly or triopoly. There
are a total of 96 markets across all treatments with 60 discretized periods each. Test-
ing for treatment effects in panel data requires to control for the dependence between
observations from the same market as opposed to observations from different markets.
Consequently, the following multilevel mixed-effects regression model is estimated, for
which treatment DB2 serves as a baseline:
j
E
P,t,m = b0 + xm
+ bContinuous · Continuous
+ bCournot · Cournot
+ bTriopoly · Triopoly
+ (bPeriod + bPeriod,m) · t
+ et,m,
where jEP,t,m is the degree of tacit collusion based on average profit P of all firms on
market, i.e., duopoly or triopoly, m in period t. On the market level, xm is the random
intercept that controls for intra-cluster correlation in terms of different base levels of
tacit collusion between markets and bPeriod,m is a random coefficient for the time trend
in each market.
Table 3.5 reports estimates for the degree of tacit collusion based on Nash (Model 1)
and Walrasian (Model 2) profits, respectively. Irrespective of the theoretical benchmark,
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continuous time is found to have a significant negative effect on tacit collusion and re-
duces the degree of tacit collusion between 4 and 20 percentage points (pp), ceteris
paribus. This is in stark contrast to the hypothesis and previous experimental find-
ings. Yet, both control treatment dummies for the competition model and the number
of firms show the expected effects. In line with the meta-study on number effects in
oligopoly experiments in Chapter 6, triopolies exhibit (10 to 22 pp) less tacit collusion
than duopolies. Moreover, price competition is found to facilitate tacit collusion com-
pared to quantity competition if measured based on Nash profit. The degree of tacit
collusion is almost 26 pp lower under quantity competition compared to price competi-
tion. However, the finding is reversed if tacit collusion is measured based on Walrasian
profit. Then, the degree of tacit collusion under quantity competition lies almost 5 pp
above price competition, everything else being equal. This is also in line with the ex-
pectation as the Walrasian equilibrium is independent of the competition model so that
the Walrasian-based degree of tacit collusion does not control for the different Nash
predictions of price and quantity competition. Furthermore, there are no significant in-
teraction effects between the treatment variables in either regression model. In sum, the
effect of continuous time compared to discrete time is not only statistically significant
but similar in magnitude to the effects due to the number of competitors and the mode
of competition.
In addition to the assessment of collusion degrees based on profits, i.e., an output vari-
able, a similar yet complementary analysis of prices and quantities, i.e., input variables,
is conducted next. Thereby, instead of aggregate market behavior, the individual firm
choices of prices and quantities are compared across treatments.
RESULT 3.2. The degree of tacit collusion based on prices and quantities is significantly higher
under discrete time than under continuous time.
Each decision by a firm on a price or quantity can be unambiguously transferred into
a choice for a certain degree of tacit collusion, which makes decisions on prices and
quantities comparable across treatments. Applying the same approach as above, the
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TABLE 3.5: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of the degree of tacit collusion on treat-
ments.
Baseline: Discrete Bertrand Duopoly (DB2).









p/q  1 jWalrasp/q  1
Continuous  0.196⇤  0.037⇤  0.109⇤⇤  0.092⇤⇤  0.106⇤⇤  0.094⇤⇤
(0.110) (0.022) (0.052) (0.037) (0.053) (0.038)
Cournot  0.264⇤⇤ 0.048⇤⇤  0.276⇤⇤⇤  0.053  0.235⇤⇤⇤  0.003
(0.110) (0.022) (0.052) (0.037) (0.053) (0.038)
Triopoly  0.219⇤⇤  0.097⇤⇤⇤  0.179⇤⇤⇤  0.138⇤⇤⇤  0.190⇤⇤⇤  0.145⇤⇤⇤
(0.110) (0.022) (0.054) (0.038) (0.054) (0.039)
Period < 0.001 >  0.001 >  0.001  0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
(0.002) (< 0.001) (0.001) (< 0.001) (0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 0.851⇤⇤⇤ 0.941⇤⇤⇤ 0.914⇤⇤⇤ 0.883⇤⇤⇤ 0.853⇤⇤⇤ 0.823⇤⇤⇤
(0.110) (0.022) (0.055) (0.039) (0.056) (0.040)
Groups 96 96 240 240 240 240
Observations 5,760 5,760 14,400 14,400 13,876 13,876
Standard errors in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
following multilevel mixed-effects regression model is used to estimate firms’ behavior




p/q,t,k = b0 + xk
+ bContinuous · Continuous
+ bCournot · Cournot
+ bTriopoly · Triopoly
+ (bPeriod + bPeriod,k) · t
+ et,k,
with jEp/q,t,k as the degree of tacit collusion based on firm k’s price p or quantity q played
in period t.
Estimation results for Models 3 and 4, reported in Table 3.5, confirm that the degree of
tacit collusion of firms’ actions is significantly higher (9 to 11 pp) under discrete time
than under continuous time, both with respect to Nash equilibrium as well as Wal-
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rasian equilibrium. Similarly, prices and quantities in triopolies are 14 to 18 pp less
collusive than in duopolies. With respect to the mode of competition, however, price
competition elicits more collusive behavior than quantity competition irrespective of
the underlying theoretical benchmark. Although the difference is found to be signifi-
cant and economically relevant with almost 28 pp only in the Nash-based degree of tacit
collusion, quantity competition is—contrary to expectations—not more prone to tacit
collusion based on Walrasian equilibrium. Again, there are no significant interaction
effects between treatment variables.
A possible criticism of the previous analysis is that jEp/q is not monotonic in “collusive-
ness” as it may exceed one, although firms make lower profit compared to the case of
j
E
p/q = 1. In fact, 3.6% of firms’ prices and quantities exceed xJPM. However, any value
of
   jEp/q
   < 1 is a deviation from the collusive equilibrium. This is not captured in Mod-
els 3 and 4 in Table 3.5. Excluding all observations with jEp/q > 1 results in estimates
reported in Models 5 and 6, which show that the treatment effects are robust to degrees
of tacit collusion exceeding one. Other alternatives dealing with these outliers such as
folding down all observations with a tacit collusion degree above one, i.e., choosing
1  
   1   jEp/q
    as the dependent variable, lead to similar results.
3.3.4 Discussion
This study provides empirical evidence that tacit collusion is higher in discrete time
experimental oligopolies than in continuous time experimental oligopolies. Thereby,
discrete time is based on synchronized and simultaneous decision-making and contin-
uous time is based on asynchronous and endogenized decision-making. These find-
ings are robust with respect to a full-factorial treatment design with i) differentiated
Bertrand and Cournot competition, ii) in duopolies and triopolies, iii) under discrete
time and continuous time. The key insights can be summarized as follows: First, con-
trolling for the competition model as well as the number of firms there is significantly
more tacit collusion under discrete time than under continuous time, irrespective of
99
Chapter 3 Theoretical Foundations and Experimental Methodology
whether the Nash or the Walrasian equilibrium serves as the relative benchmark. This
is in stark contrast to the theory (Maskin and Tirole, 1988a,b; Simon and Stinchcombe,
1989) as well as previous experimental studies on continuous and discrete time (Fried-
man and Oprea, 2012; Oprea et al., 2014). Second, the study confirms two well-known
relationships obtained in previous studies: Duopolies are found to be more collusive
than triopolies (see Chapter 6); and Bertrand competition in prices is found to be more
prone to tacit collusion than Cournot competition in quantities (Suetens and Potters,
2007). These latter findings indicate that participants in the experiment behave in line
with the general theory on oligopoly competition and thus findings with respect to the
effect of the time framework cannot be simply dismissed as experimental artifacts.
In this vein, the implications for further research are two-fold. First, researchers de-
signing oligopoly experiments should consider that the implementation of a certain
time framework may alter their results. In particular, experiments on tacit collusion—
which were until now solely run in discrete time—may have potentially overestimated
the supra-competitive effect. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that the mode of tim-
ing interacts with other properties of oligopoly competition such as market demand,
cost structure or strategy space. Second and more general, the effect of continuous
time on repeated non-cooperative games is ambiguous. In contrast to this study, ex-
periments on simpler games such as contribution to a public good (Oprea et al., 2014)
or the prisoner’s dilemma (Friedman and Oprea, 2012) found no differences between
time frameworks or even higher propensities to cooperate under continuous time than
under discrete time. The experiment differs from these two studies in several ways,
especially with regard to a greater action space and a higher number of periods in the
discrete time treatments. Thus, it may prove worthwhile to systematically vary the
number of periods in future research on discrete time versus continuous time and ex-
tend the comparison to other games (with a different number of possible actions).
For a deeper understanding of why oligopolistic firms find it easier to tacitly collude
under discrete time than under continuous time a more profound analysis of firms’ be-
havior is required. Firms may apply different strategies or learn from past behavior in
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many different ways: For example, behavior by firms in repeated oligopoly competition
may be characterized by a static strategy (see, e.g., Fudenberg et al. (2012) for strategies
in a prisoner’s dilemma), by a dynamic strategy such as the imitation of a competi-
tor’s behavior (Huck et al., 1999) or by learning from own and competitors’ decisions
in the past (Huck et al., 2004a). In particular, reinforcement learning, which was previ-
ously found to converge to collusion in a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly (Waltman
and Kaymak, 2008), may be a fruitful approach in explicitly capturing the different dy-
namics of simultaneous-move discrete time and asynchronous-move continuous time.
Furthermore, as continuous time makes simultaneous decision-making virtually im-
possible, experiments comparing sequential-move and simultaneous-move games may
be connected to the findings of this study. In fact, experiments on quantity (Huck et al.,
2001) and price (Kübler and Müller, 2002) competition suggest that sequential-move
interaction is less prone to tacit collusion than simultaneous-move competition. How-
ever, this finding holds only if the sequence of decision-making is exogenous. Instead, if
timing of sequential decisions is endogenous, behavior is equal to simultaneous-move
oligopolies (Fonseca et al., 2005; Müller, 2006).
A key feature of the presented experimental design is that it compares two extremes
of a spectrum of time frameworks with each other: Pure discrete time with no limit
on period lengths and pure continuous time with a fixed period length below the hu-
man reaction time. Obviously, this design inherently cedes control over the duration of
sessions in discrete time. Therefore, a further investigation of period lengths in the tran-
sition from discrete time to continuous time may provide valuable insights whether the
effect of the time framework is driven by period length, number of repetitions, or the
(a)synchronicity of decision-making. In particular, this calls for an experiment in near-




Infrastructure Competition and Open
Access Regulation
MARGIN squeezes can occur in markets where non-integrated downstreamfirms, which supply only retail goods, rely on wholesale access to an essential
upstream good provided by a vertically integrated competitor. In this case, the inte-
grated firm may be able to set the wholesale price above the retail price, i.e., to squeeze
the margin of the downstream firm, and thus to ultimately induce its exit from the retail
market, i.e., to foreclose the non-integrated rival. Whether regulators or antitrust author-
ities should intervene in cases of margin squeeze conduct is controversial. European
agencies and courts qualify margin squeeze conduct as a stand-alone antitrust abuse
(see the cases Deutsche Telekom, Telefónica, and TeliaSonera), whereas US courts dismiss
allegations based on the margin squeeze rationale (see the cases linkLine and Trinko).
Auf’mkolk (2012) reviews recent margin squeeze cases in competition law, Gaudin and
Saavedra (2014) discuss margin squeeze regulation in European telecommunications
markets.
This chapter scrutinizes Open Access regulation that prohibits margin squeezes in mar-
kets with more than one integrated firm producing the upstream good. More specifi-
cally, a retail triopoly is considered in which one vertically integrated firm provides
This chapter is based on joint work with Niklas Horstmann and Jan Krämer (Horstmann et al., 2016a).
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wholesale access to a non-integrated downstream competitor, while the other inte-
grated firm relies on self-supply of the upstream good and does not offer access. This
generic market structure captures any industry in which downstream firms are sup-
plied by a wholesale monopoly while other integrated firms exercise additional com-
petitive pressure in the retail market. In particular, the scenario of infrastructure compe-
tition in conjunction with retail competition resembles the current state of many Eu-
ropean telecommunications markets, where former telecommunications incumbents
compete with integrated cable operators as well as with retailers that rely on the in-
cumbent’s access network as an input.
The extant economic literature on margin squeeze regulation focuses on market struc-
tures with a single integrated monopolist under different settings. First, starting from a
setting with homogeneous retail goods, Jullien et al. (2014) point to ambiguous effects
of banning margin squeezes: although wholesale prices decrease, retail prices may in-
crease. In other words, non-integrated retailers benefit from margin squeeze regula-
tion, whereas consumers may be worse off due to more severe double marginalization.
Second, Ergas et al. (2010) suggest that retail goods are not likely to be homogeneous
and Petulowa and Saavedra (2014) show that with horizontally and vertically differ-
entiated products the single integrated firm will only engage in a margin squeeze if
its non-integrated competitor is more efficient. In this setting it is found that a mar-
gin squeeze ban induces an increase in the integrated firm’s retail price, but neverthe-
less ultimately benefits consumers, because the retail price of the non-integrated firm
decreases provided that upstream market regulation is non-constraining. Third, in a
market setting that resembles a fixed voice telephony market, Briglauer et al. (2011)
demonstrate that increasing infrastructure competition from non-strategic rivals may
elicit a margin squeeze depending on access price regulation.
In this chapter, the impact of horizontally differentiated retail goods under infrastruc-
ture competition with strategic competitors is scrutinized and it is shown that due to
increased competitive pressure in the retail market, margin squeezes occur also in the
case when competitors are equally efficient.
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Bouckaert and Verboven (2004) identify three types of margin squeezes according to
the prevailing regulatory regime: regulatory price squeezes (i.e., if wholesale and re-
tail prices are regulated), predatory price squeezes (i.e., if only wholesale prices are
regulated), and foreclosure (i.e., if no prices are regulated). Here, the focus is on the lat-
ter type because in industries of competing vertically integrated firms margin squeeze
regulation is considered a potential substitute to access price regulation, and not a com-
plement to it. This is exemplified by the ex ante economic replicability test from the Eu-
ropean Commission’s (2013a) recommendation on consistent non-discrimination (see
Chapter 2 and Jaunaux and Lebourges, 2015, for a discussion of the recommendation
and the ex ante test, respectively).
Höffler and Schmidt (2008) also consider strategic interaction between infrastructure
operators and retailers and show that, with differentiated retail goods, consumer sur-
plus decreases under retail minus X regulation, which is akin to a margin squeeze ban.
While their market structure is comparable to the setting in this chapter, Höffler and
Schmidt do not consider the emergence of foreclosure, which in fact constitutes an equi-
librium outcome as noted by Atiyas et al. (2015). However, as highlighted by Bouckaert
and Verboven (2004) and Gaudin and Mantzari (2016), foreclosure is a central concern
with regard to margin squeeze conduct. Therefore, the following analysis will distin-
guish between this more severe exclusionary behavior from simple exploitative margin
squeeze conduct (Jullien et al., 2014). The findings show that margin squeeze regula-
tion prevents both foreclosure and margin squeezes, which benefits a non-integrated
competitor, but does not translate into a benefit for consumers. Whereas the effect on
the access provider’s profit depends on product differentiation and price setting in the
retail market, margin squeeze regulation unambiguously increases profit of the inte-
grated firm, which does not supply the wholesale input. On the contrary, it is found
that margin squeeze regulation is always detrimental to consumers in the presence of
infrastructure competition.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Next, the general market struc-
ture and model that is used to analyze the effect of MSR in lieu of no regulation (NR) is
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described. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 two different timing variants of the model are studied.
Section 4.4 discusses the policy implications and limitations of the presented model.
4.1 Theoretical framework
Consider the industry depicted in Figure 4.1 with two vertically integrated firms
(Firm A & Firm B) and a non-integrated firm (Firm D) which operates only in the
downstream market. For each unit of its retail good Firm D is required to purchase
a unit of the homogeneous upstream good, which Firm A offers at price a. Firm B does
not provide wholesale access. The retail price of firm k 2 {A, B, D} is denoted by pk.
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Assuming the representative consumer suggested by Shubik and Levitan (1980) retail
goods are horizontally differentiated and demand for firm k’s retail good is given by
qk = 13 (1  pk   g(pk  
pA+pB+pD
3 ) provided that none of the firms exits the downstream
market (Höffler, 2008). Thereby, g   0 denotes the degree of substitutability so that high
values indicate less differentiated retail goods. In contrast to the case of homogeneous
retail goods, competition in differentiated goods requires to distinguish between a mar-
gin squeeze and foreclosure of the downstream firm. More specifically, even if Firm A en-
gages in a margin squeeze, i.e., D := pA   a < 0, Firm D may still make a positive profit,
because consumers value variety. If, however, the spread between Firm A’s wholesale
and retail price exceeds a certain threshold that depends on the degree of substitutabil-
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ity, i.e., D < D(g), Firm D cannot make positive profits and therefore exits the market,
i.e., it is effectively foreclosed.
In this vein, margin squeeze regulation serves two objectives: (i) to establish a level
playing field by prescribing that no firm sets its retail price below the market wholesale
price and (ii) to safeguard product variety by ensuring that non-integrated firms are
not foreclosed from the market. Whether it is profitable for the access provider, Firm A,
to foreclose the downstream retailer, Firm D, with respect to the model depends on
the degree of substitutability, g, and the strategic role of Firm D. In Section 4.2 Firm D
is considered to act as a competitive fringe, which sets its retail price after observing
the retail prices of the integrated firms. In the absence of MSR, i.e., under NR, Firm D
will be subjected to a margin squeeze in this scenario, but will never be foreclosed. In
Section 4.3 an alternative timing of the model is considered, where Firm D sets its retail
price simultaneously with the integrated firms. In this scenario, both margin squeeze
and foreclosure may occur under NR.
4.2 Competitive retail fringe
When Firm D is thought of as a competitive fringe that reacts to the integrated firms’
prices, the timing of the model is as follows:
Stage 1: Firm A sets the wholesale price a.
Stage 2: Firm A and Firm B set their respective retail prices pA and pB.
Stage 3: Firm D sets its retail price pD.
The subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game is determined by backward induc-
tion for the case of NR, where Firm A can set its prices freely, and for the case of
MSR, where Firm A must adhere to the constraint D   0. For a welfare analysis of
MSR in lieu of NR not only firms’ prices pk, quantities qk, and profits pk are com-
pared, but also producer surplus PS = Âk pk, i.e., the sum of firms’ profits, consumer
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2)  Âk qk pk, i.e., the representative con-
sumer’s net utility (Bouckaert and Kort, 2014), and total surplus TS = PS + CS. In
order to assess MSR relative to NR, ratios fXk =
XMSRk
XNRk
are reported, where X is the mar-
ket variable under investigation. In the following, a sketch of the analysis and some
intuition for the results are offered, whereas the technical details are relegated to Ap-
pendix A.2.
RESULT 4.1. If the access provider has no incentive to foreclose its downstream rival under no
regulation, margin squeeze regulation increases wholesale and retail prices, which leads to a loss
in consumer surplus and total surplus.
Under NR, in Stage 3 Firm D’s first order condition is ∂pD






3+2g as the best response to the integrated firms’ prices. In stage 2, both




= 0 simultaneously, yielding pNRA and p
NR
B ,







∂a = 0 in Stage
1 and sets the optimal wholesale charge aNR accordingly. The left panel of Figure 4.2
depicts the equilibrium retail and wholesale prices. Notice that Firm A violates the mar-
gin squeeze condition for all g > 0. Yet, Firm D makes positive profits in equilibrium as
Firm A has no incentive to foreclose the retailer. In other words, Firm A benefits more
from the wholesale revenue effect than it suffers from the business stealing effect. In con-
trast, Firm B prefers foreclosure of Firm D, because it suffers from the business stealing
effect and has no wholesale revenue to compensate for this. Relatedly, Firm B sets lower
retail prices than Firm A due to the softening effect (Bourreau et al., 2011; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1984), which occurs because Firm B has no opportunity cost in terms of foregone
wholesale revenue when decreasing its retail price.
Under MSR, however, Firm A’s retail price setting in Stage 2 is constrained, because
a margin squeeze would occur for all g > 0 under NR. This induces Firm A to raise
its retail price to the level of the profit maximizing wholesale price, i.e., pMSRA = a
MSR.
Otherwise, wholesale revenue, business stealing, and softening effects are qualitatively
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FIGURE 4.2: Equilibrium prices under NR and MSR.
the same as under NR which preserves the relative order of equilibrium prices (see the
right panel of Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.3a depicts the net effect of MSR in comparison to NR with respect to its rel-
ative impact on prices, quantities, and profits. First, the reported ratios demonstrate
that all prices rise under MSR, which highlights that the regulation not only fails to ex-
ert a negative impact on the wholesale price, but instead allows firms to attain higher
prices in both wholesale and retail markets. Since the margin squeeze condition is
binding, Firm A has no incentive to lower its retail price following an increase in its
wholesale price. This in turn incentivizes Firm B to increase its retail price as well, be-
cause downstream prices of the integrated firms are strategic complements. In addition,
Firm D raises its retail price due to the increased wholesale input price. Second, despite
this universal price increase, retail demands for Firm B and Firm D increase, and only
Firm A’s demand decreases due to the relative magnitude of its price surge compared
to NR. Third, profits increase for all firms under MSR. Whereas Firm A’s downstream
profit deteriorates due to a decline in retail demand, the increase in wholesale revenue
ultimately leads to a net benefit for the access provider as shown in Figure 4.3b.
The welfare analysis of MSR in relation to NR reinforces insights on the effect of MSR
gained thus far (see Figure 4.3c). While producer surplus increases under MSR as a
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4.3 Simultaneous retail pricing
direct consequence of firms’ ability to unanimously reap higher profits, consumer sur-
plus is lower than under NR. More specifically, consumers are worse off because the
increased outputs of Firm B and Firm D are outweighed by higher retail prices of all
firms. Remarkably, note that the harm to consumers due to MSR decreases with in-
creasing substitutability of retail goods. Overall, the effects on producer and consumer
surplus amount to an ultimately negative impact of MSR on total surplus, which is
more severe for more differentiated retail goods, i.e., for lower values of g. Altogether
these results suggest that under the given market structure and timing, MSR cannot be
justified by either a consumer welfare perspective nor a total welfare standard.
4.3 Simultaneous retail pricing
The scenario studied in the previous section may be contested based on the claim that
MSR is particularly relevant and potentially more effective in a scenario where the ac-
cess provider does not only engage in a margin squeeze but is also likely to effectively
foreclose the non-integrated retailer from the downstream market. Thus, a second sce-
nario, where the competitive position of the non-integrated retailer is strengthened,
and thus foreclosure constitutes an equilibrium under NR if retail goods are close sub-
stitutes is scrutinized in the following. In particular, the case where all (integrated and
non-integrated) firms choose their retail prices simultaneously, which reduces the pre-
vious three-stage game to a two-stage game is now considered. Again, the focus is
on the cornerstones of the analysis, whereas the technical details are provided in Ap-
pendix A.2.
RESULT 4.2. If the access provider has an incentive to foreclose its downstream rival under no
regulation, margin squeeze regulation prevents the market exit of the non-integrated retailer.
Whereas total surplus increases due to higher profits, consumer surplus always decreases.
Under NR, in Stage 2 all firms choose their retail prices given the wholesale price. In
Stage 1, Firm A decides on its wholesale price by trading off its profits when it does or
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FIGURE 4.4: Equilibrium prices under NR and MSR.
does not provide a viable wholesale offer to Firm D. Atiyas et al. (2015) and Bourreau
et al. (2011) show that Firm A prefers foreclosure of Firm D if g > g := 26.77. In this case
Firm A sets a foreclosure wholesale price of aNR > 5g+6
g
2+7g+6 . The left panel of Figure 4.4
depicts ensuing equilibrium retail prices. Note that, due to the foreclosure of Firm D,
the softening effect disappears for g > g and both integrated firms charge identical
retail prices. Furthermore, Firm A engages in a margin squeeze for all g > 3.
Consequently, under MSR the margin squeeze condition is binding iff g > 3. Thus, MSR
effectively prevents foreclosure of Firm D, because Firm A is now required to make a
viable wholesale offer. The resulting equilibrium prices are shown in the right panel of
Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.5a depicts the net effect of MSR on prices, quantities, and profits. If retail goods
are sufficiently differentiated so that foreclosure is not an equilibrium, i.e., g  g, the net
effects are similar to those observed in the previous scenario. The only exception is that,
in this scenario, MSR induces the access provider to reduce its wholesale price relative
to NR. However, similar to the previous scenario, Firm D increases its retail price due
to the stronger strategic complements effect in the retail market. If, instead, retail goods
are less differentiated, i.e., g > g, Firm A’s retail price increases and Firm B’s retail
price decreases under MSR relative to NR. The opposite holds for the integrated firm’s
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retail demand. Since MSR prevents Firm D’s foreclosure, its price, demand, and profit
are strictly positive. With respect to Firm A’s profit, the net effect of MSR is ambiguous.
Whereas for g 2 (3,34.20) increasing wholesale revenue outweighs losses in retail profit
so that Firm A benefits from the regulation, the opposite holds if retail goods are very
close substitutes, i.e., g > 34.20 (see Figure 4.5b).
The welfare analysis of MSR for this scenario is depicted in Figure 4.5c and indicates
similar effects as in the first scenario for g  g. With less differentiated retail goods, i.e.,
g > g, consumers are better off than with rather differentiated goods due to the fore-
closure ban owed to MSR, however, they are still worse off than under NR. In contrast,
producers are better off under MSR due to increased profits of Firm B and Firm D. Re-
markably, the increase in producer surplus compensates the loss in consumer surplus,
yielding an increase in total surplus for g > g. Thus, MSR is beneficial from a total
welfare perspective in case of foreclosure—however, this effect emerges from increased
producer surplus, and not from increased consumer surplus.
4.4 Discussion
This chapter scrutinizes margin squeeze regulation in the presence of infrastructure
competition and monopolistic wholesale access based on an analytic game-theoretic
model. More specifically, a setting with two integrated firms of which one offers its
wholesale good whereas the other does not, and one non-integrated firm that depends
on the wholesale good as an input to produce its retail good is considered. In contrast to
a market with a single integrated firm, it is shown that under infrastructure competition
the access provider may engage in a margin squeeze also in the case of an equally
efficient retailer. The central finding is that margin squeeze regulation is detrimental to
consumers, irrespective of the substitutability of retail goods and the timing of firms’
decisions. This result is supported and extended by several insights.
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First, if the access provider has no incentive to foreclose its downstream rival, margin
squeeze regulation unanimously increases wholesale and retail prices, which leads to a
loss in consumer surplus and ultimately even total surplus. Second, if foreclosure is an
equilibrium, margin squeeze regulation prevents the market exit of the non-integrated
retailer. Although this may lead to a decrease in the wholesale price and an increase
in total surplus, this does not translate into consumers’ benefit, but only into higher
firms’ profits. Third, margin squeeze regulation benefits all firms individually. The
only exception is that the access provider may be worse off under the regulation if
and only if it wants to foreclose the downstream firm and if the retail goods are close
substitutes. In this case, the access provider makes less profit than its integrated rival,
which is likely to evoke non-price discrimination (cf. Mandy and Sappington, 2007).
These findings bear important policy implications. Note that antitrust investigations of
margin squeezes and corresponding regulation are largely enacted in markets where
multiple integrated firms produce an upstream input good, i.e., in industries with in-
frastructure competition next to service-based downstream competition. In fact, the
European Commission (2013a) argues that infrastructure competition is a necessary
condition for margin squeeze regulation to replace traditional access price regulation.
This rationale is based on the conjecture that retail prices are already constrained by
competition under these circumstances and thus the access provider is compelled to
lower its wholesale price to comply with the requirements of the regulation. The pre-
sented findings indicate that this reasoning is flawed if firms compete in prices that are
strategic complements, which is likely to apply to network industries such as telecom-
munications, but also to other industry contexts. In this case, competitors raise their
retail prices in anticipation of the access provider’s constrained pricing ability. Fur-
thermore, a positive total welfare effect of margin squeeze regulation only occurs if the
non-integrated retailer is foreclosed under no regulation. However, even then the inte-
grated firm which does not provide access has a competitive advantage over the access
provider. Thus, margin squeeze regulation reduces the incentives to provide access
which is contrary to its original rationale as an Open Access rule. Moreover, European
authorities currently do not distinguish between (non-)foreclosure scenarios in margin
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squeeze investigations. Even if they did, the presented results raise skepticism with
regard to the alleged goal of margin squeeze regulation, i.e., to establish a level playing
field for competition, as well as to the ultimate objective of regulatory intervention, i.e.,
to protect consumers.
The analyses conducted in this chapter are limited to price competition in the retail
market. With competition in quantities decisions constitute strategic substitutes, which
may affect the mechanics of margin squeeze regulation. Yet, in Appendix A.2, a model
with differentiated quantity competition à la Singh and Vives (1984) is considered,
which yields similar welfare implications with respect to margin squeeze regulation.
Furthermore, the investigations here abstract from cost asymmetries between inte-
grated firms and non-integrated retailers as well as different application contexts of
margin squeeze regulation in ex post antitrust on the one hand and ex ante sector-
specific regulation on the other hand. This latter issue has been discussed thoroughly
from a competition law perspective (Geradin and O’Donoghue, 2005; Heimler, 2010).
Whereas authorities’ objective—and therefore their assessment of market outcomes—
may differ in these application contexts, the presented economic effects arise irrespec-
tive of an ex post or ex ante application of the margin squeeze rule. With regard to cost
asymmetries, Gaudin and Saavedra (2014) summarize the debate on whether a margin
squeeze test should be based on an Equally Efficient Operator or a Reasonably Efficient Op-
erator standard. As the results in this chapter apply to the stricter standard of an equally
efficient retailer, the consideration of a less efficient retailer would further worsen mar-
ket outcomes from the view of consumers in light of yet higher retail prices. Taking
into account additional complexity (e.g., due to non-linear pricing or bundling), which
in practice is likely to increase the number of false-positive findings of margin squeeze
conduct (Ergas et al., 2010), augments the issues that already arise in the simplified
setting of this study.
With respect to future work, the ineffectiveness of margin squeeze regulation to in-
crease consumer surplus calls for alternative regulatory approaches in cases when there
is infrastructure-based and service-based competition at the same time. It has been ob-
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served that it is not desirable to rely on (symmetric) access price regulation in this case
(cf. Bacache et al., 2014), because the inherent trade-off between static and dynamic ef-
ficiency is likely to stifle investments in infrastructure (see the survey with respect to
OA in Chapter 2). Instead, wholesale competition between the integrated firms may
be seen as a potential alternative to safeguard low input prices for non-integrated com-
petitors and to establish a level playing field in the retail market, although theoretical
research points to cases where competition at the upstream level may fail to improve
market outcomes relative to the monopoly case (Bourreau et al., 2011). Thus, further
research devoted to the design and empirical evaluation of new regulatory institutions
in an environment of competing infrastructures seem to be highly relevant from an
academic and policy perspective. Therefore, the next chapter is dedicated to an exper-
imental analysis of Open Access mechanisms, which encompasses both the test of an
established regulatory institution, in particular margin squeeze regulation, under dif-
ferent market conditions as well as the evaluation of a more behaviorally oriented and




Wholesale Competition and Open Access
Regulation
REGULATION of wholesale access to an upstream bottleneck resource that repre-sents an essential input for non-integrated firms to compete in the retail market
downstream stimulates considerable economic research. The anti-competitive effects
that possibly arise in such a scenario as well as accompanying regulatory remedies
(Armstrong et al., 1996; Armstrong and Vickers, 1998) are widely studied in the liter-
ature for the case of a single access provider. Moreover, firms’ strategic incentives to
vertically integrate across retail and wholesale markets and the effect of such conduct
on competition (see Lafontaine and Slade, 2007, for an overview) have been thoroughly
investigated, in particular with respect to the softening of retail competition (Chen,
2001; Gans, 2007) and foreclosure of non-integrated retailers (Hart and Tirole, 1990; Or-
dover et al., 1990; Choi and Yi, 2000; Rey and Tirole, 2007b) or upstream rivals (Chen
and Riordan, 2007). Economic laboratory experiments have complemented the theoret-
ical literature, most notably concerning the issue of vertical foreclosure (Martin et al.,
2001; Normann, 2011). However, a set of new issues arises when there is more than one
vertically integrated access provider such that competition at the wholesale level may
emerge in addition to retail competition. Especially in the likely case of a highly con-
This chapter is based on joint work with Niklas Horstmann and Jan Krämer (Horstmann et al., 2016c).
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centrated (duopoly) wholesale market the question arises whether access regulation is
(still) warranted. Evidently, the answer to this question will have direct ramifications
on how regulators and competition authorities should deal with this kind of market
structure, but also on whether authorities should promote the entry of a second inte-
grated access provider in markets in which the essential input is currently supplied
monopolistically.
This chapter scrutinizes the effect of wholesale competition on market performance in
terms of market prices, firms’ profits and consumer surplus by explicitly taking into ac-
count the emergence of tacit collusion that may arise in this scenario. Based on a frame-
work of two integrated firms and one non-integrated retailer (Bourreau et al., 2011), an
economic laboratory experiment is designed that allows to empirically observe market
performance under various modes of wholesale competition while keeping all other
factors fixed. Moreover, a continuous time framework is employed, which allows firms
to change and observe wholesale and retail prices at any time, and thus, endogenizes
the timing of the price setting (see Section 3.3).
More specifically, the study considers three different market scenarios: First, the case
where only one of the integrated firms provides wholesale access (access monopoly)
is examined. This constitutes the benchmark case, which is extensively studied in the
literature. Second, standard homogeneous Bertrand competition between the two inte-
grated firms at the wholesale level is considered. In this setting, firms can adjust their
wholesale prices at any time and the firm that offers the lower price serves the entire
wholesale market. Third, as Bertrand competition is known to be susceptible to tacit
collusion (Potters and Suetens, 2013), a variant of Bertrand competition at the whole-
sale level is additionally considered in which integrated firms are obliged to maintain
their wholesale price for a fixed period of time (i.e., a price commitment), everything
else being equal to the second case. Due to this price commitment, the firm that decides
on the lower price is granted a wholesale monopoly position for some time. Thus, this
latter treatment induces an element of competition for the market (Geroski, 2003), which
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is conjectured to hinder tacit collusion and to intensify competition at the wholesale
level.
All three modes of wholesale competition are examined both under a no regulation
regime, where firms are free to set wholesale and retail prices, and under a margin
squeeze regulation regime, in which an integrated firm’s wholesale price may not ex-
ceed its retail price. As described in the previous chapter, margin squeeze regulation
has recently gained attention in the debate on Open Access policies and is perceived
as a viable alternative to price regulation, e.g., by the European Commission (2013a),
particularly when there is more than one wholesale access provider.
The analyzed issues arise most prominently in network industries such as the telecom-
munications (see Chapter 2) and energy (Boots et al., 2004) industries, in which the
bottleneck arises naturally through subadditivity of the cost structure. Yet, access to an
upstream resource is also of concern in other contexts such as the licensing of intellec-
tual property (Dewatripont and Legros, 2013), where the bottleneck is constituted arti-
ficially. Although not confined to this context, the relevance of the considered market
scenario of competing access providers can be exemplified by the telecommunications
industry. Due to technological progress and consolidation both the fixed and the mobile
industries are characterized by few vertically integrated firms, as well as several non-
integrated retailers that rely on access to an upstream resource. On the one hand, with
respect to fixed networks, technological progress led to the roll out of new fiber-optic
networks as well as the evolution of broadband cable networks, which both created
new vertically integrated firms that compete most notably in densely populated urban
areas with the traditional telecommunications incumbent. On the other hand, mobile
telecommunications markets recently experienced a wave of mergers and acquisitions
that reduced the number of independent operators maintaining a distinct cellular in-
frastructure, thus increasing market concentration at the wholesale level.
Despite its practical relevance, the explicit analysis of simultaneous wholesale and re-
tail competition in the presence of both vertically integrated and non-integrated firms
received little attention in the literature. The extant theoretical analyses, which are re-
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viewed in detail below, suggest that wholesale competition is likely to improve and
not deteriorate market performance compared to the case of a wholesale monopoly,
although monopoly-like equilibria may exist. Thereby, the theoretical models gener-
ally rest on the assumption of effective competition at the wholesale level, in particular
by assuming homogeneous Bertrand competition between duopolistic access providers
(see, e.g., Bourreau et al., 2011). However, empirical results from both laboratory (En-
gel, 2007; Potters and Suetens, 2013) and field studies (see, e.g., Parker and Röller, 1997,
in the context of telecommunications markets) suggest that duopoly markets are prone
to high levels of tacit collusion, which may give rise to market outcomes that differ from
those identified in the theoretical literature (see also Chapter 6).
The results of this study indicate that, over and beyond the findings of the theoretical
literature, wholesale competition may in fact lead to a worse market outcome for con-
sumers than a wholesale monopoly. For the case of standard Bertrand competition at
the wholesale level both wholesale as well as retail market prices are above the level
that is observed when there is only a single access provider. Drawing on the litera-
ture on upstream collusion (Nocke and White, 2007; Normann, 2009) it is shown that
incentives for tacit collusion are actually higher under wholesale competition if an in-
finitely repeated game context is considered. Thus, even in the presence of wholesale
competition regulators should closely monitor the performance of such vertically re-
lated markets. However, the results also demonstrate that wholesale competition may
be intensified by a simple price commitment rule, which in turn restores the theoretical
prediction to the extent that access prices are lower than under a wholesale monopoly.
Nevertheless, even in this case, wholesale access prices remain well above the predicted
Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, in the context of the Open Access debate, there is no
evidence that a margin squeeze regulation reduces retail market prices compared to a
no regulation regime, which is in line with the findings for a wholesale monopoly in
Chapter 4. Although margin squeeze regulation may benefit the retailer, it tends to
increase retail prices and thus reduce consumers’ surplus.
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 5.1 surveys the related
literature on wholesale competition as well as recent studies which have dealt with the
margin squeeze rule. In Section 5.2, the experimental design is described and hypothe-
ses are derived from the theoretical predictions for four timing variants of the basic
model. Section 5.3 presents the experimental results. In Section 5.4, results are exam-
ined with respect to the hypotheses and incentives for tacit collusion in a repeated game
context are discussed. Finally, Section 5.5 identifies limitations and points out possible
extensions.
5.1 Related literature
5.1.1 Wholesale monopoly and competition
Before reviewing the literature on wholesale competition, it is worth noting some of
the effects that arise already in the presence of a monopolistic access provider. Even
in the absence of regulation a vertically integrated firm may be willing to supply the
wholesale market on a voluntary basis if the additional revenues generated at the up-
stream level exceed the business stealing effect of the retailer in the downstream market
(Farrell and Weiser, 2003; Höffler and Schmidt, 2008). More generally, if downstream
organizations exhibit efficiency advantages or if retail goods are sufficiently quality-
differentiated (e.g., due to brand reputation or additional sales channels as illustrated
by Banerjee and Dippon, 2009), the provision of wholesale services will allow the inte-
grated firm to generate additional revenues. In this case, the access provider benefits
from a demand expansion effect relative to a situation where the integrated firm is the
single seller of its goods in the retail market (Boudreau, 2010).
In the presence of wholesale competition the incentives to provide access on a vol-
untary basis are likely to be increased compared to a wholesale monopoly, because
the integrated firms may now find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma with respect to
the provision of the wholesale good (Brito and Pereira, 2010). Studies that investigate
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these incentives have examined the conditions under which retailers are supplied in
equilibrium and whether resale actually improves downstream market performance,
particularly in terms of market prices. The majority of these studies considers price
competition with horizontally differentiated retail products (Ordover and Shaffer, 2007;
Brito and Pereira, 2010; Höffler and Schmidt, 2008; Bourreau et al., 2011; Atiyas et al.,
2015) where competition is either spatial (Hotelling, 1929; Salop, 1979) or non-spatial
(Shubik and Levitan, 1980). The remainder assumes quantity competition in the retail
market (Dewenter and Haucap, 2006; Kalmus and Wiethaus, 2010). Although the pre-
cise nature of the supply and non-supply equilibria as well as the retail equilibria that
emerge under wholesale competition depend on the specific modeling assumptions, all
theoretical investigations agree that wholesale competition neither leads to more fore-
closure of the retailer nor increases wholesale or retail market prices in comparison to
a wholesale monopoly.
More specifically, under wholesale competition Ordover and Shaffer (2007) as well as
Brito and Pereira (2010) find that integrated firms provide the retailer with the retail
good at marginal cost if products are sufficiently differentiated, although they would
be individually better off without entry as retail prices and profits decrease. On the
contrary, retailers are generally not supplied if retail products are close substitutes and
none of the integrated firms has an incentive to make a profitable wholesale offer in the
first place. Furthermore, Ordover and Shaffer show that the supply equilibrium disap-
pears if input goods are differentiated, or if the retailer chooses its quality endogenously
and cannot commit ex ante to its product positioning.
Moreover, the analyses by Brito and Pereira (2010) and Höffler and Schmidt (2008)
reveal that if competition is spatial and the degree of quality differentiation is in-
termediate, one integrated firm may provide access while the other integrated firm
makes an unprofitable offer. This finding of a partial foreclosure equilibrium is further
generalized—including the case of non-spatial competition—by Bourreau et al. (2011)
based on the characterization of the softening effect: A vertically integrated wholesale
provider chooses its retail price with regard to its opportunity costs in the wholesale
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market (DeGraba, 2003) and thus will be less aggressive in the retail market than its
vertically integrated rival who does not provide wholesale access. In other words,
the consideration of opportunity costs weakens competition in the retail market and
may at the same time make it less attractive to compete for wholesale revenues. In
consequence, the monopoly outcome may be restored, because the integrated rival of
the access provider benefits from higher retail profits and thus prefers to exit the up-
stream market. Note, however, that the equilibrium hinges on the assumptions that
retail goods are close substitutes and that at least one firm supplies the retail firm, e.g.,
due to a retailer’s efficiency advantage (Bourreau et al., 2011) or due to regulatory co-
ercion (Bourreau et al., 2015). Otherwise, marginal cost pricing in the upstream mar-
ket constitutes the unique equilibrium under wholesale competition in the non-spatial
model if goods are sufficiently differentiated (Höffler and Schmidt, 2008). Moreover,
Atiyas et al. (2015) show that unobservable, more complex wholesale contracts may
stimulate voluntary access and wholesale competition, thus making foreclosure of the
retailer less likely.
Höffler and Schmidt (2008) investigate the effects of resale on consumer welfare, which
may be increased either by a decline in retail prices and/or an increase in variety. Under
the assumption that the retailer will be supplied by one of the integrated firms, i.e.,
there is no foreclosure, it is shown that resale may actually increase the market price
if quality differentiation is sufficiently high. In the case of non-spatial competition the
price increase is always compensated by an increase in variety with respect to consumer
welfare. In the spatial model however, consumers may be worse off as the price effect
dominates. Then again, if wholesale competition for retailers is considered in the non-
spatial model, wholesale prices are found to equal marginal cost and, in consequence,
retail prices are lower than compared to a situation without resale.
Whereas the reported analyses of wholesale competition focus exclusively on the one-
shot interaction between firms, the literature on upstream collusion examines incen-
tives for coordinated firm behavior in an infinitely repeated game setting. Nocke and
White (2007) compare critical discount factors that are necessary to sustain collusion
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by the means of grim trigger strategies and find that vertical integration facilitates tacit
collusion among upstream firms relative to a vertically separated industry structure.
Normann (2009) replicates the finding that vertical integration facilitates upstream col-
lusion for the case of linear input charges and a sequential setting of wholesale and retail
prices, whereas Nocke and White model wholesale contracts as two-part tariffs and as-
sume simultaneous price setting.
This study contributes to the literature on wholesale competition by showing empir-
ically that wholesale prices may be above the monopoly level even if theory predicts
wholesale supply at marginal costs as the unique equilibrium. It is further shown that
tacit collusion at the wholesale level may effectively be reduced by a price commitment
rule that fosters the integrated firms’ competition for the market. Moreover, the exper-
imental framework allows for a systematic comparison of retail market performance
in terms of wholesale and retail prices, firms’ profits and consumer surplus under the
different modes of wholesale competition. Finally, the experimental design in contin-
uous time endogenizes the timing of firms’ price setting, and thus reconciles different
timings proposed in the theoretical literature.
5.1.2 Margin squeeze regulation
In the presence of a duplicate infrastructure the traditional economic rationale for ex
ante price regulation is no longer applicable as the bottleneck does not represent a
single essential facility anymore (Renda, 2010). In consequence, regulators and com-
petition agencies may be concerned with identifying suitable alternatives and regula-
tory rules that still ensure Open Access for downstream competitors, but give integrated
firms more freedom in setting their wholesale prices (see Chapter 2). As described in
Chapter 4, the margin squeeze rule represents a potential surrogate for price regulation
that is already applied in various forms and different contexts. Next to its application
in (European) competition law, the basic mechanism, which is designed to ensure a
viable wholesale-retail margin for a downstream retailer, is also implemented by re-
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tail minus X regulation (Gonçalves, 2007) and the efficient component-pricing rule (Baumol
et al., 1997). Ever since the landmark decision Deutsche Telekom1 in 2003, the application
of the margin squeeze rule as an antitrust instrument is controversially debated within
the economic and the legal literature (Briglauer et al., 2011; Carlton, 2008; Geradin and
O’Donoghue, 2005). While the European Commission has repeatedly convicted firms
based on a margin squeeze accusation2 and has been confirmed by European courts3,
the US Supreme Court has dismissed allegations based on the margin squeeze rationale
in comparable cases (Trinko and linkLine).
The rationale for margin squeeze regulation is that protecting competitors in the con-
text of monopolistic bottlenecks or concentrated input markets will ultimately benefit
consumers. Particularly in competition policy the latter goal is emphasized and held in
high regard, e.g., the European Commission (2009a, p.7) clarifies that “what really mat-
ters is protecting an effective competitive process and not simply protecting competi-
tors”. Sector-specific regulation may widen the scope of application, as is illustrated
by the debate about the relevant efficiency standard for the margin squeeze conduct
(Geradin and O’Donoghue, 2005), but fundamentally still aims at the protection of con-
sumers, where competition itself is a means to an end (Vogelsang, 2013).
In this vein, Jullien et al. (2014) provide an overview of the economic theories of harm
that may qualify a margin squeeze as an abuse of market power and could provide
the basis for a stand-alone antitrust doctrine. Petulowa and Saavedra (2014) qualify
the circumstances under which a margin squeeze can occur in the case of differentiated
goods and state that a margin squeeze is rather the result of competition and not of an
exploitative abuse. Jullien et al. conclude that the effects of a margin squeeze rule are
ambiguous as wholesale prices may decrease, but retail prices may also rise, due to a
price umbrella effect. With regard to retail minus X regulation, Höffler and Schmidt (2008)
criticize that its application may lead to consumer welfare losses and higher prices.
1Commission Decision 2003/707/EC.
2See the Commission Decision of 4 July 2007 (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España vs. Telefónica).
3See the cases Deutsche Telekom (T-271/03, C-280/08), Telefónica (T-336/07, T-398/07 C-295/12) and Telia-
Sonera (C-52/09).
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In the past, the margin squeeze rule has mostly been investigated in the case of a sin-
gle access provider, as indispensability has initially constituted a central criterion in
its application as an antitrust instrument. More recently, as illustrated by the ex ante
economic replicability test in the European Commission’s 2013a recommendation on con-
sistent non-discrimination, the margin squeeze test may also be applied to an environ-
ment with competing infrastructures (Jaunaux and Lebourges, 2015). Although this
rule is already applied in practice, little research has been conducted with regard to ac-
tual consequences in the particular application context of infrastructure and wholesale
competition. This study complements the theoretical analysis of margin squeeze regu-
lation in the context of infrastructure competition with an experimental evaluation and
further extends the examination to the context of wholesale competition.
The experimental evidence obtained in this study suggests that the margin squeeze rule
is likely to be ineffective in lowering retail prices irrespective of the mode of wholesale
competition. Although margin squeeze regulation may benefit the retailer in some cir-
cumstances, it tends to increase retail prices and thus reduces consumer surplus.
5.2 Experimental framework
5.2.1 Theoretical model
The underlying experimental framework explicitly addresses the presented issues of
wholesale competition and Open Access by incorporating a market design that allows
for competition at the wholesale and retail level. The general experimental design
is based on the model of upstream competition analyzed by Bourreau et al. (2011)—
illustrated in Figure 5.1— in which two integrated firms (Firm A & Firm B) are able
to supply the wholesale good, while a third firm (Firm D) operates only in the down-
stream market. In order to supply the retail good, the downstream retailer is required
to purchase the wholesale good at the upstream market from one of the two integrated
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FIGURE 5.1: Conceptual model of wholesale competition with two integrated firms and a non-
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firms. The wholesale prices of Firm A and Firm B are denoted aA and aB, respectively.
In the retail market, all firms choose their respective retail prices pk, k 2 {A, B, D}.
It is assumed that Firm D chooses the wholesale product with the lowest price and
does not split its demand.4 Thus, the integrated firms compete à la Bertrand with ho-
mogeneous goods. For each quantity that the downstream retailer supplies to con-
sumers in the retail market it must buy an identical quantity of the wholesale good.
In the downstream market, firms compete likewise in prices, but goods are differen-
tiated. In line with previous theoretical studies on wholesale competition, competi-
tion in horizontally differentiated goods based on Shubik and Levitan (1980)5 is as-
sumed, where the retail demand of each firm k in the case of n = 3 active firms is given
by qk = 13 (1   pk   g(pk  
Â3i=1 pi
3 )) and the differentiation parameter g defines the de-
gree of substitution between firms’ retail goods. Across all treatments, g = 30, which
corresponds to a diversion ratio of 10/21 for each pair-wise relationship between firms
(Shapiro, 1996).
4Note that, as the stage game is played repeatedly in the experiment, the following tie breaking rule is
used: If Firm A and Firm B offer the same wholesale price, Firm D chooses to purchase access from the
firm that has previously offered the lower price. If both integrated firms offer an identical wholesale
price in the first period, the access provider is chosen randomly.
5The model assumes that consumers explicitly value variety. With regard to the derivation of the demand
structure for varying numbers of active firms in the market see Höffler (2008).
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Throughout all experimental sessions, Firm D is modeled to mimic the behavior of a
competitive fringe in the retail market that reacts to the price setting by the integrated
firms, Firm A and Firm B. It is therefore assumed that Firm D always chooses the best-
response retail price, i.e., the price that maximizes its profit given the wholesale and
retail prices set by the integrated firms.
In the experiment, prices are scaled as follows: Values obtained by the Shubik and Lev-
itan (1980) model are multiplied by 100/0.15. and firms can set their prices to any integer
in the range of zero to one hundred. In terms of the original Shubik and Levitan (1980)
values, this corresponds to the price interval [0;0.15]. As a consequence, the joint profit
among integrated firms’ is maximized when integrated firms choose maximum prices
in both the wholesale market (amax = 100) and the retail market (pmax = 100). There-
fore, the JPM outcome is identical across treatments. Moreover, the scaling allows for
a more granular representation of the relevant price interval between the theoretically
predicted competitive and collusive prices as well as the monopoly price in the case of
a single access provider.
In contrast to the theoretical literature on wholesale competition, which usually pre-
scribes a specific temporal sequence of actions, timing of price decisions is endogenized
in the experiment by means of a continuous time framework. Endogenous timing of
price setting has two aspects: First, no assumption is made on the sequence of upstream
and downstream decisions. While it is frequently assumed that wholesale prices are set
prior to retail prices (Bourreau et al., 2011), prices may also be chosen simultaneously
(Nocke and White, 2007). Second, price setting of the integrated firms at a specific mar-
ket level is equally unconstrained, i.e., these firms decide not only about the magnitude
of a price, but also about timing when to change it. Therefore, the experimental design
includes various time settings that are captured by the theoretical literature, but at the
same time allows for a more general approach as it also incorporates additional settings
that may arise endogenously. In consequence of the endogenous timing induced by the
continuous time framework, multiple theoretical predictions may apply, depending on
the specific temporal sequence of firms’ actions. In order to provide a robust theoreti-
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cal prediction, consider the following four alternative timing models, which are variants
of either a sequential-move or a simultaneous-move game proposed in the theoretical
literature:
(1) Two-stage game as suggested by Bourreau et al. (2011)6: First, integrated firms
set their wholesale prices simultaneously and the downstream retailer chooses its
access provider. Second, all firms decide simultaneously on their retail prices.
(2) Three-stage Stackelberg game: Same as (1) with the exception that the down-
stream retailer chooses its retail price in a third stage, i.e., after the integrated
firms have chosen their respective retail prices.
(3) Simultaneous-move game as assumed by Nocke and White (2007): All firms set
all of their prices, both wholesale and retail, simultaneously.
(4) Two-stage Stackelberg game: Same as (3) with the exception that the downstream
retailer chooses its retail price in a second stage, i.e., after the integrated firms
have chosen their prices.
Table 5.1 denotes theoretical equilibrium predictions for four market scenarios and de-
picts resulting ordinal differences of wholesale and retail prices for all four timing mod-
els. Note that the hypotheses regarding the direction of a price difference hold equally
for wholesale and retail prices of each individual firm. Although the timing models
vary with regard to the specific numerical predictions for equilibrium prices in the in-
vestigated scenarios, the direction of price effects between scenarios align—with one
exception that is discussed below.7
6Note that, in contrast to Bourreau et al. (2011), there is no assumption made that the downstream retailer
will always be supplied by at least one integrated firm and therefore consider cases where complete
foreclosure may arise as an equilibrium (see Atiyas et al., 2015, for a detailed analysis in context of
the Shubik and Levitan model). Integrated firms may choose to set wholesale prices in excess of their
own retail prices and consequently foreclose the retailer from the downstream market, which implies
qD = 0.
7See Appendix A.3 for the complete analysis and a comprehensive comparison of all models.
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TABLE 5.1: Predicted wholesale and retail price differences between market scenarios.
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation




Wholesale competition Competitive outcome
or   Competitive outcome
Foreclosure
In order to allow for a benchmark for the evaluation of wholesale competition, consider
first the market outcome under a wholesale monopoly. In this scenario only Firm A of-
fers a wholesale price and may provide the wholesale good to the retailer Firm D. By
contrast, Firm B relies on its vertically integrated structure to produce its own whole-
sale good, but does not offer access to its wholesale resource. In the absence of regula-
tion, given g = 30, Firm A is expected to set the wholesale price either at the wholesale
monopoly level aA = am or such that the retailer is foreclosed from the downstream
market. As shown in Appendix A.3, the latter outcome arises if the retailer’s price reac-
tion is not explicitly anticipated by the monopolistic wholesale provider, i.e., in Timing
Models (1) and (3). The introduction of margin squeeze regulation changes the equilib-
rium outcome in the wholesale monopoly scenario only if equilibrium prices of Firm
A under no regulation violate the margin squeeze condition aA  pA. Whereas margin
squeeze regulation is then expected to decrease prices in comparison to the foreclosure
outcome, it instead increases wholesale and retail prices for all firms according to the
theoretical prediction in Timing Model (2), where foreclosure does not constitute an
equilibrium under no regulation. In sum, theoretical predictions on whether the imple-
mentation of margin squeeze regulation decreases prices in a wholesale monopoly are
ambiguous.
In the wholesale competition scenario, it is straightforward that symmetric marginal
cost pricing, i.e., aA = aB = 0, is a Nash equilibrium, as is shown by Bourreau et al.
(2011). The corresponding equilibrium retail prices are thus symmetric for all three
firms. In Timing Models (2) and (4) this equilibrium is unique, because integrated firms
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anticipate that Firm D as a follower can only act as a price taker and therefore find it
always profitable to make a viable wholesale offer.8 In contrast, in Timing Models (1)
and (3), there exists a second foreclosure equilibrium in which both integrated firms
decide not to offer a viable wholesale price to the retailer, i.e., the retailer does not sup-
ply any retail consumers (Atiyas et al., 2015). Introducing margin squeeze regulation in
the case of wholesale competition renders foreclosure impossible, thus, the competitive
equilibrium remains as the unique predicted outcome in all presented timing models.
In conclusion and in line with previous theoretical analyses, prices under wholesale
competition are likely to be below prices in a wholesale monopoly and never exceed
them across all model variants.
5.2.2 Design
The experimental design is based on a continuous time framework in which partici-
pants can observe competitors’ price changes immediately and market variables are
updated in real time. Similar designs have recently been used in experimental eco-
nomics, e.g., in the context of a prisoner’s dilemma game (Bigoni et al., 2015; Friedman
and Oprea, 2012) as well as in a Hotelling setting (Kephart and Friedman, 2015). Next
to its property to endogenize the timing of the game and thereby to reconcile different
timings proposed in the theoretical literature, the continuous time framework is chosen
for the following reasons: First, continuous time is conjectured to promote the emer-
gence of a theoretical prediction in complex market settings (Kephart and Friedman,
2015; Kephart and Rose, 2015). Second, under both Cournot as well as Bertrand com-
petition, Section 3.3 systematically compares the extent of tacit collusion that emerges
under continuous time and discrete time and finds lower levels of tacit collusion in con-
tinuous time for both competition models. Therefore, the continuous time framework
offers a more conservative experimental test of the emergence of tacit collusion than
a discrete time framework. Third, through the continuous feedback loop subjects can
8Hence, modelling the retailer as a follower in a Stackelberg retail setting may be viewed as an alternative
implementation of the a priori assumption made by Bourreau et al. (2011) which guarantees that the
integrated firms have no incentive to foreclose the retailer.
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directly assess the interdependency between prices in the wholesale and retail market,
which aids them in evaluating the impact of their decisions on their individual perfor-
mance and on aggregate market outcomes.
The experiment is computerized with the Java-based experimental software Brownie
(Müller et al., 2014). The course of the experiment is divided in two phases: the trial
phase and the game phase. During the trial phase subjects are able to test various price
configurations for all firms in the particular market cohort and to observe the resulting
payoffs, while these actions do not impact the subjects’ earnings and are not visible
to other participants, i.e., the subjects do not interact with each other during the trial
phase. The game phase, which starts after all subjects confirm their initial prices in the
trial phase, lasts for exactly 30 minutes. All decisions in the game phase directly impact
the monetary payoff of the subjects. Earnings are the cumulative profits over the time
horizon of the experiment. Current profits and cumulative earnings are displayed to
subjects over the entire game phase.
As motivated above, the integrated firms, Firm A and Firm B, are represented by hu-
man subjects while the downstream retailer, Firm D, is represented by an automated
software agent. The agent is programmed to constantly choose its profit-maximizing
price given the wholesale and retail prices set by the integrated firms. Thereby, the soft-
ware agent reacts immediately to any price change made by one of the other firms. In
this setup, the experiment covers the following three modes of wholesale competition
and two regulatory Open Access regimes in a full-factorial manner, thus ensuing six
treatments (see Table 5.2):
Wholesale Monopoly (WM): Only Firm A sets a wholesale price and can change it at any
time. Firm B does not participate in the wholesale market.




TABLE 5.2: Full-factorial experimental design with six treatments.
Treatments No Regulation Margin Squeeze Regulation
Wholesale Monopoly WM-NR WM-MSR
(N = 12) (N = 11)
Wholesale Competition WC-NR WC-MSR
(N = 9) (N = 10)
Wholesale Competition with WCPC-NR WCPC-MSR
Price Commitment (N =10) (N = 12)
Independent observations at the market cohort level in parentheses.
Wholesale Competition with Price Commitment (WCPC)) Firm A and Firm B set wholesale
prices, however, each firm’s wholesale price is fixed for an embargo period of 30
seconds after it is changed, everything else being equal to WC.
No Regulation (NR): Firms set wholesale and retail prices freely.
Margin Squeeze Regulation (MSR): Firm A and Firm B may set neither their wholesale
price above their own retail price nor their retail price below their own wholesale
price. If firms set wholesale (retail) prices that violate these conditions, the exper-
imental software displays a warning and sets the price to the allowed maximum
(minimum), which is the current own retail (wholesale) price.
5.2.3 Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted with students of the Department of Eco-
nomics and Management at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany,
who were recruited via the ORSEE platform (Greiner, 2015). Overall, 128 subjects par-
ticipated in the study and each participant played only one of the treatments (between-
subject design). The average experimental session lasted 70 minutes. On average, sub-
jects earned a performance-based payment of 16.80 Euro in addition to a base fee of 5
Euro. Participants were randomly assigned to groups of two and interacted with the
same firm for the entire time horizon of the experiment (fixed partner matching). Con-
sequently, there are 64 independent observations at the market cohort level as denoted
by Table 5.2. The current market data is recorded every 500 ms, thus, there are 3,600
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data tuples per market cohort that include wholesale and retail prices as well as the
corresponding quantities and profits.
While the main analyses and results will focus on the student sample, a complemen-
tary validation study was additionally conducted for the WCPC-NR treatment with 16
professional experts in an effort to address external validity concerns. The experts were
recruited from the regulatory department of a major German telecommunications op-
erator, where they deal with issues of access regulation on a daily basis. The study was
executed under identical conditions as in student experiments with three exceptions.
First, the duration of the game phase was shortened to ten minutes. Second, the pay-
ment scheme was changed to a lottery system, where participants could win one of
three vouchers with a monetary value of 30 Euro each. The number of lottery tickets
that participants received were dependent on their payoff in the experiment. By this
means, monotonicity was ensured with regard to the relationship between individual
performance and payoffs. Third, each participant played a second WCPC-NR treatment
with a more differentiated retail market (g = 50). The sequence of the two treatments
was randomized across three experimental sessions.
All experimental sessions with students as well as experts were conducted with the
same experimental software and hardware in order to ensure consistency, particularly
with regard to the graphical user interface. Each session was run according to the fol-
lowing protocol. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects are randomly assigned to a seat,
from which they can neither see nor speak to any other participant of the experiment.
Subsequently, the experimental instructions9 are handed to the participants in print
and read aloud from a recording. Paragraphs that are identical across treatments are
recorded once and the recording is used in all treatments. Prior to the beginning of the
experiment, each subject has to complete a computerized comprehension test that in-
cludes a set of questions regarding the experimental instructions and the experimental
procedure. Participants are allowed to proceed to the next question only after entering
the correct answer to the current one. After all subjects successfully complete the test,
9Exemplary instructions for the WCPC-MSR treatment are provided in Appendix C.2.
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the experiment starts automatically. In addition to this procedure, student participants
wore ear protectors from the beginning of the questionnaire until the end of the game
phase in order to avoid any influence from clicking noises of computer mouses.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Main study
In the following, market prices, firms’ profits and consumer welfare are evaluated
across treatments for the main study with students. The wholesale market price am
is given by the wholesale price that the entrant faces, i.e., the minimum of both whole-
sale offers. The retail market price ym is defined as the transaction price, which is the
demand-weighted average of retail prices, i.e., ym = Âk
qk
Q · pk where Q is the aggre-
gate market demand. Profits are given by the amount of money that participants earn
during the game phase, i.e., the final payoff excluding the fixed base fee. The average
profit of both integrated firms is denoted by pAB and the profit of the downstream re-
tailer by pD. Consumer surplus is computed as the utility of a representative consumer
given the supplied quantities of all three firms subtracted by the transaction price, i.e.,





2)  Âk qk pk (see Bouckaert and Kort (2014) for a
detailed derivation). For ease of interpretation consumer surplus is standardized as
fCS = CS CSminCSmax CSmin on the interval of eligible prices, i.e., pk 2 [0,100]. Thus, fCS = 0 de-
notes the minimum consumer surplus at pk = 100, while fCS = 1 represents the maxi-
mum consumer surplus at pk = 0. For a focus on market outcomes in a stable market
environment and due to the complexity of the experiment start- and endgame effects
are neglected by considering only the market data from recorded ticks 601 to 3,000 with
1 tick = 500 ms, i.e., the first five and last five minutes are dropped for the subsequent
analysis. For the same reasons, the analysis is based on medians as this mitigates the
impact of outliers in comparison to averages and should therefore provide a more con-
servative analysis (see, e.g., Friedman and Oprea (2012) for an identical approach in a
continuous time experiment). Arguably, regulators and policy makers should be more
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TABLE 5.3: Treatment median of median market cohort prices, profits and consumer surplus.
Treatment Markets N am ym pAB pD fCS
WM-NR 12 28,800 73.573 65.499 16.383 0.899 0.292
WM-MSR 11 26,400 72.572 83.124 20.750 1.028 0.153
WC-NR 9 21,600 86.085 88.407 22.434 0.258 0.097
WC-MSR 10 24,000 83.082 92.281 22.802 2.339 0.062
WCPC-NR 10 24,000 40.540 49.560 12.243 2.491 0.461
WCPC-MSR 12 28,800 49.049 67.415 15.866 2.322 0.298
Total 64 153,600 72.071 76.159 18.093 1.672 0.213
Medians are based on minutes [5,25] of the game phase.
interested in the median outcome that can be expected from a single scenario than the
average effect across multiple co-existing scenarios.10
Table 5.3 presents the respective treatment medians of median values at the market
cohort level for wholesale and retail prices, firms’ profits, and consumer surplus to-
gether with the number of independent market cohorts and the number of partially
dependent observed time ticks. In addition, Figure 5.2 depicts the period medians of
wholesale and retail market prices across individual market cohorts for each of the six
treatment combinations. For purposes of illustration, every point in the graphs is a
median over 50 subsequent ticks. In order to evaluate treatment effects statistically,
consider the following quantile regression (Koenker and Hallock, 2001):
Xjt = b0 + bPeriod · t + bWC · WC
+ bWCPC · WCPC
+ bMSR · MSR
+ bWCxMSR · WC · MSR
+ bWCPCxMSR · WCPC · MSR + ejt,
where Xjt denotes the respective market variable X in market cohort j and period t.
Treatment WM-NR is adopted as the baseline.11 WC, WCPC and MSR are dummy vari-
10Nevertheless, the reported results are similar if the analysis is based on means rather than on medians
(see Appendix B.2).
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TABLE 5.4: Quantile regressions of wholesale market price am, retail market price ym, inte-
grated firms’ average profit pAB, retailer’s profit pD and consumer surplus fCS.
Baseline: Wholesale Monopoly & No Regulation (WM-NR).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am ym pAB pD fCS
Wholesale 23.879⇤⇤ 18.376⇤ 4.839⇤⇤⇤  0.813  0.162⇤⇤
Competition (WC) (10.073) (9.738) (1.830) (0.815) (0.080)
WC w/ Price  28.154⇤⇤⇤  19.763⇤⇤  5.459⇤⇤⇤ 1.130 0.212⇤⇤⇤
Commitment (WCPC) (8.851) (9.130) (1.729) (0.861) (0.077)
Margin Squeeze 9.401 9.721 2.358 0.173  0.081
Regulation (MSR) (10.812) (9.927) (1.827) (0.798) (0.078)
WC x MSR  24.309⇤  7.156  2.562 1.924⇤⇤ 0.060
(13.731) (12.170) (2.403) (0.926) (0.100)
WCPC x MSR  1.928 7.250 1.759 0.019  0.088
(17.188) (12.692) (2.774) (0.930) (0.116)
Period 0.004 0.004⇤⇤ 0.001⇤ >  0.001 >  0.001⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.002) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 62.893⇤⇤⇤ 62.972⇤⇤⇤ 16.251⇤⇤⇤ 1.324⇤ 0.319⇤⇤⇤
(9.764) (9.148) (1.931) (0.769) (0.080)
Observations 153,600 153,600 153,600 153,600 153,600
Clustered standard errors (by market cohort) in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
ables indicating the respective mode of wholesale market structure and Open Access
regulation. Interactions WC x MSR and WCPC x MSR delineate the effects of margin
squeeze regulation under a specific mode of wholesale competition. Standard errors
are clustered on the market cohort level to control for intra-cluster correlation over re-
peated observations from periods in the same market cohort (Parente and Silva, 2016).
The estimates of the respective models for market variables of interest are reported in
Table 5.4 and interpreted in the following.
In the benchmark case WM-NR the wholesale monopolist sets a positive wholesale
price as is indicated by the estimated constant in Model (1), which is similar in mag-
nitude to the retail market price as reported in Model (2). This is in line with the ob-
servation that margin squeezes occur frequently, such that the non-integrated firm is
effectively foreclosed, i.e., the wholesale market price is greater than or equal to the re-
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tail prices of both integrated firms.12 The median rate of foreclosure at the individual
market cohort level amounts to 49.52% in this scenario. Still, the profit of Firm D is
found to be significantly different from zero, as indicated by the positive constant in
Model (4). In other words, even in the case of an unregulated wholesale monopoly,
the downstream retailer can profitably participate in the retail market. Due to its access
monopoly, Firm A achieves a significantly (p < 0.01) higher median profit (pA = 19.031)
than its integrated competitor (pB = 14.294).13 Note that all of these results are in line
with the theoretical prediction.
RESULT 5.1. The introduction of wholesale competition reduces neither wholesale prices nor
retail prices. In fact, under homogeneous Bertrand competition at the wholesale level consumers
as well as the downstream retailer are worse off compared to the case of an unregulated wholesale
monopoly.
Surprisingly, relative to an unregulated wholesale monopoly, the introduction of homo-
geneous Bertrand competition at the wholesale level increases both wholesale and retail
market prices significantly. While under WC-NR the wholesale market price rises by
23.88 pp, consumers face an 18.38 pp higher retail market price in comparison to WM-
NR. Although it is well-known that Bertrand competition yields supra-competitive
prices, it is notable that under WC-NR prices are set even significantly above price levels
of WM-NR. In consequence, the ability to tacitly collude in the wholesale market allows
the integrated firms to extract higher profits than in the monopoly treatment as indi-
cated in Model (3). While the effect on the retailer’s profit is negative but insignificant,
the median rate of foreclosure is 62.46%, and thus higher than under WM-NR.
RESULT 5.2. Competition in the wholesale market can be stimulated by introducing competi-
tion for the market through a price commitment. Then, wholesale and retail prices are lower
than under a wholesale monopoly, but remain above the theoretical prediction.
12Note that the non-integrated firm may still be marginally active in the retail market, because goods are
differentiated.
13See Appendix B.2 for the corresponding quantile regression.
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Remarkably, the collusive effect of wholesale competition is set off by a simple whole-
sale price commitment for integrated firms. In particular, under WCPC-NR the whole-
sale market price decreases significantly by 28.15 pp (52.03 pp) relative to WM-NR
(WC-NR), while the transaction price in the retail market is lowered significantly by
19.76 pp (38.14 pp). As a result, consumers’ surplus increases significantly by 21.2
pp compared to WM-NR as indicated by Model (5). In line with declining market
prices, the integrated firms’ profits decrease significantly as well. Despite lower whole-
sale prices, the margin between wholesale and retail prices remains relatively slim
due to the increasing price competition at the retail level as is depicted by the lower
left panel in Figure 5.2. In consequence, the median rate of foreclosure amounts to
29.10%. The effect on the retailer’s profit is found to be insignificant, although positive
in absolute terms. Evidently, the estimated wholesale access under WCPC-NR price of
62.893   28.154 = 34.739 remains well above the theoretical prediction of am = 0.
RESULT 5.3. There is no evidence that margin squeeze regulation reduces retail prices, and thus
consumers do not benefit from such a regulation. However, the introduction of a margin squeeze
regulation may reduce wholesale prices, and thus the downstream retailer may be better off.
As reported above, margin squeezes are frequently observed under all market struc-
tures at the wholesale level. Since the primary justification for margin squeeze regula-
tion is the prevention of exclusionary and exploitative abuses (Jullien et al., 2014), its
impact on market prices and surplus measures is examined in the following. The re-
gression analyses reported in Table 5.4 reveal that margin squeeze regulation generally
does not have a significant impact on market outcomes, but rather tends to increase
wholesale and retail prices. In fact, the only reduction in wholesale prices evoked by
margin squeeze regulation is found in the case of a particularly collusive wholesale
market as under unregulated wholesale competition. More specific, the wholesale price
under WC-MSR is significantly lower than under WC-NR, which is indicated visually
by the middle panels in Figure 5.2 and supported empirically by the significant interac-
tion effect WC x MSR. Although this effect is paralleled by an increase in the retailer’s
profit, margin squeeze regulation translates neither into significantly lower retail prices
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TABLE 5.5: Quantile regressions of market outcomes in case of wholesale competition without
price commitment.
Baseline: Wholesale Competition & No Regulation (WC-NR).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am ym pAB pD fCS
Margin squeeze  14.632⇤ 3.909  0.149 2.051⇤⇤⇤  0.036
regulation (MSR) (8.254) (3.528) (1.034) (0.520) (0.030)
Period 0.005 < 0.001 < 0.001 >  0.001 >  0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 85.979⇤⇤⇤ 88.125⇤⇤⇤ 22.068⇤⇤⇤ 0.650 0.105⇤⇤
(15.948) (5.347) (1.638) (0.869) (0.045)
Observations 45,600 45,600 45,600 45,600 45,600
Clustered standard errors (by market cohort) in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
nor into significantly higher consumer surplus. Taken together, the empirical results do
not provide any evidence that consumers or the retailer generally benefit from a margin
squeeze regulation.
In an effort to further investigate the impact of the margin squeeze regulation and to
delineate effects on stakeholders under different wholesale competition models, the
following (reduced) quantile regression model is estimated for each of the wholesale
market structures separately to allow for a pairwise comparison:
Xjt = b0 + bPeriod · t + bMSR · MSR + ejt.
This analysis is of particular interest whenever policymakers are able to prescribe rules
that govern the competition at the wholesale level but may find themselves unable
to change the market structure completely. In these cases the margin squeeze condi-
tion may be considered as an ex ante regulatory remedy or as an ex post competition
policy instrument. The effect of margin squeeze regulation is therefore examined un-
der all three considered wholesale market structures. First, in the case of a wholesale
monopoly, margin squeeze regulation has a positive yet insignificant effect for all price
and profit variables, while the corresponding coefficient for consumer surplus is nega-
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TABLE 5.6: Quantile regressions of market outcomes in case of wholesale competition with price
commitment.
Baseline: Wholesale Competition with Price Commitment & No Regulation
(WCPC-NR).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am ym pAB pD fCS
Margin squeeze 7.983 17.081⇤⇤ 4.157⇤ 0.188  0.165⇤⇤
regulation (MSR) (10.883) (8.071) (2.251) (0.474) (0.080)
Period 0.003 0.006⇤ 0.001 >  0.001 >  0.001⇤
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 37.475⇤⇤⇤ 39.162⇤⇤⇤ 10.374⇤⇤⇤ 2.335⇤⇤⇤ 0.572⇤⇤⇤
(8.131) (5.664) (1.921) (0.609) (0.058)
Observations 52,800 52,800 52,800 52,800 52,800
Clustered standard errors (by market cohort) in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
tive and insignificant (see Appendix B.2). In line with the theoretical prediction, margin
squeeze regulation therefore does not seem to represent a suitable safeguard for effec-
tive competition nor a beneficiary instrument for consumers in the case of a wholesale
monopoly when an integrated competitor is present. Second, in the case of whole-
sale competition (Table 5.5), margin squeeze regulation instead significantly reduces the
wholesale market price, which resembles the net effect of the general margin squeeze
impact, MSR, and the interaction effect WC x MSR reported in Table 5.4. The pairwise
comparison likewise confirms the positive and significant impact on the retailer’s profit
compared to the unregulated regime. Again, there is no significant negative impact on
the retail market price. Accordingly, the effect on consumer welfare is also insignificant.
Therefore, it is concluded that the decline of the wholesale market price that results
from margin squeeze regulation allows the retailer to increase its profitability, but retail
prices do not decrease proportionately and hence, consumers are not better off. Third,
in the case of wholesale competition with price commitment, a positive and significant
effect on the retail market price (Table 5.6) advises further skepticism with regard to
margin squeeze regulation and its impact on consumers. The magnitude of the rela-
tive price increase is estimated at 17.08 pp. The price increase benefits the integrated
firms by means of significantly higher profits, whereas the effect on the downstream re-
tailer’s profit is insignificant. In sum, a margin squeeze regulation is clearly detrimental
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to consumers’ interest in this scenario as consumer surplus decreases significantly by
16.53 pp and may therefore even offset the gains from wholesale competition with price
commitment. For completeness, a summary of all pairwise comparisons between the
treatments by means of quantile regressions is given in Appendix B.2.
5.3.2 Validation study
Figure 5.3 illustrates the median wholesale and retail prices under WCPC-NR both
for the students treatment (left-hand panel) and for the experts treatment (right-hand
panel). While wholesale market prices of experts are lower according to the median
value over all periods (aStudentsm = 43.043, a
Experts
m = 29.029), retail market prices are al-
most identical (yStudentsm = 50.326, y
Experts
m = 50.613). Note that for both subject pools
wholesale prices are different from zero which is the theoretical prediction.
First, market outcomes between experts and students are compared based on the entire
time horizon of the experiment. In particular, the null hypothesis is that the median
market prices in the students sample and the median market prices in the experts sam-
ple are from populations with the same distribution. According to a Mann-Whitney U
test, there is no significant difference in wholesale market prices (z = 1.42, p = 0.155) nor
in retail market prices (z = 0.71, p = 0.477). Also with respect to overall medians, i.e., the
median of market cohort medians, Fisher’s exact test does not reject the equality of me-
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TABLE 5.7: Quantile regressions of market outcomes on subject type in case of wholesale com-
petition with price commitment.
Baseline: Wholesale Competition with Price Commitment & No Regulation
(WCPC-NR) with Students.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am ym pAB pD fCS
Experts  14.465 1.170  0.613 1.839⇤⇤⇤ 0.003
(10.259) (10.908) (2.923) (0.600) (0.126)
Period 0.001 0.003 0.001 < 0.001 >  0.001
(0.011) (0.008) (0.002) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 42.297⇤⇤⇤ 48.270⇤⇤⇤ 11.974⇤⇤⇤ 2.043⇤⇤⇤ 0.477⇤⇤⇤
(9.791) (6.920) (2.179) (0.427) (0.078)
Observations 21,618 21,618 21,618 21,618 21,618
Clustered standard errors (by market cohorts) in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
dian market prices at the wholesale level (p = 0.637) or the retail level (p = 1.0). Finally,
the same result is obtained by a quantile regression that investigates the differences of
the subject pools while controlling for the time trend and intra-cluster correlation. In
order to obtain a comparable data basis with an equivalent number of periods for the
experts and students treatments, the measures of the students treatments are averaged
over three subsequent 500 ms intervals. As shown in Table 5.7, the effect of the ex-
pert subject pool is insignificant for all market variables except the retailer’s profit. The
higher profit of the entrant can be attributed to a larger spread between wholesale and
retail prices in a subset of individual market cohorts in the experts treatment, which is
also indicated by the negative coefficient for the median wholesale market price.
Naturally, general and conclusive evidence cannot be derived based on findings of sta-
tistical insignificance. However, in addition to the finding of statistical indifference,
descriptive measures as portrayed in Figure 5.3 show quantitatively similar and quali-
tatively equal behavior for both subject pools.
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5.4 Repeated game analysis of tacit collusion incentives
In an effort to relate the empirical findings of the experiment to the four timing mod-
els introduced in Section 5.2, their theoretical predictions are considered in a repeated
game context. Thereby, a comparison to observed experimental results may reveal
which of the timing models best captures endogenous timing under the continuous
time framework. Considering the benchmark scenario of an unregulated wholesale
monopoly, observed wholesale prices suggest that the wholesale provider does gener-
ally not foreclose the downstream retailer, but rather charges the monopolistic whole-
sale price. Moreover, there is no evidence that margin squeeze regulation reduces
wholesale prices in the monopoly scenario. Both observations are in line with pre-
dictions by Timing Models (2) and (4) and contradict predictions by Timing Models (1)
and (3). This may be considered as support for the experimental design as it is in line
with the intention to model the non-integrated retailer as a competitive fringe, whose
reaction is immediate, but subsequent and anticipated by the integrated firms. Further-
more, median prices for all wholesale competition treatments are significantly above
the competitive outcome, which is an equilibrium in all timing models. More spe-
cific, the significant increase in wholesale and retail prices from wholesale monopoly
to wholesale competition contradicts the consensus prediction. Whereas wholesale
prices close to amax = 100 may be interpreted as an indication for the foreclosure out-
come, which is predicted by Timing Models (1) and (3), observed retail prices close to
pmax = 100 are in line with the JPM outcome, but diverge from predicted retail prices
in the foreclosure outcome. This suggests the presence of substantial tacit collusion
among integrated firms in the wholesale competition scenario.
Although experiments in continuous time have thus far been primarily used to con-
sider static one-shot games (Friedman and Oprea, 2012; Bigoni et al., 2015; Kephart and
Friedman, 2015), continuous time may also be interpreted as an infinite repetition of a
one-shot game as described by the timing models. In this context, the incentives to tac-
itly collude in the upstream market can be compared in the spirit of Nocke and White
(2007) and Normann (2009) with respect to the critical discount factor that is required
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TABLE 5.8: Profits and discount factors under wholesale monopoly.
Firm A Firm B











(1) 34.00 35.02 15.04 0.05 17.00 25.40 15.04 0.81
(2) 34.00 35.02 15.61 0.05 17.00 25.40 14.05 0.74
(3) 34.00 35.02 15.04 0.05 17.00 25.40 15.04 0.81
(4) 34.00 35.02 15.07 0.05 17.00 25.40 11.86 0.62
TABLE 5.9: Profits and discount factors under wholesale competition.
Firm A Firm B











(1), (2), (3), (4) 25.50 30.21 5.79 0.19 25.50 30.21 5.79 0.19
to sustain collusive outcomes. Assuming a grim trigger strategy, deviations from JPM
prices amax and pmax are punished by infinite play of the competitive Nash equilibrium
(cf. Nocke and White, 2007). Individual discount factors that support collusive behav-








for i 2 {A, B}, where p JPM is the firm’s share of the
JPM profit, pDev is the maximum deviation profit that a firm can achieve by unilateral
deviation, and pPunish is the firm’s profit in periods after deviation (cf. Normann, 2009).
The minimum critical discount factor is then given by d = max{dA,dB}.
Following this approach, the minimum critical discount factors can be computed for
wholesale monopoly and competition. Table 5.8 denotes the respective profits and dis-
count factors for both integrated firms in case of a wholesale monopoly for each timing
model. Likewise, Table 5.9 states profits and discount factors under wholesale compe-
tition. Here, critical discount factors are identical across all timing models, because in
each model punishment is exercised through the competitive equilibrium. Moreover,
integrated firms’ critical discount factors under wholesale competition are symmetric
because collusive and deviation profits are calculated as expected values, i.e., firms ex-
pect to be the access provider with probability one half.14
14Alternatively, one may assume that firms gain the entire wholesale profit if they deviate. Irrespective,
the ensuing minimum critical discount factor d = 0.43 is still lower than the ones reported in Table 5.8.
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Pairwise comparisons of minimum critical discount factors under wholesale monopoly
and competition show that collusion is sustainable for a larger range of discount fac-
tors under wholesale competition, independent of the assumed timing of the one-shot
game. More specifically, Firm B has a stronger incentive to deviate in the case of a
wholesale monopoly, because foregone profits in the case of punishment are relatively
low compared to its JPM profit share. In contrast, in the case of wholesale competi-
tion, expected JPM profits are higher, while profits in the case of punishment are lower,
thus making a deviation less attractive. Therefore, tacit collusion is less likely in the
wholesale monopoly setting than in the wholesale duopoly setting. This may provide
a theoretical rationale for Result 1.
However, notice that this does not provide a rationale for Result 2, because the same
theoretical analysis applies to the case of wholesale competition with price commit-
ment. To see this, consider price commitment to induce sequential-move rather than
simultaneous-move interaction between the integrated firms regarding the wholesale
price.15 Evidently, this does not apply to the wholesale monopoly scenario and it is easy
to see that this would also not change the equilibrium in the wholesale competition sce-
nario: As each of the integrated firms has an incentive to be the access provider, the first
mover will anticipate to be undercut by the second mover and thus set the minimum
feasible access price, just like when access prices are determined simultaneously. Con-
sequently, the alternative timing would result in the same critical discount factors and
therefore the same prediction with respect to the incentives for tacit collusion. From
a more behavioral perspective, one could argue that the price commitment limits the
extent to which one of the integrated firms can immediately retaliate the other (in the
sense of the grim trigger strategy), which therefore makes the punishment less severe,
and ultimately tacit collusion less likely. However, in an infinitely repeated game this
lack of punishment in a short (finite) period does not matter.16 But from a behavioral
15Note that this timing makes sense only in Timing Models (1) and (2), because it is the very nature of
Timing Models (3) and (4) that integrated firms’ decisions are made simultaneously in the upstream
and downstream markets.
16Obviously, it would matter in a finitely repeated game. However, note that in this case the only
subgame-perfect equilibrium would also be to play the (unique) equilibrium of the one-shot game in
each period. That is, for the case of wholesale competition, and irrespective of a price commitment, the
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perspective it may. After all the price commitment is able to secure the second-mover
a guaranteed wholesale profit for a (short) period of time and as such, it may stimulate
a notion of competition for the market that—in line with Result 2—amplifies the competi-
tive process.
5.5 Discussion
Although the regulation of access to an essential upstream resource is a perennial is-
sue for policymakers and industry stakeholders, the competitive supply of the bottle-
neck resource by vertically integrated firms is investigated only recently in the theo-
retical economic literature. By means of an economic laboratory experiment this study
scrutinizes these theoretical analyses, particularly with respect to the effectiveness of
wholesale competition in the relevant case when there are only two access providers.
The results indicate that wholesale duopoly markets may be severely affected by high
levels of tacit collusion, such that market performance in terms of market prices and
consumer surplus is worse than with a single access provider (Result 5.1). In particu-
lar, this is found to be the case under standard homogeneous Bertrand competition at
the wholesale level, which is frequently assumed in the theoretical investigations (e.g.,
Bourreau et al., 2011, 2015). In this vein and in the spirit of a more behaviorally oriented
regulation (Normann and Ricciuti, 2009; Lunn, 2014), this experimental analysis serves
as a regulatory testbed, which points at possible behavioral issues that may arise in
practice. After all, in light of the tremendous impact that regulatory decisions have on
the respective industry and—especially in the case of network industries—also on other
industries, policymakers should be particularly mindful when theoretical predictions
are not confirmed in the laboratory. In the present context, a simple price commit-
ment rule significantly improves market outcomes, although the competitive intensity
in the wholesale market remains below the theoretical prediction (Result 5.2). Further-
more, in reference to the theoretical analyses by Petulowa and Saavedra (2014) and
competitive outcome would be played. Consequently this model variant does not provide a theoretical
rationale for Result 2 either.
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Jullien et al. (2014), the experimental results give a clear indication regarding the theo-
retically ambiguous effect of margin squeeze regulation on retail prices in the presence
of wholesale competition by vertically integrated firms. More specifically, the experi-
mental evidence supports the rationale that the ban of a margin squeeze can impede
the intensity of competition in the retail market (Result 5.3). Moreover, the experiment
points to a particular problem of applying the margin squeeze rule to an environment
of multiple firms operating in the wholesale and retail market: When tacit collusion in
the wholesale market is stable and leads to prices above the Nash equilibrium, retail
pricing is constrained correspondingly. Especially the integrated firm, which naturally
has an incentive to be more aggressive in the retail market because it is not affected by
the softening effect, may be restricted in setting lower retail prices as long as it decides
not to undercut prices in the wholesale market. Although the margin squeeze rule,
as an implicit Open Access rule, ensures non-discrimination between competitors, the
premise to treat all market participants alike is not aligned with the diverse incentives
that occur in the case of simultaneous retail and wholesale competition, e.g., due to the
consideration of opportunity costs by the access provider. Thus, non-discrimination of
competitors may not always be in the best interest of the consumer.17
With respect to the limitations of the experimental study, it should be noted that firms’
investment incentives are not considered under the various market scenarios and thus,
experimental insights are constrained to short-term issues of static efficiency. However,
in many industries, particularly in network industries such as telecommunications, dy-
namic efficiency is considered to be at least equally important by policymakers. Nev-
ertheless, the findings may still be informative in this context, as there is generally an
inherent trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency (see Chapter 2) with some
notable exceptions (Klumpp and Su, 2010). That is, dynamic investment incentives
are to a large extent influenced by the expectations about the future (static) benefits
that arise from a given market structure (especially the market shares of competitors,
see Klumpp and Su, 2015), the obtained results may inform further research regarding
17Note that an additional well-known negative effect of non-discrimination on competition is articulated
by the theory of restoring monopoly power (Rey and Tirole, 2007b), where non-discrimination allows the
upstream firm to resolve its commitment problem.
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the effects that arise under infrastructure-based competition with multiple wholesale
providers. In this context, the experimental results also cast doubt on the premise that
infrastructure-based competition should be the undisputed regulatory goal (Cave and
Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006a), particularly when Open Access for independent retailer
is required at the same time (e.g., as indicated by the European Commission’s (2014b)
digital agenda). This is in line with empirical findings by Höffler (2007) which suggest
that infrastructure duplication costs may be higher than the gains from (supposedly)
intensified competition. More general with respect to economic experimentation, a sec-
ond concern arises with respect to the external validity of findings, although the val-
idation study with industry professionals corroborates the robustness of the obtained
student subject pool results. Naturally, experimental results do not directly carry over
to actual markets, however, at the same time, one should also be cautious to believe
that theoretical predictions will hold in practice when they already fail in a laboratory
environment. Furthermore, note that the results are based on the relative differences
between treatments and should thus not be affected by factors that are held constant
across treatments. Nevertheless, an empirical field study of wholesale access in context
of infrastructure competition would certainly represent a highly valuable contribution
complementing theoretical and experimental work.
Finally, this study may also inspire future work. First, rules and remedies that are
deemed to intensify competition at the wholesale level could be investigated in further
depth. While two alternative modes of wholesale competition which yield market out-
comes below and above the wholesale monopoly treatment have been considered, the
investigation of the underlying competitive process and further investigation of instru-
ments that may intensify competition at the wholesale level appear promising. Second,
the presented analysis may be extended by a variation of the number of competitors
and retailers as well as the introduction of asymmetry between the integrated firms.
With regard to the competition across different access levels and quality layers—as in
Internet and telecommunications markets—such an extension could provide valuable
insight for decision makers and regulators within these fast-moving industries.
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Chapter 6
Number Effects and Tacit Collusion in
Oligopolies
IN oligopolistic markets, concerns about market power and coordinated behaviorfrequently confront competition and regulatory authorities with the question: How
many competitors are enough to ensure competition? Thereby, it is of particular interest how
the competitiveness of a market is affected if a low number of competitors is further re-
duced through consolidation, i.e., if the number of firms is reduced from four to three
or from three to two. For example, several high-profile merger control proceedings in
the European Union1 as well as in the US2 have dealt with cases that would reduce the
remaining number of competitors from four to three major mobile telecommunications
operators in the respective relevant market. In the US airline industry, the Department
of Justice had initially filed a lawsuit to block the merger between American Airlines
and US Airways that reduced the number of legacy carriers from four to three, explicitly
referring to the low number of competitors as a critical threat to effective competition
(Stewart, 2013). Even in a high-tech commodity industry like the hard disk drive in-
dustry, consolidation among manufacturers raises the question whether there is a mag-
This chapter is based on joint work with Niklas Horstmann and Jan Krämer (Horstmann et al., 2016b).
1Hutchinson 3G Austria / Orange Austria (European Commission, 2012), Telefónica Deutschland / E-
Plus (European Commission, 2014c), Hutchinson 3G UK / Telefónica Ireland (European Commission,
2014d).
2AT&T / T-Mobile US (Federal Communications Commission, 2011), Sprint Corp / T-Mobile US (Federal
Communications Commission, 2014).
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ical number to reconcile scale synergies and pro-competitive effects (Igami and Uetake,
2015). Similar to competition authorities, sector-specific regulatory agencies implicitly
or explicitly examine the sufficient number of competitors when assessing the need for
ex ante access regulation. For instance, geographically segmented deregulation of the
wholesale broadband access market in the UK is conditioned on the number of active
competitors in a region (Ofcom, 2014). Likewise, in media retail markets, which in
some countries are characterized by repeated direct public intervention, competition
authorities are required to determine the sufficient number of local sellers to achieve
sustainable coverage in combination with competitive prices (Balmer, 2013).
In general, the number of firms in a specific market is determined endogenously by
the competitive process and particularly by firms’ entry and exit decisions. However,
as described above, in merger cases and regulatory proceedings, authorities are often
required to determine a specific number of competitors exogenously. This makes it nec-
essary to estimate the impact of number effects on the competitiveness in that market.
Obviously, markets in practice exhibit many idiosyncrasies that impact competitiveness
and require a case-by-case analysis before a merger can be cleared or before regulatory
remedies are imposed or lifted. Yet, a general relationship between the number of com-
petitors and the competitiveness of a given market, above and beyond any market pe-
culiarities, is frequently assumed. To this end, it is well-known that equilibrium predic-
tions for market prices (quantities) are generally decreasing (increasing) with a higher
number of competitors, i.e., markets become more competitive. However, the impact
on the degree of tacit collusion, i.e., the ability of firms to sustain a supra-competitive
outcome above (below) the equilibrium, is not as clear.
Based on three complementary studies this chapter investigates the research hypoth-
esis that tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets with two, three, and four competitors
decreases strictly monotonically with the number of competing firms. From a method-
ological point of view, experimental laboratory experiments are well suited to address
this question, because they allow to observe out-of-equilibrium behavior while control-
ling for environmental conditions. In this context, it has previously been concluded that
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tacit collusion is “frequently observed with two sellers, rarely in markets with three
sellers, and almost never in markets with four or more sellers” (Potters and Suetens,
2013, p.17). Surprisingly, a review of the extant literature shows that there is actually
no robust empirical evidence that would support the claim of a strictly monotonically
decreasing relationship between the number of firms and the degree of tacit collusion
in a given market. Whereas, a meta-analysis of the extant literature supports the no-
tion that duopolies are significantly more prone to tacit collusion than quadropolies,
i.e., that “two are few and four are many” (Huck et al., 2004b, p.435), there is no em-
pirical support for a significant effect when moving from four to three firms. However,
the lack of statistical power across and within existing studies precludes a conclusive
evaluation of a strictly monotonic relationship between the number of firms and the
degree of tacit collusion in a market. Moreover, the review of the extant literature re-
veals a lack of systematic evaluation of such number effects under different competition
models (Cournot vs. Bertrand), symmetric and asymmetric firms, and under consider-
ation of different theoretical equilibrium predictions (Nash vs. Walras). Therefore, two
laboratory experiments are conducted in this chapter, which are explicitly designed to
systematically test for number effects on tacit collusion under price and quantity com-
petition, as well as with symmetric and asymmetric firms. Thereby, the findings show
a significant competitive effect from four to three firms as well as from three to two firms.
In fact, the empirically observed decrease in the degree of tacit collusion is almost iden-
tical from four to three as from three to two, suggesting a linear number effect for highly
concentrated oligopolies with regard to the (in)ability to coordinate above the theoreti-
cal Nash prediction.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Next, Section 6.1 reviews the
extant experimental literature and conducts a meta-analysis. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3
the design and results of the experiments with symmetric and asymmetric firms are
reported, respectively. Section 6.4 discusses the findings pooled over all three studies
and highlights their policy implications for both antitrust and regulatory authorities.
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6.1 Review and meta-analysis of the experimental literature
In order to investigate the general relationship between the number of competitors
and the competitiveness in a given market, economic laboratory experiments are par-
ticularly suited, because they allow to identify systemic effects and to isolate distinct
sources for tacit collusion through controlled variation of exogenous variables (see Sec-
tion 3.2). In particular, experiments allow to isolate the effect of the number of com-
petitors on firms’ ability to coordinate through randomization, while holding constant
any potential confounding variable. By this means, the experimental method avoids
endogeneity concerns (e.g., of the observed number of competitors) inherent to field
data (Angrist and Pischke, 2010), which are especially pronounced in the context of the
structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Schmalensee, 1990)
of industrial organization. Moreover, empirical field studies are naturally framed in a
specific market context and are thus neither generalizable per se nor directly applicable
to other market scenarios as causal relationships are inherently difficult to prove (see
Einav and Levin, 2010, for a discussion of generalizability of empirical industry stud-
ies). Particularly with regard to the issue of tacit collusion, which is notoriously hard
to detect in field studies, laboratory experiments can provide general insights by ana-
lyzing in- and out-of-equilibrium strategies and respective market outcomes relative to
benchmark equilibria predicted by economic theory.
Consequently, it is not surprising that there are several experimental studies that inves-
tigate the drivers and impediments of tacit collusion in oligopolies. In their overview
on these experiments, Potters and Suetens (2013) conclude, among others, that “the
scope of collusion is strongly affected by the number of competitors” (p.17). With re-
spect to the effect of the number of competitors on tacit collusion, Potters and Suetens
suggest a strictly monotonic relationship, referring to individual experimental studies
that have employed posted-offer markets, Bertrand competition or Cournot competi-
tion. Although several of these studies find that tacit collusion is generally lower for
a larger number of competitors, e.g., in markets with four relative to two competitors
(e.g., Huck et al., 2004b; Orzen, 2008), as described above, evidence for the stipulated
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monotonic number effect is rather scarce, in particular with regard to the assessment of
tacit collusion in markets with three and four competitors.
6.1.1 Experimental designs
Most oligopoly experiments implement one of the two workhorse models in indus-
trial organization: price competition à la Bertrand (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963; Dolbear
et al., 1968; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Orzen, 2008; Davis, 2009; Fonseca and Nor-
mann, 2012) or quantity competition à la Cournot (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963; Bosch-
Domènech and Vriend, 2003; Huck et al., 2004b; Waichman et al., 2014).3 A third strand
of literature observes tacit collusion in posted-offer markets, i.e., simultaneous com-
petition in prices and quantities (Ketcham et al., 1984; Alger, 1987; Brandts and Guil-
lén, 2007; Ewing and Kruse, 2010). As the latter experiments use very diverse models
and are hence hardly comparable to one another, the focus here is on price or quantity
competition. Table 6.1 lists the ten oligopoly experiments which are surveyed in this
meta-analysis and which all vary the number of competitors n in a market in one way
or another.4
Six experiments employ price competition. Four of those investigate homogeneous
Bertrand competition, i.e., firms’ products are perfect substitutes. The remaining two
experiments use differentiated price competition, i.e., competitors’ products are differ-
entiated with regard to quality or consumers have heterogeneous preferences: Dolbear
et al. (1968) consider a model in which the cross-price elasticity is half the own-price
elasticity and Orzen (2008) models a fraction of consumers to be price-insensitive “con-
venience shoppers” (Orzen, 2008, p.392). All of the four quantity competition experi-
ments included in this meta-analysis employ a homogeneous Cournot model.
3Note that merger experiments induce asymmetry exogenously (see Götte and Schmutzler, 2009, for
a comprehensive review) or endogenize merger formation which yields asymmetric markets post-
merger (Lindqvist and Stennek, 2005). In order to prevent path dependencies from merger formation,
only data from those experimental studies that vary the number of competing firms exogenously across
treatments is used for this meta-analysis.
4To the extent of the author’s knowledge, the list in Table 6.1 is complete with the exception of Abbink
and Brandts (2005, 2008) for which no complete experimental data was attainable.
157
Chapter 6 Number Effects and Tacit Collusion in Oligopolies
TABLE 6.1: Economic laboratory experiments that vary the number of competing firms.
Information
Study Competition Complete Perfect Matching n
Bertrand (price) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Homogeneous 3 3/ 7 Partner {2,3}
Dolbear et al. (1968) Differentiated 3/ 7 3 Partner {2,4,16}
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) Homogeneous 3 3 Stranger {2,3,4}
Orzen (2008) Differentiated 3 3 Partner, Stranger {2,4}
Davis (2009) Homogeneous 3/ 7 3 Partner {2,3,4}
Fonseca and Normann (2012) Homogeneous 3 3 Partner {2,4,6,8}
Cournot (quantity) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Homogeneous 3 3/ 7 Partner {2,3}
Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003) Homogeneous 3/ 7 3 Partner {2,3}
Huck et al. (2004b) Homogeneous 3 3/ 7 Partner {2,3,4,5}
Waichman et al. (2014) Homogeneous 3 3/ 7 Partner {2,3}
3: applicable | 7: not applicable | 3/ 7: both (as treatment variable)
Experiments differ further in the amount of information provided to participants. In
a situation of complete information, each firm, represented by an individual partici-
pant, knows about (or can retrieve) the cost and demand function of all firms in the
market. Moreover, a firm with perfect information can observe all decisions made by
its competitors, and hence, has knowledge over the full history of the game. Lastly, all
but one study employ a fixed matching of firms over the entire time horizon. Instead,
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) match firms randomly in each period. Orzen (2008)
additionally compares partner and stranger matching in a between-subject manner.
6.1.2 Measuring competitiveness as the degree of tacit collusion
In order to compare number effects on competitiveness or likewise, tacit collusion,
across heterogeneous data sets from different experimental designs, a uniform perfor-
mance criterion is required. As absolute price or quantity levels are inconclusive across
experiments, different metrics are proposed in the extant literature to measure compet-
itiveness in experimental oligopoly outcomes. For a review of Cournot experiments,
Huck et al. (2004b) report the ratio between a market’s average total quantity Q and the
total Nash quantity QNash, r = Q/QNash. However, as Engel (2007) points out, r is “sen-
sitive to arbitrary changes in the level of QN[ash]” (p.494). In addition, the measure is
not well suited to quantify and compare non-equilibrium outcomes between treatments
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and experimental designs, because it does not incorporate the joint profit maximizing
(JPM) outcome as a second benchmark.
Therefore, the measure introduced in Subsection 3.3.2, which has previously been em-
ployed in meta-analyses by Engel (2007) and by Suetens and Potters (2007), is utilized
here as well. Thus, tacit collusion is measured as the relative deviation of average price
from the theoretical equilibrium E 2 {Nash,Walras} towards the JPM price pJPM. For-
mally,
j
E = jEp =
p   pE
pJPM   pE .
In this vein, jE represents the degree of tacit collusion based on prices as compared to ei-
ther the Nash equilibrium or the Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium as the theoretical
prediction. The Walrasian equilibrium assumes all competitors to be price-takers and
thus, under homogeneous Bertrand competition the Nash prediction and the Walrasian
prediction coincide. Moreover, under some regularity conditions, Walrasian prices can-
not exceed Nash prices in any oligopoly competition model, i.e., pWalras  pNash. If
j
E = 0, the average market price p corresponds to the theoretical prediction by the
equilibrium concept E. If jE = 1, the market is completely collusive and competitors
behave like in the case of a monopoly. Note that jE may exceed one if joint profit is
not monotonic in prices; the measures’ lower limits, however, depend on the experi-
mental design. Suetens and Potters (2007) employ the same collusion metric based on
Nash predictions to investigate relative differences of tacit collusion under Bertrand
and Cournot competition.5
In addition, Friedman (1971) suggests a theoretical benchmark to assess the likelihood
“that tacit collusion can be sustained as an equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game
context as part of a grim trigger strategy” (Suetens and Potters, 2007, p.73), which is
given by Friedman = P
JPM PNash
PDe f ect PJPM with P
De f ect as the maximum profit for a firm that
unilaterally deviates from a collusive agreement. Hence, the Friedman index measures
the incentive to tacitly collude by comparing the collusive markup on the Nash profit
5Suetens and Potters (2007) exclude negative prices in Cournot experiments from their calculation of the
degree of tacit collusion. In this meta-analysis, however, negative prices are considered as well, as they
correctly reflect the high competitiveness of excess capacity in Cournot markets.
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to the additional profit for defecting from cooperation. In repeated oligopoly experi-
ments each firm has to trade off short-term profits from deviating to foregone profits in
future periods. The higher the Friedman index, the less profitable is a deviation from
a collusive agreement.6 Although the Friedman index assumes an infinitely repeated
game, it may nonetheless be informative in the context of finitely repeated games in ex-
periments with fixed lengths across treatments as it is well-known that tacit collusion
is no phenomenon that is limited to experiments with random termination rules.
6.1.3 Results of the meta-analysis
Table 6.2 reports the number of independent observations N, the two collusion metrics
j
E, and the Friedman index for all experiments and treatments considered in this meta-
analysis.7 The following analysis is carried out in two steps: At first number effects
are examined only within a single study (intra-study). Subsequently, tacit collusion in
duopolies, triopolies, and quadropolies is compared across all studies (inter-study).
RESULT 6.1. Within and across the surveyed oligopoly experiments, markets with two firms
are significantly more prone to tacit collusion than markets with three as well as four firms,
everything else being equal. However, no significant difference in the degree of tacit collusion
can be found between three and four firms.
With respect to the intra-study analysis, data on the level of independent observations
could be obtained for five experiments.8 Table 6.3 provides p values from one-tailed
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests of intra-study number effects on tacit collusion
in these experiments. Following the hypothesis of a strictly monotonic relationship, the
null hypothesis is that tacit collusion is always higher in a market with more firms. With
6For Orzen (2008), the Friedman index has to be averaged over all three successive phases in each treat-
ment in order to gain a single index value.
7The original experimental data is either collected from tables in the respective study, downloaded from
an online repository, or provided by the authors. One exception is Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003)
for which the data is retrieved from figures.
8The author thanks Hans-Theo Normann and Henrik Orzen for providing the experimental data used in











TABLE 6.2: Degrees of tacit collusion in economic laboratory experiments that vary the number of competing firms.
Study Treatment Periods† n N jNash jWalras Friedman
Bertrand (price) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Complete information [1,15] 2 [1,15] 2 17 0.412 0.412 0.766
3 10 0.039 0.039 0.311
Incomplete information [1,15] 2 [1,15] 2 17 0.149 0.149 0.766
3 11 0.019 0.019 0.311
Dolbear et al. (1968) Complete information [8,12] 2 [1,15] 2 18 0.300 0.500 1.250
4 9  0.040 0.257 1.250
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) 2/3/4 [1,10] 2 [1,10] 2 12 0.260 0.260 1.000
3 8 0.067 0.067 0.497
4 6 0.077 0.077 0.331
Orzen (2008) Fixed matching [1,90] 2 [1,90] 2 6 0.352 0.604 0.624
4 6  0.025 0.381 0.206
Random matching [1,90] 2 [1,90] 2 6 0.113 0.462 0.624
3 6  0.008 0.391 0.206
Davis (2009) 2np/3np/4np [1,220] 2 [1,220] 2 6 0.113 0.113 0.754
3 6 0.006 0.006 0.376
4 6 0.006 0.006 0.251
Fonseca and Normann (2012) NoTalk [1,29] 2 [1,29] 2 6 0.504 0.504 1.020
4 6 0.060 0.060 0.338
6 6 0.025 0.025 0.202
8 6 0.011 0.011 0.145
Cournot (quantity) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Complete information [1,22] 2 [1,22] 2 16  0.244 0.585 1.000
3 11  0.266 0.367 0.750
Incomplete information [1,22] 2 [1,22] 2 16  0.114 0.629 1.000
3 11  0.260 0.370 0.750
Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003) Easy [1,22] 2 [1,22] 2 9 0.296 0.765 0.889
3 6  0.176 0.451 0.732
Hard [1,22] 2 [1,22] 2 9  0.159 0.614 0.889
3 6  0.107 0.484 0.732
Hardest [1,22] 2 [1,22] 2 9  0.164 0.612 0.889
3 6  0.491 0.304 0.732
Huck et al. (2004b) Unified frame [1,25] 2 [1,25] 2 6 0.403 0.801 0.889
3 6 0.032 0.516 0.750
4 6 0.065 0.439 0.640
5 6  0.109 0.260 0.556
Waichman et al. (2014) DSNC/TSNC [1,17] 2 [1,17] 2 12  0.154 0.615 0.889
3 13  0.265 0.367 0.750
DMNC/TMNC [1,17] 2 [1,17] 2 10  0.046 0.651 0.889
3 11  0.062 0.469 0.750
† Periods used to compute the average degree of tacit collusion. If possible, data from all periods is used to maximize comparability.
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TABLE 6.3: Intra-study one-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests and associated p values.
Study Treatment n jNash jWalras
Bertrand (price) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Complete information 2 vs. 3 < 0.001 < 0.001
Incomplete information 2 vs. 3 0.003 0.003
Orzen (2008) Fixed matching 2 vs. 4 0.005 0.005
Random matching 2 vs. 4 0.002 0.002
Davis (2009) 2np/3np/4np 2 vs. 3 0.008 0.008
2 vs. 4 0.008 0.008
3 vs. 4 0.437 0.437
Cournot (quantity) competition
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) Complete information 2 vs. 3 0.294 0.008
Incomplete information 2 vs. 3 0.084 < 0.001
Huck et al. (2004b) Unified frame 2 vs. 3 0.019 0.004
2 vs. 4 0.019 0.002
3 vs. 4 0.261 0.261
the exception of the measure based on Nash predictions for Fouraker and Siegel’s (1963)
Cournot treatments, all test results indicate that tacit collusion is higher in duopolies
than in triopolies (2 vs. 3) or quadropolies (2 vs. 4) at the 5% level of significance.
However, triopolies are not found to be more prone to tacit collusion than quadropolies
(3 vs. 4), neither under Bertrand competition nor under Cournot competition.
For inter-study comparisons the most comparable treatments between studies are se-
lected in an effort to rule out any other explanations for differences other than the
number of competitors. Thus, only treatments with complete and perfect information
are considered for the following analysis.9 Consequently, there are ten independent
duopoly observations, seven independent triopoly observations, and six independent
quadropoly observations. As there is only a single study for any n > 4 the statistical
analysis is limited to markets with n 2 {2,3,4} firms. The Friedman index, which is
suggested to assess the likelihood of tacit collusion, predicts poorly if correlated with
j
Nash (r = 0.213, p = 0.330) but is positively and significantly correlated with jWalras
(r = 0.593, p = 0.003). In order to control for potential dependencies between treatments
9The following treatments reported in Table 6.2 are not considered in this step of the inter-study analy-
sis: Incomplete information (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963), Random matching (Orzen, 2008), Hard and
Hardest (Bosch-Domènech and Vriend, 2003), and DMNC/TMNC in which participants are managers
instead of students (Waichman et al., 2014).
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from the same study, i.e., different base levels of tacit collusion between experimental
settings, the following three-level linear random-intercept model is estimated:
j
E
s,m,n = b0 + xs + zm
+ bDuopoly · Duopoly
+ bQuadropoly · Quadropoly
+ bCournot · Cournot
+ es,m,n,
where jEs,m,n is the average degree of tacit collusion jE of markets with n competitors
under model m 2 {Bertrand,Cournot} in study s, zm is the error component shared
between observations of the same model in study s (see Bertrand and Cournot treat-
ments in Fouraker and Siegel, 1963), and xs is the error component shared between
observations from the same study. The results, as portrayed in Table 6.4, confirm the
insight of the above intra-study findings that there is significantly more tacit collusion
in duopolies compared to triopolies and quadropolies. Furthermore, there is no signifi-
cant difference in tacit collusion between triopolies and quadropolies. In particular, the
degree of tacit collusion is, on average, 26 pp higher in duopolies than triopolies accord-
ing to both collusion measures. On the contrary, the same does not hold for the compar-
ison between markets with three and markets with four firms as triopolies are found
to have, on average, an almost identical degree of tacit collusion than quadropolies.
Also notice that the regression analysis replicates the finding by Suetens and Potters
(2007) that Bertrand colludes more than Cournot—however, only if tacit collusion is based
on Nash predictions. In contrast, when compared to Walrasian equilibrium, this effect
is significant in the opposite direction. Thus, if a competitive market outcome where
price equals marginal cost represents the benchmark for the degree of tacit collusion,
Cournot may collude more than Bertrand.
All these results hold if tacit collusion metrics are averaged over all treatments from
each study with the same competition model and two, three, or four firms, respectively
(see Table B.14 in Appendix B.3 for results of the respective multilevel mixed-effects
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TABLE 6.4: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on number of competi-
tors and competition model on the basis of most comparable treatments.














Baseline: Bertrand triopoly. Standard errors in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
regressions). Furthermore, these findings can also be replicated by a meta-regression, a
method vastly used in medical research (see, e.g., Higgins and Thompson, 2002), which
takes into account the reliability of sample means from different studies by controlling
for study-specific standard errors. The results of the meta-regressions are in line with
the findings of the multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions presented in Table 6.4
and yield similiar effect sizes. See Appendix B.3 for a presentation and discussion of
estimates.
Although the previous analyses control for different base levels of tacit collusion be-
tween experiments via multilevel mixed-effects regressions as well as for the reliability
of sample means via meta-regressions, the data used in the previous regression mod-
els are unbalanced with regard to the different number of independent observations
(treatments) for each number of competitors. Consequently, number effects are next
investigated inter-study also via matched samples. By this means, a comparison of n1
and n2 competitors includes all studies that have conducted treatments with n1 and n2
competitors. Note that, therefore, the number of included studies varies between pair-
wise comparisons, e.g., when comparing two with four and two with three competitors.
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TABLE 6.5: Inter-study average degrees of tacit collusion and one-tailed matched-samples
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the basis of most comparable treatments.
Studies jNash jWalras
2 vs. 3
Duopoly 7 0.155 0.507
Triopoly 7  0.081 0.259
p value 7 0.009 0.009
2 vs. 4
Duopoly 6 0.322 0.464
Quadropoly 6 0.024 0.203
p value 6 0.014 0.014
3 vs. 4
Triopoly 3 0.035 0.196
Quadropoly 3 0.049 0.174
p value 3 0.946 0.500
Table 6.5 presents average degrees of tacit collusion and p values based on one-tailed
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Again, the tested null hypothesis is that
tacit collusion is higher in markets with less firms than in markets with more firms.
Test results show that tacit collusion is significantly higher in duopolies than in tri-
opolies (2 vs. 3) and quadropolies (2 vs. 4), respectively. However, based on all ex-
periments that run triopolies as well as quadropolies, the former is not more prone to
tacit collusion than the latter (3 vs. 4). In fact and in stark contrast to the existence of a
strictly monotonic relationship, tacit collusion may even be slightly higher in markets
with four firms (jNash = 0.049) than in markets with three firms (jNash = 0.035) and
this difference is almost significant at the 5% level (N = 3, p = 0.054). Again, results are
similar if tacit collusion metrics are averaged over all treatments from each study with
the same competition model and two, three, or four firms, respectively (see Table B.15
in Appendix B.3 for results of corresponding Wilcoxon signed-rank tests).
6.1.4 Discussion of the meta-analysis
Based on the survey of the extant literature, there is no pooled evidence that would
support a general strictly monotonic relationship between the number of firms and
the degree of tacit collusion in experimental oligopolies. Moreover, the studies that
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have examined number effects between three and four competitors within a single
study likewise conclude that there is no significant difference between triopolies and
quadropolies. For homogeneous Bertrand competition, both Dufwenberg and Gneezy
(2000) and Davis (2009) find that experimental markets converge to the Nash equilib-
rium with three as well as with four competitors. For homogeneous Cournot compe-
tition, Huck et al. (2004b) find more competitive output levels with four compared to
three firms in absolute terms, however, this effect is reversed if the collusion degree is
measured relative to the Nash equilibrium. In summary, the results of the inter- and
intra-study analyses are in line and suggest that the surveyed oligopoly experiments
cannot support that markets with four firms exhibit ceteris paribus a lower degree of
tacit collusion than markets with three firms. In conclusion, this contrasts the hypoth-
esis of a strictly monotonic relationship between the number of competitors and the
degree of tacit collusion in a market.
Although meta-analyses can provide valuable insight by evaluating robustness and
external validity of systematic effects, they also have several limitations. First, the lack
of control for all differences between studies considered in the same analysis limits the
internal validity of meta-results per definitionem. Second, in this specific meta-analysis
the number of independent observations of the pairwise comparisons is rather low,
which raises concerns about statistical power. In particular, only three studies cover
both triopoly and quadropoly treatments. Moreover, the individual studies themselves
may lack statistical power to detect a difference between three and four competitors
as the number of independent observations is often lower for markets with a larger
number of competitors.10 In addition, both experiments that examine number effects
in the context of price competition in a single study employ a homogeneous Bertrand
model, which arguably represents a special case with regard to number effects, because
the theoretical prediction does in fact not change with the number of competitors. Last
but foremost, none of the experiments in the meta-study employs treatments with all
10The three studies that examine triopolies and quadropolies (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Huck et al.,
2004b; Davis, 2009) each base their analysis on six independent quadropoly observations.
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the relevant characteristics considered here, i.e., Bertrand and Cournot markets with
two, three, and four firms.
6.2 Experiment with symmetric firms
Due to the lack of comprehensive evidence on a strictly monotonic relationship be-
tween the number of firms and the degree of tacit collusion in the extant experimental
literature, two oligopoly experiments are conducted based on a design that exploits the
duality between Bertrand and Cournot competition. First, this section considers the
case of symmetric firms, which is also assumed in all of the oligopoly experiments sur-
veyed in the meta-study. Next, the subsequent section considers asymmetry between
firms.
6.2.1 Experimental design
Price competition à la Bertrand and quantity competition à la Cournot serve as good
proxies for a large share of models on oligopoly competition. As homogeneous price
competition is often deemed unrealistic and yields a discontinuous demand function,
the model by Singh and Vives (1984) is considered that generalizes the Hotelling (1929)
model to exploit the duality between price and quantity competition in differentiated
goods. More precisely, the model’s generalization to more than two firms (see Häck-
ner, 2000) is used, which is described in further detail in Subsection 3.3.2. Appendix A.1
provides a thorough analysis of the general model with asymmetric firms and a formal
derivation of the theoretical predictions, specifically, the Nash and the Walrasian equi-
libria as well as the joint profit maximizing outcome. For the assessment of symmetric
firms, it is assumed that firms’ goods are differentiated horizontally but are homoge-
neous in vertical quality and have identical demand elasticity.
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Specifically, treatments are examined with Bertrand and Cournot competition in
duopolies, triopolies, and quadropolies in a full-factorial design, resulting in a total
of six treatments. In the following, these treatments are referred to with abbreviations
such as B4 for the Bertrand quadropoly treatment. The model is parametrized with
w = 100, l = 1, and q = 23 . Consequently, G =
300
2n+1 , L =
6n 3
2n+1 , and Q =
6n 6
2n+1 . The theo-
retical benchmarks of the one-shot game for each treatment are reported in Table A.1 in
Appendix A.1. As Nash prices, quantities, and profits do not coincide under Bertrand
and Cournot competition and are additionally dependent on the number of competi-
tors n, these values are not adequate to compare cooperative intentions, i.e., tacit col-
lusion, across treatments. Thus, the same measure as for the meta-analysis is utilized,
i.e., the degree of tacit collusion jE.
In a further effort to maximize comparability between treatments and to prevent any
source for behavioral effects other than the treatment, input and output variables are
scaled in the following way. The action space of prices in Bertrand treatments and
quantities in Cournot treatments is equally set to [0,100] with a minimum increment
of one and the JPM action at a price or quantity of 50. This ensures that the collusive
action is not more or less behaviorally attractive across treatments and that the search
costs of finding the collusive action are the same in all treatments. With a similar in-
tention profits are scaled so that they would be equal in Nash equilibrium. Thereby, a
subject playing the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game—given that its competitors
play Nash as well—would make identical profits in all treatments.11 Altogether, this
precludes confounding effects of the experimental design and parametrization.
Due to the normalization of input and output variables of the model, the different
measures of the degree of tacit collusion have two desirable characteristics in the ex-
periment. First, the Nash prediction-based degree jNash serves as a good predictor of
relative differences in tacit collusion between treatments as Nash equilibria vary with
the competition model as well as with the number of firms in the market. Second,
11Alternatively, profits may be standardized with respect to the collusive outcome. However, this would
in turn lead to different Nash profits across treatments. Hence, firms would face diverse incentives to
deviate from the theoretical Nash prediction.
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the Walrasian-based measure of tacit collusion jWalras assesses absolute differences to
a uniform baseline, as the experiment is specifically designed to have a constant Wal-
rasian equilibrium and collusive equilibrium across treatments. Due to the normaliza-
tion of input variables, choosing a price or quantity of p,q 2 [0,100] in the experiment
directly translates to a Walrasian-based degree of tacit collusion of 2p% in the Bertrand
or 2(100   q)% in the Cournot treatments, respectively. Consequently, as the equilib-
rium price level is monotonically decreasing with the number of firms, the Walrasian
prediction associated with each treatment’s Nash equilibrium is also strictly monoton-
ically decreasing as shown in Table 6.6. Therefore, if participants in the experiment
behave in line with the Nash prediction and do not have an inexplicable preference to-
wards a certain integer within the interval [0,100] or even choose prices and quantities
randomly, the Walrasian-based tacit collusion measure is expected to decrease with the
number of firms.
The consideration of the degree of tacit collusion based on the Walrasian equilibrium in
the experiment is thus not only done for completeness, but also serves two additional
purposes. First, the measure serves as a means to check whether subjects’ behavior
in the experiment are in line with decreasing Nash predictions for a larger number of
firms. Although, Nash-consistent behavior is also indicated by jNash = 0 across mar-
kets with a varying number of firms, this equality is difficult to verify empirically as a
non-significant difference may also result from a lack of statistical power. Precisely in
this case, the Walrasian collusion measure should indeed decrease with the number of
firms, and should thus differ significantly between markets with a varying number of
firms. Second, in the model consumer surplus as well as total welfare are monotonically
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decreasing in prices if goods are substitutes and hence, for regulatory authorities, the
Walrasian equilibrium may constitute an additional relevant theoretical benchmark.
Perfect information is ensured in all treatments, i.e., subjects are provided with individ-
ual feedback about each competitor’s price, quantity, and profit. In an effort to prevent
that treatments evoke only short-term effects, the one-shot game is repeated 60 times.
These repetitions are referred to as periods.
6.2.2 Procedures
The experiment is computerized with the Java-based experimental software Brownie
(Müller et al., 2014). All sessions were run at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
in Karlsruhe, Germany in October 2014 (duopoly and triopoly sessions), April 2015
(quadropoly sessions), and May 2016 (additional quadropoly sessions). Disregarding
the first period, in which subjects familiarized themselves with the experimental soft-
ware and decided on their initial price or quantity, the sessions took roughly 30 minutes
on average. Note that there are no practice periods, neither with nor without interaction
between subjects, and thus, no unobservable learning confounds occur. The matching
of subjects is constant throughout a session (fixed partner matching). In total, 240 stu-
dents of economic fields participated in the experiment. Subjects were recruited via the
ORSEE platform (Greiner, 2015) and the hroot platform (Bock et al., 2014) and partic-
ipated only in one of the treatments (between-subject design). The protocol for each
session is identical to the protocol described in Subsection 3.3.2. The total length of
a session from subjects’ entering to leaving the lab was about one hour. The average
payoff per subject was EUR 17.70.
6.2.3 Results
The experimental data amounts to 12 Bertrand and Cournot duopolies and triopolies,
each, as well as 14 (16) Bertrand (Cournot) quadropolies. Before analyzing the exper-
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TABLE 6.7: Average degrees of tacit collusion across treatments.
Treatment N jNash jWalras Friedman
B2 12 0.832 0.916 0.750
(0.249) (0.124)
B3 12 0.605 0.737 0.556
(0.324) (0.216)
B4 16 0.436 0.577 0.438
(0.267) (0.200)
C2 12 0.627 0.907 0.936
(0.550) (0.138)
C3 12 0.397 0.759 0.831
(0.484) (0.193)
C4 14 0.206 0.603 0.750
(0.374) (0.187)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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imental data longitudinally, Table 6.7 and Figure 6.1 provide an overview of experi-
mental data12 based on the level of independent cohorts over all 60 periods.13 Similar
to the previous meta-study, the Friedman index predicts the degree of tacit collusion
poorly in terms of jNash (r = 0.049, p = 0.670), but is significantly correlated with jWalras
(r = 0.409, p = 0.001).
12Note that one duopoly in treatment C2 is exceptionally competitive. In particular, its average degree of
tacit collusion based on Nash profits lies almost three standard deviations below the treatment mean.
All results reported in the following hold if this outlier is dropped.
13Here, collusion degrees over all 60 periods as measured relative to the Nash equilibrium are displayed.
Appendix B.3 depicts an analogous figure for collusion degrees measured relative to the Walrasian
equilibrium.
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For an in-depth analysis of firms’ longitudinal behavior, a mixed-effects model is ran
to control for different base levels of tacit collusion in cohorts via a random intercept as




k,t = b0 + xk
+ bDuopoly · Duopoly
+ bQuadropoly · Quadropoly
+ bCournot · Cournot
+ (bPeriod + bPeriod,k) · t
+ ek,t,
with jEk,t as the average degree of tacit collusion of all firms’ prices or quantities in
cohort k in period t. Table 6.8 shows the estimated coefficients for both degrees of tacit
collusion.14 All results reported in the following with respect to prices or quantities
hold also if the degree of tacit collusion is measured by transaction prices, i.e., prices
weighted by the quantities sold.
RESULT 6.2. In the experiment with symmetric firms, the degree of tacit collusion based on the
Nash or the Walrasian equilibrium is significantly higher in markets with two firms than in
markets with three as well as four firms, and significantly higher in markets with three firms
than in markets with four firms, everything else being equal.
In line with the meta-analysis, the duopolies show, on average, a statistically signifi-
cant 20 pp higher degree of tacit collusion than triopolies based on Nash predictions.
Moreover, and in contrast to the meta-analysis, quadropolies show a statistically sig-
nificant 19 pp lower degree of tacit collusion than triopolies. The similar effect sizes of
both coefficients indicate not only a strictly monotonic, but a linear number effect in the
degree of tacit collusion. According to a Wald test, the equality of the absolute value
14Note that due to the dualism of the competition model used in the experiment, the degrees of tacit
collusion measured by prices or quantities coincide.
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TABLE 6.8: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on number of competi-
tors and competition model under competition between symmetric firms.















Standard errors in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
of treatment dummy coefficients cannot be rejected (c2(1) = 0.00, p = 0.946). Measured
relative to the Nash equilibrium, Bertrand competition colludes more than Cournot
competition. In fact, the increase of 21 pp in the degree of tacit collusion is similar to
the effect size found in the meta-study and also to the effect of an additional competitor
in a market as measured above. Thus, with regard to number effects, the experiment
replicates the findings of the meta-analysis with respect to duopolies and triopolies, but
also identifies a significant effect between triopolies and quadropolies.
With respect to the Walrasian-based degree of tacit collusion measure the data shows a
significant 14 pp (17 pp) increase (decrease) in duopolies (quadropolies) compared to
triopolies. Hence, there is also a monotonically decreasing, approximately linear trend
of the degree of tacit collusion as the number of firms in the market increases. These
findings indicate that subjects do indeed react to differences in theoretical predictions.
Moreover, there is a small yet significant negative time trend in the degree of tacit col-
lusion if measured relative to the Walrasian Equilibrium.
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In summary, the results attained from the experiment with symmetric firms provide
support for the original conjecture of a strictly monotonic relationship between the
number of competitors and the degree of tacit collusion. In fact, the measured effect
sizes point to a linear trend with regard to the degree of tacit collusion relative to the
Nash equilibrium.
6.3 Experiment with asymmetric firms
As tacit collusion has been attributed to be driven by symmetry of firms in the economic
literature (Mason et al., 1992; Ivaldi et al., 2003), number effects in oligopolies may also
interact with the (a)symmetry of firms. Therefore, two additional experimental treat-
ments with asymmetric, i.e., vertically differentiated, firms are considered. Thereby, the
experiment focusses on the comparison of triopolies and quadropolies, which clearly is
the most interesting case in the light of the previous results.
Consideration of asymmetric firms also has a high practical relevance, particularly in
the context of network industries, e.g., telecommunications and energy, which are still
characterized by a dominance of the former (state-owned) monopolist. Therefore, a
market structure with one incumbent and two or three entrants competing against each
other is conceived in the following. In particular, this market structure resembles the
regularities of many European mobile telecommunications markets, which are com-
prised of one large dominating and two or three smaller network operators, totaling at
three or four cellular networks in each national market.
6.3.1 Experimental design and procedures
For means of comparability to the previous experimental treatments, the experimen-
tal design introduced in Subsection 6.2.1 is extended to allow for asymmetric firms.
Asymmetry is implemented by establishing a single firm (i.e., the incumbent) with a
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higher quality good than the remaining—two or three—firms (i.e., the entrants). As
consumers value quality, the incumbent’s market share is higher than that of an entrant
for identical prices. Equivalently, for equal market shares the incumbent may charge a
higher price for its good than the entrants. In this vein, wk constitutes the reservation
price of firm k’s consumers in the model and thus, may be interpreted as the quality
of firm k’s product. Consequently, if the quality of one firm’s product is higher than
that of the other firms, i.e., wk > w k, the former has higher market power that results
in a higher equilibrium price, market share, and thus, profit. The extent of asymmetry
in product quality can be expressed by a single parameter, W = wIncumbent   wEntrant,
which denotes the markup quality of the incumbent’s good compared to the entrants’
goods. See Appendix A.1 for the analysis of the model with horizontal as well as verti-
cal differentiation.
Two additional asymmetry treatments—an asymmetric Bertrand triopoly (B3A) and
an asymmetric Bertrand quadropoly (B4A)—are considered. The parametrization for
entrants is the same as for firms in the symmetry treatments, i.e., wEntrant = 100, l = 1,
and q = 23 . Motivated by common market shares in European telecommunications mar-
kets, W however is now greater than zero and chosen such that the incumbent’s Nash
equilibrium profit is 50% higher than an entrant’s Nash equilibrium profit. Thus, the
incumbent’s market share with regard to its proportion of joint Nash equilibrium prof-
its is 3/7 ⇡ 43% in a triopoly and 1/3 ⇡ 33% in a quadropoly. As market power is a
relative rather than an absolute concept, holding the relative profit markup of the in-
cumbent constant has two important advantages over alternative approaches, such as
holding the incumbent’s market share constant. First, this allows to normalize entrants’
equilibrium profits such that they are the same as in the symmetry treatments (see be-
low), which increases comparability across the symmetry and asymmetry treatments.
Second, the additional relative market power of the incumbent compared to any single
entrant is independent of the number of firms which increases comparability between
asymmetric triopolies and quadropolies. For the two asymmetric Bertrand treatments
a Nash equilibrium profit markup for the incumbent of 50% corresponds to W = 6.10
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in triopolies and W = 4.79 in quadropolies. The theoretical predictions of the one-shot
game for both asymmetry treatments are listed in Table A.2 in Appendix A.1.
In order to further ensure comparability, the same scaling and normalization as in the
previous experiment is applied: First, the action space of the incumbent is scaled such
that the JPM prices of all firms coincide at a price of 50 in an action space of [0,100].
Second, profits are standardized such that an entrant would have the same Nash equi-
librium gains as a firm in any of the symmetry treatments. Consequently, incentives
to deviate from the theoretical Nash prediction are equal for entrants and symmetric
firms in the previous experiment. The same scaling factor is applied to the entrants’
profits as well as to the incumbent’s profits so that the asymmetry in market power is
not affected.
Except for an additional paragraph in the experimental instructions explaining how
one of the firms differs from the others, the exact same experimental procedures are
followed for the asymmetry treatments as previously for the symmetry treatments.15
Again, the experiment was run at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Karlsruhe,
Germany, and participants were recruited via the ORSEE platform for sessions between
June and August 2015 and via the hroot platform for sessions in May 2016. None of the
104 students of economic fields participating in one of the two asymmetry treatments
had previously participated in one of the symmetry treatments. The participants’ pay-
off averaged at EUR 19.82.
6.3.2 Results
Similar to the symmetry treatments, there are 12 independent asymmetric Bertrand tri-
opolies and 17 independent asymmetric Bertrand quadropolies. Summary statistics for
both new treatments are provided in Table 6.9. Means over cohorts are computed by av-
eraging over all firms, i.e., the incumbent and each entrant are weighted equally. With
15As an example, the experimental instructions for the asymmetric Bertrand quadropoly treatment to-
gether with a screenshot of the experimental software are provided in Appendix C.3.
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TABLE 6.9: Average degrees of tacit collusion across asymmetry treatments.
Treatment N jNash jWalras Friedman
Incumbent Entrant
B3A 12 0.332 0.554 0.792 0.444
(0.296) (0.197)
B4A 17 0.217 0.412 0.619 0.379
(0.148) (0.111)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
regard to the incumbent, the Friedman index is not significantly correlated with jNash
(r = 0.160, p = 0.408), but significantly correlated with jWalras (r = 0.330, p = 0.081).
Regarding the entrants, the Friedman index—in line with the symmetry treatments—
predicts jNash rather poorly (r = 0.295, p = 0.120) but has some explanatory power for
j
Walras (r = 0.453, p = 0.014). Furthermore, the Friedman index predicts that the in-
cumbent faces a higher incentive to tacitly collude—or, vice versa, that it has a lower
incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement. Thus, according to the Friedman index,
the entrants are supposed to be the drivers of competition. In the experimental sam-
ple, the incumbent indeed chooses, on average over both treatments, about 4 pp more
collusive prices than the entrants if measured relative to the Walrasian equilibrium.
This difference is significant according to a matched-samples Wilcoxon signed-rank test
(z = 2.87, p = 0.004) and coincides with the disparity between the Nash predictions for
the incumbent and entrants (see Table A.3 in Appendix A.1). In contrast, prices in terms
of the degree of tacit collusion relative to the Nash equilibrium vary neither largely nor
significantly between firms.
For an analysis of firms’ behavior in the asymmetry treatments, a similar mixed-effects
model as for the symmetry treatments is employed to control for different base levels
of tacit collusion in cohorts via a random intercept as well as for different time depen-
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k,t = b0 + xk
+ bQuadropoly · Quadropoly
+ (bPeriod + bPeriod,k) · t
+ ek,t,
with jEk,t as the average degree of tacit collusion of the incumbent’s and the entrants’
prices in cohort k in period t. Table 6.10 provides estimated coefficients for both mea-
sures of the degree of tacit collusion.
RESULT 6.3. In the experiment with asymmetric firms, the degree of tacit collusion based on
the Nash or the Walrasian equilibrium is significantly higher in markets with three firms than
in markets with four firms, everything else being equal.
The Nash-based degree of tacit collusion is, on average, 21 pp higher in triopolies than
in quadropolies. In line with the previous findings from the symmetry treatments, this
difference is statistically significant and similar with respect to the effect size. Also con-
sistent with the results under symmetry, the Walrasian-based degree of tacit collusion is
significantly higher in markets with three firms than markets with four firms. Further-
more, a negative time trend of prices due to an end-game effect can be found for both
measures. These results hold if only the entrants’ degree of tacit collusion is used.16
In summary, the empirical results under asymmetry replicate the findings under sym-
metry and thus support the general conjecture of a strictly monotonic relationship.
Whereas the relative effect on tacit collusion with regard to an additional competitor
is similar across symmetric and asymmetric market structures, the absolute degree of
tacit collusion for a market with a specific number of firms may differ, as a comparison
of Tables 6.7 and 6.9 indicates.
16If only the incumbent’s degree of tacit collusion is considered the difference between triopolies and
quadropolies is statistically insignificant according to the specified mixed-effects model.
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TABLE 6.10: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on number of com-
petitors under Bertrand competition between asymmetric firms.











Standard errors in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
While the detailed comparison of symmetry and asymmetry treatments is relegated to
Appendix B.3, it is briefly highlighted that the experimental results indicate support
for previous theoretical and empirical studies in their findings that symmetry seems
to facilitate tacit collusion (see, e.g., Mason et al., 1992; Ivaldi et al., 2003; Fonseca and
Normann, 2008). In particular with regard to quadropolies, asymmetry is a significant
driver of competition, with the degree of tacit collusion relative to the Nash (Walrasian)
equilibrium being 18 pp (13 pp) lower in asymmetric than symmetric markets with
four firms. Put into context, the effect size of implementing asymmetry by increasing
the market power of a single firm is comparable to the number effect on tacit collusion
between markets with two and three firms as well as between markets with three and
four firms.
In an effort to rule out social preferences—which may be viewed as an artifact of a labo-
ratory setting—as a dominant motive for subjects’ decisions to collude less under asym-
metry, subjects’ social value orientation is measured in an ex post questionnaire based
on Murphy et al. (2011). A comparison of the social value orientation index reveals no
differences between incumbents and entrants or subjects in triopolies and quadropolies
(see Appendix B.3). In conclusion, these findings suggest that social orientations cannot
explain why asymmetric firms collude less than symmetric firms.
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6.4 Discussion
The question that motivates this chapter is rather blunt: How many competitors are enough
to ensure competition? Evidently, it would be utterly unscientific to propose an answer
to this question disregarding the particular characteristics and circumstances in a given
market. But even if “case-by-case analysis implies that there is no ‘magic number’”
(Vande Walle and Wambach, 2014, p.10), the findings reported here point to systematic
effects with regard to tacit collusion that should be given careful consideration by com-
petition and regulatory authorities when assessing the question of how to achieve and
safeguard effective competition in a market.
To this end, the three presented studies provide comprehensive evidence based on ei-
ther existing or new oligopoly experiments, considering a different number of firms
(two vs. three vs. four firms), different modes of competition (price vs. quantity com-
petition) and different degrees of market power (symmetric vs. asymmetric). First, the
meta-study on the extant literature studying number effects in experimental oligopolies
provides robust empirical support that tacit collusion is significantly higher in markets
with two firms compared to markets with three firms as well as to markets with four
firms. In contrast, neither intra-study nor inter-study evidence confirms a significant
effect between markets with three firms and markets with four firms. Thus, the extant
literature does not provide any evidence for the original conjecture of a strictly mono-
tonic relationship between the number of competitors and the degree of tacit collusion
under Bertrand or Cournot competition.
However, there are several limitations to the meta-analysis itself as well as the individ-
ual studies that compare markets with three and four firms. First, the data collected
from experimental studies for the meta-study is heterogeneous in quality, i.e., it is ei-
ther obtained from the authors directly, from tables in the article, or even retrieved
from figures. As a consequence, the granularity of the data varies across studies. Data
on the level of independent observations from sessions is only provided for half of the
studies considered here and hence, intra-study treatment differences are not replica-
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ble nor testable for the remaining studies. Second, the number of experimental stud-
ies surveyed in the meta-analysis is rather low, especially with regard to effects be-
tween triopolies and quadropolies, and thus the results are based on a small number
of observations. Moreover, within the individual studies, the number of independent
observations—in particular the number of independent quadropoly observations—is
also rather low. In consequence, the meta-study as well as individual studies may sim-
ply lack the statistical power to detect a potential number effect between triopolies and
quadropolies (cf. List et al., 2011; Bellemare et al., 2014).
Therefore, two experiments are conducted that further test the relative competitiveness
in triopolies and quadropolies based on a dataset with a considerably larger number
of independent observations and an experimental design that exploits the duality be-
tween differentiated Bertrand and Cournot competition. As a result, a significant effect
between markets with three firms and markets with four firms is found for both sym-
metric and asymmetric distributions of market power. Remarkably, the effect size of a
20 pp lower degree of tacit collusion is very similar from four to three firms as well as
from three to two firms across symmetric and asymmetric treatments. This points not
only to a strictly monotonic trend, but to a linear relationship between the number of
firms and the degree of tacit collusion measured relative to the Nash equilibrium. Fig-
ure 6.2 summarizes these findings and depicts the number effect in prices/quantities
across symmetric Bertrand and Cournot treatments.
Furthermore, the results both confirm and shed new light on previous insights. First,
the results indicate that already the judgment of the competitiveness of a certain mode
of competition (price vs. quantity competition) depends on the point of reference
(Nash vs. Walrasian equilibrium). In particular, Suetens and Potters (2007) suggest
that Bertrand colludes more than Cournot. However, as the empirical analysis reveals,
this holds only with respect to Nash equilibria. Instead, if tacit collusion is measured
with regard to Walrasian equilibrium, the opposite may hold. This finding of the meta-
study is in line with the stronger competition predicted by the Nash equilibrium under
Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Second, the findings are in line
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with the notion that tacit collusion is more likely to emerge among symmetric rather
than asymmetric firms.
Whereas the conducted experiments address the limitations of the meta-study, they
are at the same time limited to the specific parametrization used. This applies to both
the specific demand parameters as well as to the way in which prices and profits are
normalized and scaled across treatments in order to maximize comparability. Also the
asymmetry between competitors may be parametrized in various ways, e.g., based on
differences in Nash profits or based on absolute differences in product quality. Al-
though there is considerable variation in parametrization across the studies included in
the meta-analysis, it cannot be ruled out that the results of the conducted experimental
studies are to some degree affected by the specific parametrization used.
As a further limitation of all studies it is noted that competition in experimental
Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies is merely considered with exogenously symmetric
or asymmetric firms but not in the context of endogenous merger formation. Further-
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more, neither the experiments considered in the meta-analysis nor the conducted exper-
iments allow for investments in order to increase the market size, which arguably plays
an important role in most industries that are characterized by an oligopolistic market
structure. With regard to a risk-averse regulator not only averages of market outcomes
may be of interest. Instead, authorities may also take into account the effect, which
the number of firms and regulatory institutions have on the variance of the expected
competitive intensity, in order to minimize the possibility of tacit collusion. However,
based on the samples in the meta-analysis as well as both oligopoly experiments, there
are no significant differences in this regard.
These limitations give rise to future research on number effects in oligopolies. In partic-
ular, the variety of asymmetric market settings offers opportunities for scenario-specific
investigations of competitive effects. For instance, a decrease in the number of competi-
tors in a market, e.g., through a merger, is also likely to affect the horizontal and vertical
differentiation of firms’ products. In this vein, a merger may introduce asymmetry in
the market power of the remaining firms and thus not only relax competition due to
the decrease in the number of firms but also foster competition. Therefore, further ex-
perimental studies in the spirit of current replication efforts (see, e.g., Camerer et al.,
2016) are desired to test the robustness and generality of the presented findings (see




Voluntary Open Access in Digital Services
Markets
THE Internet as an online platform ecosystem now encompasses a diverse set ofweb pages, mobile apps and services, shopping and product comparison sites, as
well as content and media platforms. The rapid expansion of this ecosystem and its user
base is spurred by the entry of new platforms and increased specialization of individual
outlets. At the same time, a small number of general-purpose platforms has emerged,
especially social networks. These platforms are now often characterized as the gateways
to the Internet (Arakali, 2015; Barnett, 2010) as they are used by the vast majority of
Internet users and often serve as a starting point for their online activities. The most
prominent example, Facebook, served 1.59 billion monthly active users worldwide at
the end of 2015 (Facebook, 2016) and a 74% share of US online adults in 2014 (Pew
Research Center, 2016). Next to the sheer amount of user data, these platforms—and
Facebook in particular—are in the possession of unique personal data as its social and
personalized services naturally require accurate and extensive information input from
its users.
Expansion and specialization at the edges on the one hand, together with increased
concentration at the core on the other hand, have created a situation in today’s online
This chapter is based on joint work with Jan Krämer and Michael Wohlfarth (Krämer et al., 2016).
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platform ecosystem where user data and usage data are collected and stored by different
entities. In consequence, there emerges a rationale for data sharing between online
content providers (CPs)—and even competitors—to combine data sources in order to
enhance knowledge about users and potential customers. Targeting of consumers based
on a superior data set is viewed as a major competitive advantage in these markets,
particularly in the context of online advertising. Next to purchasing usage data ex post
in the form of collected tracking data through specialized intermediaries or markets
(cf. Montes et al., 2015), CPs may try to directly access and share users’ data across
platform boundaries. So-called social logins (Gafni and Nissim, 2014; Janrain, 2014),
which allow users to authenticate with third-party CPs through their social network
account have been established as one of the most popular instruments to share user
and usage information among online outlets. The most popular social login1, Log in with
Facebook2, e.g., allows websites and mobile apps to access users’ public profile including
demographic data, email address and friends. Moreover, access to extended profile
properties such as the history of users’ likes or recorded web activities may be requested
from the user.3 In return, Facebook obtains comprehensive data on users’ activities at
the third-party outlet through the programming interfaces of the login service. In fact,
Facebook states that it “can analyze [a third-party’s] app, website, content, and data for
any purpose, including commercial” in its Platform Policy.4
Whereas ex post data sale and purchase transactions are frequently conducted without
the knowledge of the data subject concerned, consumers choose the social login service
actively and voluntarily. Such user control has been found to be vital for successful
marketing campaigns in the context of social media (Fournier and Avery, 2011; Tucker,
2014). In fact, the widespread popularity of social logins indicates that reduced trans-
action costs as well as enhanced personalization and customization provide real added
value to users (see Acquisti and Varian, 2005, for a related scenario where personaliza-
tion alters consumers decisions in the context of price discrimination). Already in 2010,
1According to LoginRadius (2015) 97% of websites that offer a social login employ Facebook’s login.
2See https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login. Accessed March 14, 2016.
3For a comprehensive list of accessible properties see https://developers.facebook.com/docs/
facebook-login/permissions. Accessed March 14, 2016.
4See https://developers.facebook.com/policy. Accessed March 14, 2016.
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two years after the launch of the service, Facebook stated that 250 million consumers
and two million third-party websites used its social login and that the installed base
was growing by 10,000 sites per day (Grove, 2010). The current installed base is esti-
mated at almost 10 million web sites (SimilarTech, 2016). According to Janrain (2014)
51% (88%) of consumers have used (encountered) a social login at least once and more
than half of the users (64%) “are more likely to return to a website that remembers them
without a username and password”. In this vein, increased user engagement and inter-
action are often quoted as main reasons for outlets’ decision to adopt a social login (see,
e.g., Gigya, 2015). However, the emergence of social logins as universal authentication
and authorization services has not been without criticism. Next to privacy and security
concerns and users’ inability to internalize potential long-term disadvantages (Breuer
et al., 2015; Kontaxis et al., 2012), strategic threats due to dependency on and exploita-
tion by a dominant undertaking (Feingold, 2013) as well as legal risks (Van Der Sype
and Seigneur, 2014) have been cited as major issues for CPs who decide to adopt a
social login.
Despite the practical relevance, online CPs’ incentives to offer direct access to user in-
formation or to share usage data by means of a social login together with the ensuing
effects on competition have not yet been addressed in depth by the academic litera-
ture. This chapter scrutinizes outlets’ strategic decisions whether to offer and/or adopt
a social login, identifies the feasible market outcomes and highlights the implications
for the involved decision makers. The incentives and fundamental trade-offs that drive
adoption decisions and impact the profitability of CPs are examined based on a styl-
ized model of horizontal competition between special-intererst CPs (who may adopt
the login), and advertising competition between special-interest CPs and the general-
interest CP (who may offer the login). Whereas there are situations where all parties are
mutually better off, it is demonstrated that special-interest CPs may implement a social
login even in cases where this decision ultimately makes them worse off, i.e., they may
find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma-like situation. On the contrary, there may also
arise situations where the general-interest CP does not offer the social login although
it would be beneficial to consumers. This may provide a rationale for potential policy
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interventions in the form of Open Access based on no-discrimination considerations,
which have traditionally been debated at the network layer (see Chapter 2), but may
be extended to the platform layer as discussed by Graef et al. (2015) and Easley et al.
(2015). This could in consequence restrict services provider’s discretion with regard to
discriminatory practices.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.1 surveys related lit-
erature strands on single sign-on systems, access to user data and user privacy, on-
line advertising and targeting, which inform the model framework presented in Sec-
tion 7.2. The model is analyzed and the feasible market outcomes are presented in
Section 7.3. Section 7.4 discusses policy questions together with possible extensions
and limitations.
7.1 Related literature
Although social login mechanisms have so far been explicitly addressed either by schol-
ars concerned with usability of services and user acceptance (Egelman, 2013; Gafni and
Nissim, 2014), from a technical perspective (Breuer et al., 2015; Kontaxis et al., 2012), or
from a legal point of view (Van Der Sype and Seigneur, 2014), there are several related
strands of literature in the domains of economics, management and marketing, as well
as information systems, which will be discussed in the following.
One strand of studies explores the factors that affect consumers’ decision to use a so-
cial login rather than a website’s own registration service. For example, Kontaxis et al.
(2012, p.321) point to an additional “social dimension to the browsing experience” due
to users’ ability to share, rate and interact with content. These features require the
sharing of user and usage data between the respective social network and the content
provider. Based on an exploratory survey, Gafni and Nissim (2014) identify familiarity
and convenience as factors that positively affect users’ readiness to opt for a social login
in a world in which Internet users face an increasing number of websites that require
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authentication. In such cases, social logins avoid the need for multiple (different) user-
name and password combinations, evade repetitive registration processes and mini-
mize the effort to update and maintain accurate information in the case authentication
properties change. In a laboratory experiment, Egelman (2013) examines convenience
benefits of the Facebook Login relative to perceived privacy costs and finds that for the
majority of subjects the former outweighs the latter even if this requires the disclosure
of extensive personal information and although subjects are well-aware of the scope of
collected data.
The technical literature views social login services (Ko et al., 2010) in the history of (en-
terprise) single sign-on systems (SSOs), i.e., systems that allow for centralized and fed-
erated identity management across remote and distributed resources (Pashalidis and
Mitchell, 2003). Next to the design and implementation of authentication protocol stan-
dards, e.g., OAuth (Sun and Beznosov, 2012; Chen et al., 2014), studies have been con-
cerned with the security of data transmission (Wang et al., 2012) and users’ control over
their personal data in different services contexts (Dey and Weis, 2010; Kontaxis et al.,
2012). In essence, these studies suggest that social logins reduce users’ transaction costs
in a distributed (web) context, if technical systems are designed and implemented se-
curely and with regard to users’ privacy concerns. However, Sun et al. (2010) also note
that many SSOs, in particular open source systems, failed due to a lack of adoption
incentives for involved platforms and content providers.
Additionally, social logins introduce new business opportunities and thus adoption
incentives through the access to external data sources and potential sharing agree-
ments among competitors. With regard to such voluntary access relationships among
competitors, well-known economic trade-offs for the involved transaction parties arise
(Boudreau, 2010; Mantena and Saha, 2012; West, 2003). In general, a firm needs to con-
sider whether additional access revenues (e.g., wholesale revenues in vertical markets,
cf. Ordover and Shaffer, 2007) outweigh the business stealing effect (Mankiw, 1986),
due to competitors’ access to the firm’s exclusive resources. Moreover, wholesale ac-
cess has been found to soften competition in downstream markets (Bourreau et al.,
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2011), whereas with regard to price discrimination a common data pool may intensify
competition (Fudenberg et al., 2000; Montes et al., 2015). Thus the interplay between
data sharing and competitive intensity is a priori unclear.
Incentives to collect data were scrutinized with regard to firms’ ability to price dis-
criminate based on historic usage data when consumers react to such practices (see
Fudenberg and Villas-Boas, 2007, 2012, for summaries of behavior-based price discrim-
ination in digital markets). More specifically, Acquisti and Varian (2005) show that
personalization of services which increases consumers’ valuation over time of use may
be critical to make price discrimination profitable if consumers act strategically. Access
to users’ personal data may invoke a range of privacy issues that have been examined
by a growing strand of theoretical and empirical literature (see Acquisti et al., 2016, for
an extensive survey). With regard to social logins, authors have criticized inter alia the
loss of anonymity, revelation of social information, loss of traceability in cases of a data
breach, propagation of advertisements, and disclosure of user credentials as potential
threats to users’ privacy (Kontaxis et al., 2012). However, the fact that users deliberately
decide to use the social login opposed to alternative registration options suggests that
the positive effect on users’ valuation outweighs potential privacy concerns (Egelman,
2013).
Over and beyond the ability to offer personalized services and prices, data collection
and analysis is driven by the desire to improve the display of online advertising and to
better match advertising to users’ preferences by the means of targeting. Evans (2008)
provides an overview of online advertising markets and characterizes key features
that differentiate them from traditional media markets (Anderson and Coate, 2005).
Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) show that on the one hand targeting benefits consumers
through improved matching between consumers’ preferences and advertised products,
but on the other hand, targeting increases market concentration in the advertising in-
dustry.
Online advertising allows for a much more diverse set of pricing models and perfor-
mance metrics than for offline advertising (Asdemir et al., 2012): Consumers’ response
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to online advertising may either be measured based on click-throughs, i.e., the immedi-
ate engagement with the advertisement, or based on view-throughs, i.e., the more com-
prehensive long-term effect on consumers’ purchase decision (Bleier and Eisenbeiss,
2015). Next to potential brand building effects (Yoo, 2009) and long-term impact on
consumers’ decision (Drèze and Hussherr, 2003; Manchanda et al., 2006; Lewis and
Reiley, 2014), which are neglected by click-based or action-based measures, the aca-
demic literature has identified moral hazard as a potential impediment to the adoption
of pricing models associated with pure click-through measures (Animesh et al., 2010;
Asdemir et al., 2012; Liu and Viswanathan, 2014) or action-based measures (Hu et al.,
2015). View-through (which includes click-through) is therefore commonly considered
as the relevant performance measure in display advertising markets (Hamman and
Plomion, 2013) and especially by advertisers in social networks. According to market
research (Ross, 2015) more than 60% of total advertising budget spent at Facebook is al-
located via optimized CPM (oCPM), a metric where advertisers are billed on the basis of
impressions, while Facebook optimizes bidding for the effective cost per impression ac-
cording to advertisers’ preferred mix of user interaction (actions, reach, clicks or social
impression).5 With close to 24% of total revenues in 2014 (eMarketer, 2015) and a third
of total display impressions to US Internet users in 2011 (comScore, 2011), Facebook
has become the clear market leader in display advertising and its share is estimated to
grow further over the coming years (Marshall, 2015).
Through the social login, Facebook and other social networks may be able to drastically
improve their ability to display targeted advertising and thus to increase view-through.
According to Iyer et al. (2005) ubiquitous data gathering allows firms to gain “much bet-
ter information on consumers, their preferences and their media habits” (p.461). More-
over, the advent of new media in combination with fragmentation of traditional media
allows firms to differentiate and delineate between target segments. In particular, Iyer
et al. show that targeting increases advertisers profits by reducing wasted impressions
to consumers who are not interested in an advertiser’s product. In economic theory,
5Further information is provided by Facebook’s documentation of pricing models and advertising objec-
tives: https://www.facebook.com/business/help/355670007911605. Accessed March 14,
2016.
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consumers benefit from improved targeting of advertising, because the displayed ads
are perceived as more relevant to their interest and therefore also more informative
(Butters, 1977; Anand and Shachar, 2009). This in turn leads to increased user engage-
ment for respective advertisers. Although survey-based research also identifies poten-
tial adverse effects due to better informed advertising (Turow et al., 2009), empirical
studies generally support the hypothesis that data collection and analysis increases the
effectiveness of displayed advertisements by the means of targeting (Braun and Moe,
2013; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011a,b; Urban et al., 2014) and personalization (Ansari
and Mela, 2003; Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015; Tucker, 2014).6 In particular, Goldfarb and
Tucker (2011a) find that targeted ads, which, e.g., would match the content of the vis-
ited website, exhibit a significantly higher effectiveness than conventional non-targeted
ads. Moreover, in a study of advertising effectiveness on Facebook, Tucker (2014) finds
that personalization of ad impressions in addition to targeting further increases the like-
lihood that users click on displayed ads if consumers maintain (perceived) control over
their privacy. With regard to retargeting effectiveness, Lambrecht and Tucker (2013)
and Bleier and Eisenbeiss (2015) show that advertisers need to be accurately informed
about the current status of consumers’ purchasing decision process. This further em-
phasizes the necessity for a firm’s global view on consumers’ activities over and beyond
its own platform.
In the following, a game-theoretic model is developed that offers a microfoundation
and characterization on how social logins affect the competition between CPs for users,
as well as the competition between CPs and the social network for advertising rev-
enues. Research gaps of the extant literature are addressed by explicitly considering the
effects of data access and information sharing among competitors on CP’s ability to at-
tract users as well as its ability to generate advertising revenues. Moreover, factors that
impact CPs decision to offer access to user data and/or usage data are examined. More
specifically, it is shown that a higher competitive intensity between special-interest CPs
6See Tucker (2012) for a discussion of adverse effects on advertising effectiveness if user perceive data col-
lection as excessive. However, these issues may be resolved by (perceived) user control over disclosure
of their personal data as shown by Tucker (2014).
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makes information sharing with a general-interest CP more likely even if this is ulti-
mately detrimental to the special-interest CPs.
7.2 A model of coopetition in online advertising markets
Before providing the details of the model, the basic competitive setting is outlined.
7.2.1 Competitive setting
The considered online advertising ecosystem includes two competing special-interest
content providers (CP s, s 2 {A, B}), one general-interest content provider (CP G) and
one advertiser (Z). The special-interest CPs may be thought of as specialized web
sites that offer a narrow range of content in the same domain of interest (e.g., celebrity
news or financial news), whereas the general-interest CP offers a much broader range
of complementary content (e.g., a general news site). In the context of this chapter
and the preceding motivation it will be convenient to think of CP G as a social net-
work provider (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn or GooglePlus), although the insights
of the model are not restricted to this scenario. The important aspect of the model is
that the special-interest CPs operate in the same domain and are thus competing di-
rectly for users, whereas the general-interest CP is already used by all Internet users
under consideration. This captures the relevant competitive dynamics of the Internet,
where, on the one hand, users split their attention between a general-interest site (e.g.,
Facebook) and a particular special-interest site, but, on the other hand, choose to pay
attention to only one of the two comparable special-interest sites (e.g., they visit either
hellomagazine.com or ok.co.uk, but not both). In other words, whereas users multi-
home between CP s and CP G, they single-home between CP A and CP B.
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Furthermore, it is assumed that all CPs offer their content free of charge to Internet users
and derive revenues by charging a price, p, for showing display advertisements on their
sites. To date, this is the prevalent business model on the Internet (cf. Dou, 2004; Evans,
2009; Anderson, 2012) and consequently, this is the dominant modelling assumption
in the related literature (see, e.g., Athey et al. (2014); Choi and Kim (2010); Kourandi
et al. (2015)).7 To fix ideas, it is assumed that CPs offer advertisement space based
on pricing per impression (i.e., they adopt a cost-per-mille (CPM) model). Although,
there exist also other means to sell advertisement space, in particular based on pricing
per click (cost-per-click (CPC) model) or per transaction on the advertiser’s site (cost-
per-action (CPA) model), CPM is still widely adopted by large CPs (e.g., Facebook,
Google Ad Sense) and consequently, this is the standard assumption used in the context
of display advertisements markets (see, e.g., Anderson and De Palma (2013); Johnson
(2013); Reisinger (2012)).8 In order to focus on the competition between CPs, it is further
assumed that there is a single advertiser, Z, that wishes to buy advertisement space for
a special-interest ad (in the same domain as the special-interest CPs) at any one of the
CPs. As will be described in detail subsequently, CPs differ in their targeting ability
and, due to competition and split attention between CPs, each CP reaches a different
subset of the users at any given point in time. Depending on a CP’s ad pricing relative
to how many view-throughs can be achieved at this CP, the advertiser will choose at
which subset of the CPs to advertise in order to maximize its profit. Thus, it is important
to see that, although the general-interest CP is not in direct competition for users with
any of the special-interest CPs, it is still in competition with them for users’ attention to
7However, this assumption is mainly made for convenience and clarity of the model, because it would
only be required that CPs derive a significant portion of their total revenues from advertising. Other
revenue streams (e.g., from transaction fees or subscriptions) are not considered here, because they
are not directly relevant to the analysis of the competitive dynamics of the online advertising market,
which is the focus of this analysis.
8Moreover, as will be seen later, the CPM model allows for the formulation of an intuitive microfoun-
dation of how advertisement prices are formed and affected by the competition between CPs. The
corresponding microfoundation would be more complicated and hence, less intuitive under a CPC
model, without providing additional insights. The results remain qualitatively unaffected as long as a
CP’s advertisement price increases with the attractiveness of that CP to users (which is especially the
case for enhanced targeting, see Athey and Gans, 2010). For a more detailed analysis of the trade off
between the CPC and CPM model, see Asdemir et al. (2012).
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ad impressions. This basic competitive set-up of the model is summarized in Figure 7.1.
FIGURE 7.1: The competitive setting of the model: Each user chooses exactly one of the two
special-interest CPs (single-homing) and splits attention between the special-
interest CP and the general-interest CP (multi-homing). All CPs are ad-financed








7.2.2 Details of the model
In the following, a more detailed description of the building blocks of the model, the
strategic variables of each of the entities involved, as well as the timing of actions will
be provided.
Internet users There is a unit mass of heterogeneous Internet users that have a natural
preference for one of the two special-interest CPs. Users’ preference for the CPs is de-
noted by x and assumed to be uniformly distributed between zero and one (Hotelling,
1929). The two special-interest CPs are horizontally differentiated and located at either
end of the users’ preference spectrum, i.e., CP A at x = 0 and CP B at x = 1. Thus, a
type x consumer derives utility of UA(x) = uA   tx or UB(x) = uB   t(1  x), when he
consumes the content of CP A or CP B, respectively. Thereby, us denotes the base utility
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that is derived from the viewing experience and usability of the site (e.g., the quality of
the content or the hassle of the login procedure), and t is the degree of competition be-
tween the two special-interest CPs. When t is large, the users’ innate preference for the
CPs becomes more important, such that competition on the basis of us becomes weaker.
Users will visit only the special-interest CP which gives him the highest utility. The re-
spective user demand for CP s is denoted by Ds. Furthermore, it is assumed that us is
large enough, such that the market is fully covered, i.e., at any time DA + DB = 1.
Besides one of the special-interest CPs, the users will also visit the general-interest CP.
In order to model how users split attention between the two considered CPs, it is as-
sumed that there are two time periods, indexed by t = 1,2. In each time period, a user
visits the special-interest CP with probability d and the general-interest CP with prob-
ability 1   d. Thus, d and 1   d are referred to as the screen attention probability of CP
s and CP G, respectively. Consequently, in each time period t, a special-interest CP s
expects to be viewed by a total of Ds,t = Ds d users, whereas the general-interest CP G
expects a total of DG,t = (DA,t + DB,t) (1   d) = 1   d viewers per time period.
Content providers All content providers k 2 {A, B, G} receive revenues from selling
advertisement space to the advertiser. In principle, each CP demands a price for dis-
playing the ad on its site in both time periods. In order to focus on the relevant aspects
of the model the costs of providing content of each CP are normalized to zero and it
is further assumed that advertisements can be displayed at zero marginal costs. More-
over, it is important to highlight that the special-interest CP s is only in competition
with CP G for views, because users single-home between special-interest CPs. Thus,
prices will depend on the submass of consumers, Ds, s = A, B that is considered. There-
fore, CP s’s price is denoted by ps and CP G’s price for the submarket Ds is denoted by
pG(s).
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Consequently, the profit of CP s is Ps = ps, whereas the profit of CP G is PG =
Âs=A,B pG(s). While a CP seeks to maximize its profit from advertising, p will depend
on the CPs’ ability to reach ad-relevant users, which is influenced by two factors: (i)
the number of a CP’s viewers in time period t, which again depends on competition
and screen attention, and (ii) its ad targeting rate ak  1. A CP’s targeting rate denotes
which fraction of the viewers that actually see the ad belong to the advertiser’s target
group. More specifically, the targeting rate describes view-through, i.e., how well a CP
can transform views into relevant advertising impressions.
In this context, it should be emphasized that the model is set up to analyze the economic
effects that arise in competition for the advertising budget of a particular advertiser
targeting a specific audience. Thus, attention is restricted to the subset of the online ad-
vertisement ecosystem that is relevant for this advertiser, comprised of special-interest
websites (targeted at roughly the same audience as the advertiser) and general-interest
websites. Evidently the special-interest CPs are considered by a much smaller number
of advertisers (which is approximated by a single advertiser here) than the general-
interest CP, who will therefore display a larger variety of ads. The revenue streams
that may arise for the general-interest CP from these other advertisers are not explicitly
modeled, because they are not relevant for the economic effects that arise in any given
advertisement submarket, which is considered here.
CP G may choose to offer CP s a social login. If CP s chooses to adopt the social login
feature on its site, the two CPs implicitly agree to cooperate by means of sharing infor-
mation about their users. Formally this has two implications:
First, it is assumed that CP s’s base utility, us increases by q   0. This can be motivated
by a better user experience at CP s, e.g., because the same credentials can be used at
both CPs, which limits password fatigue and lowers transaction costs of registration, or
because information sharing enables better personalization of content and better inte-
gration of the services of both CPs. Of course, there may also be countervailing effects
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on the users’ experience, in particular due to concerns of privacy or a single point of
failure.9 However, it is assumed that the overall users’ experience is better with the





ubs , if CP s does not use the social login
uls = ubs + q if CP s uses the social login,
whereby the superscript l denotes the case where the login is used and the superscript
b denotes the base case without the social login. Furthermore, it is assumed that CPs




Second, due to information sharing about the user, the targeting rates of CP G and CP







k, for the mass of users, Ds, of CP s that does not use the social login
a
l
k = min{fkabk,1}, for the mass of users, Ds, of CP s that uses the social login.






Advertiser The advertiser wants to place an informative ad that is targeted at a spe-
cific target audience. The goal of the advertiser is to generate attention for its product
or service, which, e.g., can be a visit to its online- or offline-store some time after the ad
has been viewed. The effectiveness of an ad is thus measured with respect to the rate
of effective view-through (Hamman and Plomion, 2013), which includes the case of a
click-trough, but also considers lagged responses of consumers (Asdemir et al., 2012;
Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015). In particular, it is assumed that the value of the first ad im-
pression that is displayed to a user belonging to the target audience is v = 1. Moreover,
9For example, the "Log in with Facebook" feature was unavailable for several hours in September 2015,
preventing users to login at all CPs that used this social login (Burlacu, 2015).
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because the ad is informative, it is assumed that all subsequent ad impressions on the
same user are wasted and thus, do not create additional value for the advertiser (for a
similar assumption see, e.g. D’Annunzio and Russo, 2015; Calvano and Jullien, 2012;
Athey et al., 2014; Ambrus et al., 2016).10 The objective of the advertiser is to select the
subset of CPs at which to advertise in order to maximize its profit, i.e.,
PZ = GA (nA   pA) + GB (nB   pB) + Â
s=A,B
GG(s) (nG(s)   pG(s)),
where Gs (GG(s)) is an indicator function, which returns one if an ad is placed for the
mass of Ds users at CP s (CP G) and zero otherwise. Moreover, ns (nG(s)) denotes the
expected number of ad-relevant viewers from the total mass of users Ds at CP s (CP G)
that see the ad for the first time and thus have a value of v = 1 for the advertiser. In
order to keep the presentation concise n will be referred to simply as “view-throughs"
in the following.
Structure and timing The following four-stage game is considered:
Stage 1: The general-interest CP G decides whether to offer a social login for the
special-interest CPs s.
Stage 2: Special-interest CPs s simultaneously but independently decide whether to
adopt the social login and users decide which CP to use.
Stage 3: All CPs simultaneously set advertisement prices pk.
Stage 4: The advertiser decides at which CPs to advertise.
10In fact, it is only required that the marginal value of subsequent ads is decreasing (cf. Anderson and
De Palma, 2013). The assumption that subsequent views have zero marginal value is thus merely made
to keep the analysis simple. Empirical research on advertising effectiveness shows that additional
impressions of the same ad are indeed less valuable for the advertiser (see, e.g., the survey by Simon
and Arndt, 1980).
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7.3 Competitive effects of the social login and market outcomes
The subgame perfect equilibrium is determined by solving through backward induc-
tion, i.e., beginning in Stage 4 and proceeding backwards.
Stage 4: Advertiser’s decision In order to decide at which CPs to advertise, Z calcu-
lates the expected view-throughs per CP, nk. Since the special-interest CP s is only in
competition with CP G for views, it suffices to consider only the mass of users at CP
s, i.e., Ds. In the first period every ad impression will be the first for a visitor, so that
CP s expects view-throughs of ns,1 = as dDs. In reverse, the remaining Ds   dDs users
have visited CP G in the first period, and thus CP G expects nG(s),1 = aG(s)(Ds   dDs)
view-throughs in the first period from the mass of users that multi-home between CP
s and CP G. Recall that CP G’s targeting rate can differ between different masses of
users, Ds, because it depends on whether or not CP s has adopted the social login.
This is denoted by aG(s). In the second period, only those users are relevant for the
advertiser that have not seen the ad in the first period at any of the two CPs, i.e.,
Ds   ns,1   nG(s),1. Note that in period two, the mass of users Ds again redistributes
its attention randomly between CP s and CP G according to d, i.e., users that have been
targeted at CP s may now visit CP G, and vice versa. Thus, CP s and CP G expect
to generate ns,2 = asd(Ds   ns,1   nG(s),1) and nG(s),2 = aG(s)(1   d)(Ds   ns,1   nG(s),1)
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new view-throughs in the second period, respectively. In summary, this yields a total
number of view-throughs by CP k of11
ns = asdDs| {z }
period t = 1
+asd(Ds   asdDs   aG(s)(Ds   dDs))| {z }




aG(s)(Ds   dDs)| {z }
period t = 1
+aG(s)(1   d)(Ds   asdDs   aG(s)(Ds   dDs))| {z }
period t = 2
.(7.2)
It is important to see that nk does not only depend on CP k’s own targeting rate, ak, but
also on the other CP’s targeting rate. This is the basis for competition between the CPs
in the advertising market. With regard to the mass of users Ds, the advertiser faces the
decision to display advertising either exclusively at CP s or CP G, or at both outlets at
the same time. Obviously, the latter option maximizes view-throughs n = nG(s) + ns.
However, the advertiser maximizes profit Gs(ns   ps) + GG(s)(nG(s)   pG(s)) and may
decide to switch exclusively to a CP if it can gain a higher net benefit through a lower
price p for the view-throughs. For example, the advertiser will decide to reach the mass
of Ds consumers exclusively through CP s if nes   ps > Âm=G(s),s (nm   pm). Thereby
nes, which denotes the total view-throughs at s when CP s is the advertiser’s exclusive
outlet, is larger than CP s’s total view-through when CP s is not exclusive. This is
because CP s can generate more view-throughs in the second period, as users have
not been able to view the advertisement already at the other CP in the first period.
The advertiser’s decision where to advertise will thus depend on view-throughs, as
identified above, and CPs’ prices, which are determined next.
Stage 3: CPs’ ad pricing First, see that exclusive advertising cannot be an equilibrium
outcome, because CPs do not have marginal costs of advertising and thus the excluded
CP, which currently experiences zero profits from advertising, would always be better
11Note that it has been implicitly assumed that the advertiser has chosen to display the ad at all CPs,
which is indeed the equilibrium outcome. A complete characterization of the model would also require
to specify nk in those cases in which the advertiser choose only a proper subset of the CPs. It is easy to
see that nk can then be derived by setting ak = 0 for all CPs that are not chosen by the advertiser.
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off by lowering its advertising price, such that it may be considered again by adver-
tiser Z. This competition for selection by Z constrains the CPs’ advertising prices. In
equilibrium prices must therefore be chosen such that Z is indifferent between selecting
both CPs and selecting one CP exclusively. Hence, equilibrium prices can be derived
by solving the following system of equations
nG(s)   pG(s) + ns   ps = neG(s)   pG(s)(7.3)
nG(s)   pG(s) + ns   ps = nes   ps,(7.4)
which yields equilibrium prices of p⇤k (Ds,as,aG(s)). Note that equilibrium prices (and
thus CPs’ equilibrium profits) behave intuitively with respect to changes in the tar-
geting rate. For example, in line with Athey and Gans (2010), a higher targeting rate,
which in turn yields more view-throughs, allows CPs to demand a higher equilibrium




> 0. Moreover, competition between











Stage 2: Special-interest CPs’ social login adoption Provided the social login is of-
fered by CP G, each CP s decides independently whether to adopt the social login by
comparing anticipated advertising profits P⇤k given targeting rates ak and market share
Ds. More specifically, each CP s trades off the positive effect on consumers’ valua-
tion for their services and/or a potentially improved advertising effectiveness against
the negative effect of intensified competition in the advertising market. On the one
hand, the adoption of the social login increases the special-interest CP’s base utility by
q, which may generate a competitive advantage over the other special-interest CP and
expand its market share from Dbs to Dls. However, if the rival CP also adopts the social
login, then both CPs offer the same base utility again and thus, Dbs = Dls. Moreover,
the social login may improve the special-interest CP’s targeting rate based on the ad-
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ditional information over its users and therefore increases its advertising effectiveness,
i.e., als = fsabs , with fs   1. On the other hand, data sharing may also improve the
general-interest CP’s targeting rate, i.e., alG(s) = fGa
b
G(s), with fG   1, which negatively
affects the special-interest CP’s advertising revenues, as shown above. In summary,
four different scenarios can be distinguished: Either both special-interest CPs adopt
(scenario l, l) or do not adopt (scenario b,b) the social login, or only one CP adopts the
social login (scenarios l,b and b, l). The resulting normal form game is summarized in
Table 7.1 and the corresponding profits are derived in Appendix A.4.
TABLE 7.1: Normal form game representing special-interest CPs’ social login adoption deci-
sion.
CP B
Social Login (l) No Login (b)
















In the following, it is shown that if special-interest CPs are symmetric, either both or
none adopt the social login. Thereby, CP s considers the net effect Dl,d b,d := Pl,ds   Pb,ds
of the social login on its anticipated profits, given its rival’s decision d 2 {b, l}. CP s
adopts the social login, given that its rival does not adopt it, if and only if Dl,b b,b :=
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On the other hand, CP s adopts the social login, given that its rival also adopts it, if
and only if Dl,l b,l := Pl,ls   Pb,ls > 0, which is satisfied if its base-targeting rate does not
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As special-interest CPs are symmetric and decide simultaneously, it follows directly
that both CPs will adopt the login (universal adoption) whenever Dl,b b,b > 0 and no
CP will adopt the login otherwise.12 Due to the symmetry of the special-interest CPs,
in both cases Ds = 1/2.
In situations where both CPs A and B have an unilateral incentive to adopt the login,
i.e., Dl,b b,b > 0, resulting profits under universal adoption may not necessarily exceed
profits in the initial setting without the login. Instead, special-interest CPs may find
themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma-like situation, where relative competitive benefits
due to the social login cancel out if the other CP adopts the social login as well. In
consequence, increased advertising competition by the general-interest CP G due to
information sharing via the social login may outweigh any positive impact on CP s’s
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12Formally it can be shown that fs > fs.
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Stage 1: General-interest CP’s social login offer Anticipating special-interest CPs’
adoption decision and ensuing effects on advertising prices, the general-interest CP de-
cides whether or not to offer the social login. To this end CP G weighs the positive effect
on its own targeting ability against the negative effect of the rival’s improved targeting
ability, both of which will affect competition in the advertising market. In general, CP
G is willing to offer the social login if Ul,l b,b := Pl,lG   P
b,b
G > 0, since the symmetric








G   1) (d   1) + 2 (dabG(s) + fG   1)
2d fG abs
.(7.8)
Possible market outcomes: Based on the previous analysis and the therein derived
thresholds, the feasible market outcomes that may arise can now be fully character-
ized. As special-interest CPs are symmetric, it will generally suffice to consider any
submarket Ds to discuss the possible market outcomes. Thereby, it is most insightful to
delineate the different market outcomes in terms of CP s’s and CP G’s increase in tar-
geting rate due to the social login. In particular, the market outcomes are determined
by the critical thresholds i) fs, ii) bfs and iii) efs derived above, that denote i) when the
special-interest CPs adopt the social login, ii) when special-interest CPs are actually
better off by adopting the social login, and iii) when the general-interest CP offers the
social login.
In total there are six possible market outcomes, which are illustrated in Figure 7.2.
I: The social login is offered and adopted. All CPs are better off, i.e., profits
with the social login are higher than without it.
II: The social login is offered and adopted. Whereas the general-interest CP is
better off, special-interest CPs are worse off (prisoner’s dilemma-like out-
come).
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III: The social login is not offered, but special-interest CPs would be willing to
adopt it. However, adoption would make them worse off.
IV: The social login is offered, but special-interest CPs do not adopt it.
V: The social login is not offered, but special-interest CPs would be willing to
adopt it. Adoption would make them better off.
VI: The social login is neither offered nor would it be adopted by special interest
CPs. All CPs would be worse off with the social login.
Evidently, the social login is either not offered, or not adopted, or both in market out-
comes I I I - VI. Furthermore, it is immediately obvious that the social login is neither
always offered nor always adopted when it would be socially optimal. First, the social
login is always beneficial to consumers, who experience an increase in base utility by q,
everything else being equal. Thus, the market outcomes I I I to VI are inefficient with
respect to consumers surplus, because the social login is not offered or not adopted
here. Moreover, in market outcome I I special-interest CPs are worse off despite the
fact that they have voluntarily adopted the social login. Finally, in market outcome V
special-interest CPs would be better off by using the social login, but are not offered
this option. Consequently, in five of the six possible market outcomes a market failure
may occur, whereas only in outcome I the market outcome is always efficient.
RESULT 7.1. In market outcome I I (voluntary) adoption of the social login leaves the special-
interest CPs worse off. Generally, provision of the social login may create market failures in
market outcomes I I to VI, whereas it is always efficient in market outcome I.
Comparative statics Subsequently, the conditions under which the social login is of-
fered and adopted are further examined. Therefore, it is investigated how the critical
thresholds fs, efs and bfs change ceteris paribus in response to a change in one of the
model’s exogenous parameters. While the details of the comparative statics are rele-
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FIGURE 7.2: Illustration of possible market outcomes: The social login is offered in outcomes
I, I I and IV and not offered otherwise. The social login is adopted in outcomes
I and I I and not adopted in outcome IV. In outcome I special-interest CPs are
better off and in outcome I I they are worse off by adopting the social login. Note:
The figure is derived for abs = 0.5,abG(s) = 0.5,t = 0.5,q = 0.1,d = 0.5. Not all
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gated to Appendix A.4, it can be concluded that the model yields quite intuitive re-
sults. An increase in the CPs’ targeting rate without the login, as for CP s (aG(s) for CP
G), makes it less likely for CP s (CP G) to adopt (offer) the social login. A similar effect
can be observed for an increase in a CP’s screen attention, d for CP s ((1   d) for CP G),
which translates into the same effect as if one’s own targeting rate is increased while
simultaneously the rival’s targeting rate is decreased. Overall an increase in one’s own
screen attention therefore decreases incentives for the adoption (for CP s) and the offer
(for CP G) of the social login.
The parameters aG(s), as and d, which affect the competition in the advertising market,
impact all three critical thresholds. By contrast the parameters q and t, which affect
the competition for users between special-interest CPs, impact only threshold fs. Intu-
itively, as users’ benefit of the social login increases (increase in q) or as the competition
for users becomes weaker (decrease in t), the social login becomes less relevant for the
competition for users and thus, it is adopted less likely by the special-interest CPs.
RESULT 7.2. As a special-interest (general-interest) CP’s targeting rate or screen attention
increases, it becomes less attractive to adopt (offer) the social login. The more special-interest
CPs are in competition for users, the more the social login is adopted.
Illustrative market scenarios To conclude the analysis two specific market scenarios
are highlighted that are illustrative in the sense that they represent extrema of the fea-
sible spectrum of possibilities.
First, consider the case where the special-interest CPs have already attained a high tar-
geting rate and thus only the general-interest CP will be able to increase its targeting
rate due to information sharing via the social login, i.e., fG > fs ⌘ 1. In this case the
special-interest CP cannot gain a competitive advantage in the advertising market from
adopting the social login. It will base its adoption decision therefore purely on the ex-
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pected impact of the social login on the competition for users. In particular, if q > 0
the prisoner’s dilemma-like situation will prevail, as special-interest CPs are symmet-
ric and none can commit not to use the social login. Eventually both will adopt the
login and compete again head to head, each attaining 50 percent market share. In the
end, only the general-interest CP, and, of course, the consumers, benefit from the so-
cial login. From Figure 7.2 it is easy to see that at fs = 1 only two market outcomes
are feasible. The general-interest CP will always offer the social login and either both
special-interest CPs adopt it and are worse off (outcome I I), or they do not adopt it
(outcome IV).
Second, consider the polar case where the social login does not offer any net benefit
to consumers, i.e., q = 0. In this case the special-interest CPs will base their decision
whether or not to adopt the social login purely on the effect in the advertising market.
This means that fs and bfs coincide in this case, because special-interest CPs will only
adopt the social login if and only if it is eventually profitable for them. Thus, market
outcomes I I and I I I do not exist and the prisoner’s dilemma-like situation does not
arise here.
7.4 Discussion
Social logins are single sign-on solutions provided predominantly by social networking
sites that allow users to register with and login at otherwise unaffiliated CPs using their
existing login credentials of the social network. While a social login provides added
value to the website users, they also imply that user data is shared between the CP that
employs the social login and the social network that offers it. Whereas the former effect
is relevant for the competition for website visitors, the latter effect is relevant for the
competition in the advertising market, as data sharing improves the websites ability
to offer targeted advertising. The presented model captures these two dimensions of
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competition and identifies the winners and losers with regard to the usage of social
logins in the various market outcomes that may arise. In particular, it is shown that the
adoption of the social login may yield a prisoner’s dilemma-like situation for the CPs.
The competition for users may induce them to adopt the social login, but eventually
they may stand to lose their competitive advantage over the social networking site
in the advertising market. Moreover, it is demonstrated that social logins are likely
to yield a market failure because the login is not offered in cases where it would be
beneficial for users and the advertiser.
Although the model considers only a particular submarket, it is evident from the anal-
ysis that the social network wishes to offer the login only to those CPs from which it
can profit relatively more (in terms of increase in its targeting rate) than the content
provider that employs the social login. Indeed, although Facebook generally allows
every content provider to employ the social login, it lays out in its platform policy that
it may “enforce against [a] [...] website if [Facebook] concludes that [it] violates [its]
terms or is negatively impacting the platform" and that in this case it "may or may not
notify in advance".13 Thus, this analysis also raises an important policy question that
is related to the debate on net neutrality (Krämer et al., 2013; Easley et al., 2015) and on
Open Access (see Chapter 2). The Open Access debate at the telecommunications in-
frastructure layer centers around the question to what extent the operator of an access
network is allowed to discriminate between retailers that rely on access to the network
infrastructure. Hence, the network operator as a gatekeeper controls the access to an
essential upstream resource. Similarly one can raise the question here whether Face-
book, who is also an important gatekeeper with regard to its mostly unique personal
data resources, should be allowed to discriminate between different content providers
in providing access through its Facebook login. Given the analysis in this chapter, it
13See https://developers.facebook.com/policy, ”Things you should know", number 6. Ac-
cessed March 14, 2016.
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is demonstrated that market failures may occur and thus there potentially is room for
welfare improving policy interventions.
Finally, possible model extensions and limitations are highlighted. First, the presented
analysis starts from the premise that the adoption of the social login provides a net
benefit to consumers. However, the model could be extended to also incorporate a net
loss in users’ utility, e.g., due to privacy concerns. In this case, the prisoner’s dilemma
would be reversed in the sense that special-interest CPs may not adopt the social login
although it would be beneficial to them. Second, special-interest CPs are assumed to
be symmetric. Although this is the obvious starting point, a much richer set of market
outcomes may arise in case CPs are asymmetric, e.g., with respect to their targeting
rates ex-ante, or with respect to their increase in net utility or targeting rate ex-post.
The prisoner’s dilemma-like situation may also be mitigated if markets were not fully
covered or if a CP would enjoy some additional elastic demand from users that does not
come from the rival CP. Third, some of the model parameters that are currently treated
as independent and exogenous may in fact be correlated and partially endogenous. For
example, the screen attention may depend on the net benefit that a CP offers, or a CP’s
targeting rate may depend on its demand. This will likely amplify the already observed
effects. At last, the presented analysis considers a monopolistic login provider as well
as a monopolistic advertiser. Although this seems to represent a reasonable assumption
with respect to the presence of market power and network effects in online content and
digital services markets, it may be worthwhile to extend the analysis to competing login





THIS thesis studies the competitive and cooperative interactions in informationand communications technology markets, where firms require access to an es-
sential competitive resource. In the light of continuous technological innovation, firms
and policy makers alike are challenged by the consequences of transforming market
structures in the telecommunications industries and the emergence of new digital ser-
vices markets. As outlined in this thesis, combining theoretical analysis and experi-
mental evaluation provides a methodological foundation to examine market outcomes
under institutions that may govern these markets. By serving as a testbed for policy
proposals, this work aims at identifying the welfare implications of designated institu-
tions and informing the design of new regulatory institutions prior to their implemen-
tation in the field. Specifically, the concept of Open Access is scrutinized with regard to
its implications for competition and its ultimate impact on consumers. The insights and
conclusions drawn from these investigations thus contribute to the scientific discourse,
but also support policy makers and practitioners when assessing the implications of
competitive and cooperative strategies in ICT markets.
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8.1 Summary and implications
In the following, the main findings of this thesis are summarized and discussed with
respect to their methodological and policy implications. The section is organized along
the research questions set out in Chapter 1.
Addressing Research Question 1, this thesis proposes a unified definition of Open
Access based on various notions offered by different stakeholders in the context of
telecommunications infrastructure markets. According to this understanding, Open
Access, in essence, mandates that access to an upstream resource is provided in a non-
discriminatory manner. In situations where the upstream resource is provided by a ver-
tically integrated firm this requires non-discrimination between the integrated down-
stream subsidiary and an independent retailer as well as non-discrimination between
two independent retailers. Chapter 2 demonstrates that Open Access may thereby be
achieved by a range of alternative regulatory institutions. At a fundamental level, these
institutions may differ with regard to i) the vertical structure that is allowed or pre-
scribed at the supply-side of the upstream resource, ii) the degree and form of public-
sector participation, and iii) the level of access and the corresponding wholesale prod-
ucts.
In consequence, the choice for a specific regulatory institution involves several trade-
offs that must be recognized by authorities and policy makers. More generally, the sur-
veyed economic literature points to a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency
that each regulatory institution balances differently. Based on the effects identified in
the theoretical and empirical literature, Chapter 2 suggests a guideline to assist policy
makers and regulatory agencies in their decisions according to their primary objective.
In this vein, it is made explicit that regulatory policy needs to weigh and prioritize
objectives. To this end, traditional regulatory institutions such as price regulation and
vertical separation have been examined thoroughly by the extant literature. In contrast,
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the review points to research gaps with regard to alternative regulatory regimes which
may be better suited to balance the efficiency trade-off. Most notably, a regime based on
mandated non-discrimination may be able to safeguard competition by creating a level
playing field, but at the same time foster investment incentives as wholesale charges
are not subject to ex ante price regulation.
Margin squeeze regulation, in particular, has been proposed as an alternative institu-
tion to price regulation and referred to as a possible means to ensure Open Access in
telecommunications markets where infrastructure competition has been established.
Previous investigations of margin squeeze regulation, however, have predominantly
been concerned with the application in markets with a single dominant supplier of the
wholesale resource. Therefore, Research Question 2 aims specifically at a market struc-
ture, where a second integrated firm is able to self-supply the upstream good. Chapter 4
examines whether margin squeeze regulation could improve market outcomes relative
to no regulation in the case of a wholesale monopoly based on a game-theoretic model.
This market scenario resembles the current situation in many fixed telecommunica-
tions markets. Although margin squeeze regulation may prevent foreclosure and thus
could be beneficial for independent retailers, consumers are found to be unambigu-
ously worse off due to higher retail prices. Remarkably, total welfare may increase in
some cases, due to higher producer surplus under margin squeeze regulation. These
findings contradict the rationale underlying the current legislative implementation in
Europe: competing infrastructures do not represent exogenous competitive constraints
as assumed, but are likely to react strategically to the implementation of new regulatory
rules. In consequence, rather that the wholesale price level falls, the overall retail price
level rises under margin squeeze regulation.
Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment provides further support for the the-
oretical findings that margin squeeze regulation does not benefit consumers in a mar-
ket characterized by infrastructure competition and a wholesale monopoly. Moreover,
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Chapter 5 extends the analysis of margin squeeze regulation to wholesale competi-
tion, i.e., a market scenario where both integrated firms may offer wholesale access to
their respective upstream resource. In this scenario, theory would predict that margin
squeeze regulation benefits consumers, as foreclosure is prevented and the compet-
itive outcome remains as the single equilibrium prediction. However, experimental
evidence contradicts this prediction as consumer welfare does not increase under mar-
gin squeeze regulation compared to no regulation. In fact, empirical findings indicate
that under regulation retail market prices may increase to the detriment of consumers,
especially in cases where wholesale competition is effective in reducing prices below
the monopoly level. On the contrary, margin squeeze regulation may allow the retailer
to obtain higher profits due to lower access prices only in cases where a high degree
of tacit collusion among integrated firms impedes effective wholesale competition. As
findings on margin squeeze regulation contrast conventional wisdom and the intuitive
appeal of its justifying rationale, the general need for thorough theoretical and experi-
mental evaluation of policy proposals is emphasized.
Infrastructure competition has often been articulated as the ultimate goal of sector-
specific regulation and may thus be viewed as a sufficient criterion to abstain from
price regulation. Furthermore, previous theoretical studies have pointed to wholesale
competition as an effective means to achieve Open Access for independent retailers at
the competitive wholesale price (cf. Ordover and Shaffer, 2007; Brito and Pereira, 2010;
Bourreau et al., 2011). These studies, however, do not take into account the possibil-
ity of tacit collusion, which is frequently observed in markets with only few integrated
competitors (Parker and Röller, 1997). Therefore, Chapter 5 investigates Research Ques-
tion 3 and yields the following result: wholesale and retail prices are found to be higher
under wholesale competition than under a wholesale monopoly. The surprising finding
that consumers are in consequence worse off under competition is rationalized by an
investigation of collusion incentives in an infinitely repeated game context. It is shown
that the symmetric market structure under wholesale competition facilitates tacit col-
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lusion relative to the asymmetric market structure under a wholesale monopoly. In
the latter case, the vertically integrated firm that does not provide access, benefits rel-
atively less from tacit collusion. Moreover, it has a stronger incentive to price more
aggressively in the retail market as it does not face any opportunity costs in the form
of foregone wholesale revenues. In conclusion, these results point to a more general
dilemma of the Open Access rationale: whereas non-discrimination may provide the
basis for competition on equal terms, symmetry may facilitate coordinated behavior
among competitors to the detriment of consumers. In this vein, tacit collusion may
constitute a primary concern above and beyond the exercise of market power. There-
fore, it is of particular interest that a complementary price commitment rule—which
does not change the theoretical prediction—significantly decreases the empirically ob-
served degree of tacit collusion and in consequence leads to significantly lower market
prices as well as higher consumer surplus.
The relevance of tacit collusion for competition in concentrated markets motivates Re-
search Question 4, which asks for the relationship between the number of competitors
and the degree of tacit collusion in a market. A meta-analysis of experimental studies
that have varied the number of firms provides general support for the notion that mar-
kets with a larger number of firms are less prone to tacit collusion than markets with
a lower number. In particular, previous studies confirm a significant negative effect on
tacit collusion from four to two as well as from three to two firms. Suprisingly, the ex-
tant experimental literature does not provide empirical evidence for a significant effect
from four to three firms under either Bertrand or Cournot competition, and therefore
cannot substantiate the assumption of a strictly monotonic number effect on tacit col-
lusion. Therefore, Chapter 6 conducts two experimental studies with symmetric and
asymmetric distributions of market power that systematically investigate number ef-
fects for two, three and four firms, while also controlling for the competition model.
Based on a considerably larger number of independent observations compared to the
surveyed studies, the experiments find evidence for a significant number effect on tacit
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collusion from four to three firms as well as from three to two firms. In fact, the empiri-
cally observed increase in the degree of tacit collusion relative to the Nash equilibrium
is almost identical from four to three as it is from three to two. Indeed, this suggests a
linear number effect on the degree of tacit collusion for highly concentrated oligopolies.
Furthermore, the experimental evidence contributes to the notion that asymmetry be-
tween firms impedes coordinated behavior and leads to lower degrees of tacit collusion
compared to a symmetric market structure. Notably, market outcomes remain signifi-
cantly above the theoretical prediction even in markets with four firms, demonstrating
subjects’ robust ability to sustain tacit collusion—even under a finite time horizon.
From a methodological perspective it is important to recognize the relevant design di-
mensions that affect the degree of observed tacit collusion in economic laboratory ex-
periments. In this spirit, Research Question 5 is concerned with the consequences of
conducting competitive interactions in continuous rather than discrete time. Therefore,
Section 3.3 classifies extant studies in non-discrete time and then conducts an experi-
ment to compare tacit collusion under continuous and discrete time, while controlling
for the competition model and the number of firms. In contrast to previous studies,
which have found that continuous time facilitates cooperation, e.g., in a prisoner’s
dilemma context (Friedman and Oprea, 2012), the obtained empirical evidence sug-
gests that tacit collusion in an oligopoly competition context is significantly lower with
a continuous framework than with a discrete framework. This finding bears impor-
tant methodological implications. First, it may inform the design of future oligopoly
experiments with regard to the consequences of the chosen mode of interaction (con-
tinuous vs. discrete). Second, these findings may be taken into account when results
of oligopoly experiments in discrete time—which applies to the vast majority of the ex-
tant experimental literature—are generalized to a context that is rather characterized by
continuous time. This is the case whenever decision makers can decide on the timing
of an action endogenously and thus asynchronous interaction may occur. Finally, given
the contrasting findings in previous comparisons of continuous and discrete time, the
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results suggest that whether continuous time facilitates or impedes cooperation hinges
critically on the specific game context.
Above and beyond the telecommunications infrastructure layer, Research Question 6
addresses the implications of voluntary access relationships among competitors at the
digital services layer. To this end, Chapter 7 examines the competitive effects of so-
cial logins that allow for the sharing of user and usage data between online content
providers and social networks. It is shown that content providers may adopt the so-
cial login even if this strategic decision makes them ultimately worse off, i.e., they find
themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma-like situation. The rationale for adoption is based
on the relative advantage that a content provider can gain over its horizontal competi-
tor by sharing information with the social network. However, this advantage is offset if
all content providers decide to adopt the social login. In doing so, the content providers
allow the social network—the provider of the social login—to access a superior data ba-
sis and to increase its revenues in the advertising markets through a higher targeting
rate. Moreover, the analysis shows that the social network has incentives to discrimi-
nate between content providers if it can offer the social login on a discretionary basis.
More specifically, it may not offer the social login if this would threaten its position in
the advertising market relative to the respective content provider. In conclusion, this
shows that voluntary access regimes do not necessarily ensure Open Access with re-
gard to data resources. In consequence, consumers may be worse off. On the contrary,
voluntary access offers may be implemented by a dominant gatekeeper to protect its
position, albeit not through exclusion, but through exploitation.
8.2 Limitations and outlook
This thesis has several limitations with regard to its scope and its methodology that
point to promising avenues for future research. Whereas, limitations specific to each
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study are discussed in the respective chapters, this section is dedicated to a summary
of the overreaching issues.
Foremost, the studies in this thesis analyze the underlying issues from a purely static
perspective and do not explicitly consider effects on dynamic incentives. More specifi-
cally, the thesis focusses on the question which institutions might improve static market
outcomes compared to alternative institutions, in particular to the benchmark scenario
of no regulation. Thus, the implicit premise is that regulatory regimes which abstain
from price regulation are more likely to have a positive effect on dynamic incentives.
This reasoning is based on the trade-offs between static and dynamic objectives identi-
fied for regulatory institutions in telecommunications infrastructure markets in Chap-
ter 2, and the growing empirical evidence on the chilling effects of wholesale price reg-
ulation (inter alia Briglauer et al., 2013; Bacache et al., 2014) on investment incentives.
Moreover, a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency has long been recognized
in economic theory going back to Schumpeter (1942) and found to apply to a more gen-
eral context than infrastructure markets and price regulation (Aghion et al., 2005). Yet,
there is an ongoing academic discussion about the more precise characterization of the
trade-off’s functional form (Sacco and Schmutzler, 2011; Hashmi, 2013) and potential
interaction effects with varying market characteristics (Gilbert, 2006). With regard to
the current developments in telecommunications markets as well as antitrust cases in
digital services markets, the necessity to understand the relationship between static and
dynamic effects in specific application scenarios is only expected to grow (Bauer, 2014;
Parker and Van Alstyne, 2014). In these antitrust cases, authorities and courts are reg-
ularly challenged to weigh the benefits of competitive markets in a static sense against
incentives for innovative activity. Therefore, additional theoretical, experimental, and
empirical work is required to inform those decision makers about the consequences
of alternative regimes with regard to specific application scenarios and to explore and
design institutions that can balance the general efficiency trade-off.
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From a methodological perspective this calls for further research on how laboratory
experiments can be employed to investigate and compare dynamic effects across in-
stitutions. The evaluation of investment decisions thereby presents several challenges
because path dependencies and experimental subjects’ unobserved strategic reasoning
considerably affect experimental outcomes. Most notably, experimental subjects need
to form expectations about future market interactions and associated payoffs when
faced with investment decisions. Yet, these expectations may not realize accordingly,
and in consequence, subjects may base their subsequent decisions on forward induc-
tion, i.e., behavior that rationalizes past decisions, rather than backward induction, which
is regularly assumed in the theory to be tested. Whereas this issue can be mitigated
through a more constrained experimental design, i.e., a higher degree of experimental
control, such measures may limit the “behavioral freedom” of experimental subjects
(Morgan, 2005). In consequence, this may prevent interesting effects in the interplay
between dynamic and static considerations to arise in the first place. Nevertheless,
studies that have examined investment decisions in an economic laboratory context
point to potential approaches that can alleviate the aforementioned issues and provide
a methodological basis for future inquires (see, inter alia, Darai et al., 2010; Sacco and
Schmutzler, 2011; Aghion et al., 2014; Krämer and Vogelsang, 2016). In particular, Sacco
and Schmutzler (2011) query subjects’ beliefs in the investment stage and are thus able
to relate actions in subsequent periods to those beliefs. Future experimental work may
therefore focus on identifying and capturing individuals’ strategic rationales at the mi-
cro level without unintentionally framing and interfering with those decisions.
Two general shortcomings of the experimental method apply to this thesis in particular.
First, recent methodological analyses and replication studies have raised general con-
cerns about the robustness and generalizability of individual empirical studies (Ioanni-
dis, 2005; Simmons et al., 2011). Most notably, life sciences (Prinz et al., 2011; Begley and
Ellis, 2012) and psychological science (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) have found
themselves in a “credibility crisis” in consequence of a “reproducability crisis” (Baker,
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2016). As a result, these disciplines have introduced additional mechanisms and in-
creased efforts to improve the reliability and robustness of empirical findings (see, e.g.,
Nosek et al., 2015). On the one hand, pre-registration of study designs (Schulz et al.,
2010) is emphasized in order to avoid false positive findings and minimize flexibility
in data collection and analysis (Schwab et al., 2011; Simmons et al., 2011) as well as
to mitigate publication bias (Easterbrook et al., 1991). On the other hand, ex ante sta-
tistical power analysis is traditionally required for medical trials in order to minimize
false negative findings, i.e., erroneous findings of non-significance despite a true effect
(Lachin, 1981; Lenth, 2001; Button et al., 2013). Finally and foremost, large replication
programs have been initiated to corroborate robustness of findings by individual stud-
ies (e.g., Errington et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2014).
In experimental economics, similar efforts are desired to safeguard scientific credibil-
ity through replication efforts that assess robustness of findings and methodological
standards that minimize confirmation bias (Roth, 1994). A recent replication study of
laboratory experiments (Camerer et al., 2016) and methodological guidelines regard-
ing statistical power analysis for economic experiments (List et al., 2011; Bellemare
et al., 2014) represent starting points for further activities in this regard. In the spirit
of Engel (2007) and Suetens and Potters (2007), empirical meta-analyses as conducted
in Chapter 6 can shed light on the generalizability of findings by individual studies. In
particular, the parametrization decisions made in this thesis may be subject to future
robustness tests. As the parametrization of variables is inherently required when mod-
els are used as experimental instruments (see Chapter 3), the ensuing effects of specific
parameter sets and their generalizability bear important practical and methodological
implications.
The second general concern regarding economic experiments that study firm behavior
in a laboratory context is the lack of external validity. Although shortcomings in this
regard are inherent in the experimental methodology—which aims at internal validity
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as the primary objective (Guala, 2005)—there are possible approaches to mitigate those
shortcomings. First, external validity may be tested in experimental studies that go
beyond pure student samples and instead include experts and practitioners within the
designated context of application. Chapter 5, for instance, conducts a validation study
with expert subjects from the telecommunications industry, which allows for a compar-
ison of outcomes with the student relative to the practitioners sample. Note, however,
that the inclusion of expert subjects involves additional challenges that need to be con-
sidered in the design and implementation of such validation studies. Experts may in-
troduce implicit additional considerations based on their everyday experience into the
laboratory that however are not considered in the experimental context or even the un-
derlying theory (Ball and Cech, 1996). Additional questionnaires and comprehension
tests can help to make these implicit assumptions and expectations explicit. In turn,
this allows experimenters to reinforce experimental control ex ante or at least allow for
control ex post by considering peculiarities in the analysis of experimental outcomes.
A further step to address external validity above and beyond the laboratory context is
the implementation of experimental field studies (Einav and Levin, 2010). In particular,
electronic markets and digital services may allow for controlled variation of market
institutions directly in the designated application context (see the discussion in Levin,
2013). In regulatory practice, new institutions may be implemented first in pilot studies
in order to test theoretical and experimental predictions prior to large-scale application
in the field. On the downside, these pilot studies may introduce additional strategic
incentives for the involved decision makers that researchers and regulators need to be
aware of.
Finally, experimental studies in this thesis have provided several results that point to
empirical regularities, which, however, are not (yet) well understood from a theoretical
perspective. Based on the empirical results at the macro level, the development of mi-
crofounded theory is desired to gain a more precise understanding of how the observed
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market outcomes evolve. For instance, Section 3.3 points to a systematically lower de-
gree of tacit collusion under continuous time which however is in contrast to the few
theoretical analyses that suggest more cooperative behavior. In this context, broadening
the scope of methodological approaches may be beneficial to either conduct explorative
studies which could provide further stylized facts to inform theory building or to test
early explanatory theory hypotheses (see Section 3.1). For these purposes, agent-based
simulation could serve as a natural extension to laboratory experiments and as a means
to create more comprehensive testbeds for institutions (Duffy, 2006). In this vein, fu-
ture work could build on previous simulation studies that have examined individual
strategies in the context of tacit collusion (Midgley et al., 1997; Erev and Roth, 1998;
Waltman and Kaymak, 2008) as well as the design of markets and institutions (Bichler
et al., 2010; Block et al., 2010; Ketter et al., 2013).
Above and beyond the aforementioned limitations, the findings of this thesis point to
themes that have received only little attention in the extant literature, but are believed
to play a major role in ICT markets. In particular, it is shown that tacit collusion and
anti-competitive coordination between competitors have a profound impact on market
outcomes, above and beyond the exploitation of market power by a single dominant
firm. More specifically, it is found that implicit cooperation among competitors may
have important ramifications for competition in and across vertically related markets.
As ICT markets become more mature and concentrated at the services layer, and at
the same time firms become more integrated across the value chain, these issues are
likely to be magnified (see A.T. Kearney, 2016, for a summary of recent market devel-
opments). Whereas the recent literature has provided important insights into market
power and its consequences in these markets, analysis of behavioral effects and collu-
sion incentives in these contexts are currently scarce (see Hossain et al., 2011, for a rare
experimental analysis in the context of two-sided markets). As a result, it is for example
well-known that market concentration cannot be equated with market power per se in
two-sided markets (Evans and Schmalensee, 2013), but whether such market concen-
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tration may facilitate coordinated behavior to the detriment of competitors, suppliers
or consumers is currently unknown and thus open for future research.
Strategic decisions with regard to competition and cooperation as well as the balance
of those activities will represent key challenges for firms across the ICT value chain
(Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1997; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000, 2014). In particular,
firms will need to weigh short and long-term consequences of cooperative vertical rela-
tionships with respect to effects on horizontal competition in their respective markets.
Moreover, competition will regularly take place between ecosystems, i.e., integrated
organizations, or partnerships that exceed clearly delineated market boundaries and
vertical value chain layers. Therefore, the management of access relationships and the
optimal degree of openness are crucial strategic variables for firms’ success in these
markets (Eisenmann et al., 2008). As shown in this thesis and in line with previous
studies, short-term benefits of cooperation may incentivize partnerships that prove to
hurt some firms in the long-term (Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda, 2015). From a policy
perspective, this points to new forms of market failures with regard to Open Access
among competitors. In contrast to telecommunications infrastructure markets, where
exclusion was the traditional concern, here, negative consequences on competition may
result from voluntary or discriminatory access agreements. In the spirit of this thesis,
policy proposals should thus be informed by microfounded theory and be subject to
empirical examination in the designated context of application prior to implementa-






Let the relevant industry consist of n 2 N firms. Each firm produces one good and
goods between firms are differentiated. Considering the representative consumer’s
utility function suggested by Singh and Vives (1984) and extending the generalization
by Häckner (2000), inverse demand for firm k 2 {1, ...,n} is given by
pk = wk   lkqk   g Â
j 6=k
qj
with wk,lk > 0,8k 2 {1, ...,n} and the degree of substitutability g. If g < 0 goods are
complementary, if g = 0 goods are independent of one another, and if g > 0 they are
substitutes. wk may be interpreted as quality and thus, differences among firms as
vertical differentiation. With substitute goods, wk is also firm k’s reservation price. lk
is the elasticity of inverse demand of firm k’s good. For simplicity, assume that lk =
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l,8k 2 {1, ...,n} and let q = g
l
. This bounds q  1 with goods being perfect substitutes
if q = 1. The inverse demand for firm k then transforms to
(A.1) pk = wk   l
 





Note that firms are vertically differentiated, i.e., asymmetric, and that symmetry re-
quires wk = w,8k 2 {1, ...,n}. To calculate the demand for firm k, summarize Equation












































and using Equation (A.1), firm k’s demand for non-perfect substitutes (q < 1) is given
by
(A.3) qk =
(wk   pk)(1 + q(n   2))  q Âj 6=k(wj   pj)
l(1   q)(1 + q(n   1))
provided that the quantity is non-negative and with n as the number of firms with




With costs normalized to zero and q k = {q1, ...,qn} \ qk, firm k’s profit is given by
Pk = pkqk with price pk(qk,q k) as a function of quantities in Cournot competition and
quantity qk(pk, p k) as a function of prices in Bertrand competition. In the following
analysis of Walrasian, Nash, and collusive equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits,
subscripts are used to differentiate between Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Walrasian equilibrium In the Walrasian equilibrium, also referred to as competitive
equilibrium, firms are assumed to have no market power and hence, are price-takers
with all prices at marginal cost. Therefore, the Walrasian equilibrium is identical under
Bertrand and Cournot competition. Setting Equation (A.1) to marginal cost, i.e., zero, it
can be transformed to
qk(q k) =
wk   lq Âj 6=k qj
l
.





Ânk=1 wk   lq(n   1)Ânk=1 qk
l
,
which, using the previous Equation together with Equation (A.2), yields the Walrasian
equilibrium
qWalrask =
wk(1 + q(n   2))  q Âj 6=k wj




Nash equilibrium In the Nash equilibrium under Cournot competition firm k maxi-
mizes Pk with respect to its quantity qk given the other firms’ quantities q k. Firm k’s
best response is given by
qk(q k) =
wk   lq Âj 6=k qj
2l
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Ânk=1 wk   lq(n   1)Ânk=1 qk
2l
.
Using the previous Equation together with Equation (A.2), the Cournot Nash equilib-
rium can be retrieved as
qNashCournot,k =
wk(2 + q(n   2))  q Âj 6=k wj
l(2   q)(2 + q(n   1)) ,
pNashCournot,k =
wk(2 + q(n   2))  q Âj 6=k wj
(2   q)(2 + q(n   1)) ,
PNashCournot,k =
(wk(2 + q(n   2))  q Âj 6=k wj)2
l(2   q)2(2 + q(n   1))2 .
(A.5)
In the Nash equilibrium under Bertrand competition firm k maximizes Pk with respect






q Âj 6=k(wj   pj)
2(1 + q(n   2)) .







  q(n   1)Â
n
k=1(wk   pk)
2(1 + q(n   2)) ,
which can be transformed using the previous Equation together with Equation (A.2) to
retrieve the Bertrand Nash equilibrium
qNashBertrand,k =
(1 + q(n   2))(wk(q2(n2   5n + 5) + 3q(n   2) + 2)  q(1 + q(n   2))Âj 6=k wj)
l(1   q)(1 + q(n   1))(2 + q(n   3))(2 + q(2n   3)) ,
pNashBertrand,k =
wk(q2(n2   5n + 5) + 3q(n   2) + 2)  q(1 + q(n   2))Âj 6=k wj
(1 + q(n   1))(2 + q(n   3))(2 + q(2n   3)) ,
PNashBertrand,k =
(1 + q(n   2))(wk(q2(n2   5n + 5) + 3q(n   2) + 2)  q(1 + q(n   2))Âj 6=k wj)2




As Häckner (2000) shows, Nash prices are always higher under Cournot competition
than under Bertrand competition for substitute goods (q > 0). Instead, if goods are
complements (q < 0) and vertical differentiation between firms is high, Nash prices
of low-quality firms may be higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot
competition. With respect to profits there are different nuances. For complementary
goods, Nash profits are always higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot
competition. Instead, if goods are substitutes, the opposite holds unless vertical differ-
entiation between firms is low, when Nash profits of high-quality firms may be higher
under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.
Collusive equilibrium In the collusive equilibrium firms employ JPM, i.e., firms be-
have like a single monopolist and maximize Ânk=1 Pk. Therefore, the collusive equilib-
rium is identical under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Using Equation (A.1) and




















Noting that ∂ Â
n
k=1(qk Âj 6=k qj)
∂qk
= 2Âj 6=k qj, the first-order condition of JPM can be calculated
as
qk(q k) =
wk   2lq Âj 6=k qj
2l
.
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which finally yields the collusive equilibrium using the previous Equation and Equa-
tion (A.2) as
qJPM =
wk(1 + q(n   2))  q Âj 6=k wj






wk(wk(1 + q(n   2))  q Âj 6=i wj)
4l(1   q)(1 + q(n   1)) .
(A.7)
Note that JPM prices are linearly connected to vertical differentiation as firm k’s price
in collusive equilibrium depends solely on its own quality.
Symmetric firms In case of symmetric firms without vertical product differentiation,
i.e., wk = w,8k 2 {1, ..., N}, k’s demand function, i.e., Equation (A.3), simplifies to
qk =
(w   pk)(1 + q(n   2))  q Âj 6=k(w   pj)
l(1   q)(1 + q(n   1))
=
w
l(1 + q(n   1))| {z }
G
  1 + q(n   2)








= G   Lpk + Q
Âj 6=k qj
n   1
with G,L,Q > 0 for substitute goods (q > 0). Consequently, the Walrasian equilibrium
given by Equation (A.4), which predicts marginal cost pricing, simplifies to
qWalras =
w





In the Nash equilibrium under Cournot competition firm k maximizes Pk with respect
to qk. With symmetric firms, Equation (A.5) yields the Cournot Nash equilibrium
qNashCournot =
w
l(2 + q(n   1)) ,
pNashCournot =
w




l(2 + q(n   1))2 .
In the Nash equilibrium under Bertrand competition firm k maximizes Pk with respect
to pk. With symmetric firms and Equation (A.6), the Bertrand Nash equilibrium is given
by
qNashBertrand =
w(1 + q(n   2))
l(2 + q(n   3))(1 + q(n   1)) ,
pNashBertrand =
w(1   q)
2 + q(n   3) ,
PNashBertrand =
w
2(1   q)(1 + q(n   2))
l(2 + q(n   3))2(1 + q(n   1)) .
Finally, in the collusive equilibrium, with firms employing JPM and irrespective of
Bertrand or Cournot competition, Equation (A.7) simplifies to
qJPM =
w








4l(1 + q(n   1)) .
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Parameterized and scaled theoretical benchmarks
TABLE A.1: Scaled theoretical benchmarks of oligopoly competition for each treatment with





























































TABLE A.2: Scaled theoretical benchmarks of oligopoly competition for the asymmetric








































TABLE A.3: Nash predictions pNash as measured by Walrasian-based degree of tacit collusion
j
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A.2 Margin squeeze regulation
Retail demand for firm k 2 {A, B, D} in case of n = 3 active firms according to Shubik




· (1   pk   g · (pk  
pA + pB + pD
3
).
Assume w.l.o.g. that Firm A is the single wholesale access provider to the retailer
Firm D. Firms’ profits are then given by
pA = pA · qA(pA, pB, pD) + a · qD(pA, pB, pD),
pB = pB · qB(pA, pB, pD),
pD = (pD   a) · qD(pA, pB, pD).
Three-stage model with a competitive fringe The subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
are determined through backward induction. Under NR, in Stage 3, Firm D’s first order
condition ∂pD














22ag4 + 101ag3 + 150ag2 + 95g3 + 72ag + 384g2 + 504g + 216
57g4 + 428g3 + 1092g2 + 1152g + 432
,
pNRB =
16ag4 + 64ag3 + 84ag2 + 95g3 + 36ag + 384g2 + 504g + 216
57g4 + 428g3 + 1092g2 + 1152g + 432
.
In Stage 1, Firm A chooses the wholesale price aNR anticipating its competitors’ best











49g4 + 336g3 + 828g2 + 864g + 324
  
19g2 + 54g + 36
 
973g7 + 17071g6 + 111816g5 + 370476g4 + 686880g3 + 723168g2 + 404352g + 93312
.
236
A.2 Margin squeeze regulation
Simple plugging in of equilibrium prices gives equilibrium retail demands and equilib-
rium profits dependent on g. For the sake of brevity, the algebraic expressions are not
denoted here, but can be found in the online appendix. Testing for the margin squeeze
condition
D = pNRA   aNR
=  
g
2  665g4 + 3543g3 + 6984g2 + 6048g + 1944
 
973g7 + 17071g6 + 111816g5 + 370476g4 + 686880g3 + 723168g2 + 404352g + 93312
shows that D < 0 for g > 0 and thus, Firm A engages in a margin squeeze if retail goods





399g7 + 9893g6 + 67488g5 + 218268g4 + 388368g3 + 391392g2 + 209952g + 46656
973g7 + 17071g6 + 111816g5 + 370476g4 + 686880g3 + 723168g2 + 404352g + 93312
as Firm A does not find it profitable to foreclose its downstream competitor, which is
shown in the following.
Foreclosure occurs if Firm A’s wholesale price is so high compared to retail prices such
that Firm D is unable to set a retail price that would yield a positive profit. Then, Firm D




(1   pi  
g
(3 + 2g)
(2   (pA + pB))
as integrated firm i’s retail demand (Höffler, 2008). Profit-maximization of integrated
firms in case of foreclosure yields equilibrium profits pForeclosurei (g). Figure A.1 depicts
the difference of equilibrium profits pForeclosurei   pNRi for both integrated firms. Irre-
spective of the degree of differentiation, for substitute goods, i.e., g > 0, Firm B seeks
foreclosure due to higher downstream profits, but Firm A does not. Instead, the Firm A
benefits from a viable wholesale offer to Firm D and thus has no incentive to foreclose
its competitor even in the absence of regulation.
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FIGURE A.1: Comparison of profits in the case of (non-)foreclosure under NR.
Under MSR, in Stage 2, Firm A is constrained in its retail price setting by the require-
ment that D   0. Because it prefers to engage in a margin squeeze under NR, the margin
squeeze condition is binding and pMSRA = a









equilibrium retail demands and equilibrium profits can be obtained by simple compu-
tations.
Two-stage model with simultaneous retail pricing The initial three-stage game is re-
duced to a two-stage game in which all three firms choose retail prices simultaneously.





5ag2 + 9ag + 15g + 18





ag2 + ag + 5g + 6





7ag2 + 21ag + 18a + 15g + 18
5g2 + 21g + 18
.
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Anticipating these retail prices, Firm A chooses the profit-maximizing wholesale
price
aNR =
3(25g3 + 120g2 + 198g + 108)
20g4 + 249g3 + 909g2 + 1296g + 648
.
If instead, Firm A does not make a viable wholesale offer but decides to foreclose
Firm D, integrated firms’ profits are given by pForeclosurei (g) as obtained for the pre-
vious three-stage model. Solving pForeclosureA > p
NR
A for the degree of substitutability
yields g > 26.77 =: g, i.e., Firm A benefits from foreclosure if retail goods are close sub-
stitutes (see Figure A.2). Therefore, as noted by Atiyas et al. (2015) and Bourreau et al.
(2011), foreclosure is the unique equilibrium outcome for g > g. Otherwise, Firm A
makes a viable wholesale offer and all three firms participate in the downstream mar-
ket in equilibrium.
FIGURE A.2: Comparison of Firm A’s profit in the case of (non-)foreclosure under NR.
While in case of foreclosure Firm A’s price structure clearly violates the margin squeeze
constraint, an additional analysis is warranted for g  g. Testing for the margin squeeze
condition





5g2   9g   18
 
20g4 + 249g3 + 909g2 + 1296g + 648
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demonstrates that D < 0 for g > 3 so that only for strongly differentiated goods, i.e.,
g 2 [0,3], the margin squeeze condition is not binding. Therefore, under MSR, in Stage
2 Firm A sets pMSRA = a





7ag2 + 9ag + 15g + 18





13ag2 + 30ag + 18a + 15g + 18
5g2 + 16g + 12
.






Two-stage model with simultaneous retail quantity competition In order to exam-
ine the effect of MSR in case of retail quantity competition, a two-stage game that is
similar to the one detailed above is considered with the exception that firms choose
quantities in Stage 2 and compete according to the demand structure suggested by
Singh and Vives (1984). Following the generalization by Häckner (2000) for more than
two firms, inverse retail demand of firm k 2 {A, B, D} in the case of symmetric com-
petitors is given by
pk = w   l
 




with w,l > 0 and q as a standardized measure of substitutability (see Appendix A.1).
Here only the case of q 2 [0,1] is considered. For ease of illustration, let w = 100 and
l = 1.




aq   100q + 200
q




aq + 2a + 100q   200
q
2   q   2 ,
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where i 2 {A, B}. In Stage 1, Firm A anticipates these decisions and sets
aNR =  100(q
3   4q2 + 2q + 4)
2q3 + 3q2   8q   8 .
In order to identify whether Firm A engages in a margin squeeze, Firm A’s retail price
pNRA that arises from all firms’ quantity decisions is calculated and then
D = pNRA   aNR =
50q
 
2q2   5q + 2
 
2q3 + 3q2   8q   8
is determined to test the margin squeeze condition, for which D < 0 if q 2 (0,0.5). There-
fore, Firm A engages in a margin squeeze for rather differentiated goods.
Plugging in equilibrium quantities and the optimal wholesale price yields equilib-
rium profits pNRk , which are now compared to the case of foreclosure which ensues
profits pForeclosurei (q). Provided that Firm D is foreclosed, the integrated firms choose
qForeclosurei =
100




A   pNRA =
2500(q4 + 4q3   4q2   16q + 16)




B   pNRB =
2500q
 
7q5 + 24q4   36q3   128q2 + 48q + 128
 
(q + 2)2 (2q3 + 3q2   8q   8)2
,
where pForeclosureA  pNRA < 0 and pForeclosureB  pNRB > 0 for all q 2 [0,1]. Hence, in analogy
to the two-stage price competition model, Firm B prefers foreclosure, whereas Firm A
benefits from making Firm D a viable wholesale offer.
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Under MSR, in Stage 2, constrained pricing of Firm A and simultaneous profit maxi-
mization by its competitors yields retail quantities
qMSRA =
2(a + 50q   100)
2q2   q   2 ,
qMSRB =  
2aq2   3aq   100q2 + 300q   200
(q   2) (2q2   q   2) ,
qMSRD =
2(aq + 50q2   a   150q + 100)
(q   2) (2q2   q   2) .
In Stage 1, Firm A sets aMSR =  25q + 50. Ensuing prices and profits allow to com-
pute consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus as in the main analysis.
Figure A.3 depicts the effect of MSR relative to NR for these welfare measures. The
implications are similar to the investigated three-stage price competition model: while
MSR is to consumers’ detriment, producers benefit from it. Because the former effect
outweighs the latter, total surplus is unambiguously lower under MSR than NR.




The market structure and retail demand is identical to the previous analysis of infras-
tructure competition under margin squeeze regulation in Appendix A.2. Thus, retail




· (1   pk   g · (pk  
pA + pB + pD
3
),




· (1   pk  
g
(3 + 2g)
· (2   (pA + pB)).
In the following, let g = 30. Assume w.l.o.g. that Firm A provides wholesale access to
the retailer Firm D. This yields profits
pA = pA · qA(pA, pB, pD) + a · qD(pA, pB, pD),
pB = pB · qB(pA, pB, pD),
pD = (pD   a) · qD(pA, pB, pD).
In the following, Nash predictions are calculated for the market scenarios: (i) wholesale
monopoly under no regulation, (ii) wholesale monopoly under margin squeeze regu-
lation, (iii) wholesale competition under no regulation, and (iv) wholesale competition
under margin squeeze regulation, each for all four timing models as described in Sub-
section 5.2.1. For the sequential-move Timing Models (1), (2), and (4) subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria are determined through backward induction. In order to facilitate the
comparison of theoretical predictions and experimental results, final prices and profits
are scaled as in the experiment. Note that scaling affects only the output, but calcula-
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tions are based on the original Shubik and Levitan (1980) values. Price (profit) values
are multiplied by factor q = 100/0.15 (Q = 400) to obtain scaled values.
Timing Model (1): Under a wholesale monopoly, in stage II, two (integrated) or three
firms may operate in the retail market depending on the wholesale price chosen in stage
I. In stage II, in case of foreclosure, i.e., qD = 0, integrated firms’ profit-maximizing
prices are given by pForeclosureA = p
Foreclosure





B = 15.04. Instead, in case there is a viable wholesale offer, firms choose re-

















In stage I, anticipating retail prices, Firm A chooses the monopolistic wholesale price
aTriopoly = 66.36. Ensuing retail prices are given by pTriopolyA = 61.05, p
Triopoly
B = 48.29, and
pTriopolyD = 75.08 and profits by p
Triopoly
A = 14.97, p
Triopoly
B = 14.69, and p
Triopoly
D = 0.48.
Comparing pForeclosureA to p
Triopoly
A , Firm A prefers the foreclosure outcome and thus sets
a wholesale price aForeclosure 2 (93.19,100], which forces the retailer to exit the retail mar-
ket.
Taking into account margin squeeze regulation, foreclosure is ruled out as a valid mar-
ket outcome and therefore does not constitute an equilibrium. However, as aTriopolyA >
pTriopolyA , Firm A would violate the margin squeeze condition if it could set its prices
freely. Instead, Firm A is required to maximize its profit pA subject to the condition
aA  pA in stage II, while the other firms maximize profits unconstrained. This yields












832 a). In stage I, Firm A sets the
monopoly wholesale price to aMSRA = 66.16 and corresponding retail prices are given by
pMSRA = 66.16, p
MSR
B = 49.86, and p
MSR
D = 76.57 with profits p
MSR
A = 15.09, p
MSR
B = 15.66,
and pMSRD = 0.68.
Considering unregulated wholesale competition, two equilibria emerge, namely a com-
petitive and a foreclosure type. Atiyas et al. (2015) show that for g > 26.77 (and ob-
servable wholesale contracts) the foreclosure outcome constitutes an additional Nash
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TABLE A.4: Theoretical predictions for Timing Model (1).
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation
Wholesale monopoly aA = 100.00 aA = 66.19
pA = 55.56 pA = 66.19
pB = 55.56 pB = 49.86
pD = 100.00 pD = 76.57
Wholesale competition aA = aB = 100.00 aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = 55.56 pA = pB = pD = 30.30
pD = 100.00
or:
aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = pD = 30.30
equilibrium next to the competitive outcome. As shown for the case of a wholesale
monopoly, an integrated firm does not find it profitable to deviate from the state of coor-
dinated foreclosure in the wholesale market, because wholesale profits are outweighed
by the retailer’s business stealing effect in the retail market, even at the monopoly
price. Moreover, given the nonviable wholesale offers, no firm k has an incentive to
deviate from its foreclosure price pForeclosurek . In contrast, as shown by Bourreau et al.
(2012b), if a firm is required to make a viable wholesale offer, integrated firms al-
ways find it profitable to undercut their rival in the wholesale market for g < 40.97.
Once wholesale prices are driven to zero, i.e., aCompetitiveA = a
Competitive
B = 0, firms can-
not unilaterally increase the wholesale price profitably. Thus the competitive outcome
aCompetitiveA = a
Competitive
B = 0 with ensuing retail prices p
Competitive
k = 30.30 and profits
p
Competitive
k = 5.79, 8k 2 {A, B, D}, constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Whereas in the case of no regulation two types of equilibria coexist, the competitive
equilibrium is unique in the case of wholesale competition under margin squeeze reg-
ulation. Integrated firms are now unable to foreclose the retailer, due to the margin
squeeze condition, while the Bertrand logic applies as described above for the unregu-
lated case. These results are summarized in Table A.4.
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Timing Model (2): In stage III, the retailer’s optimal price as a follower is given by







all scenarios. Anticipating the retailer’s reaction, integrated firms’ simultaneous (un-
constrained) profit-maximization in stage II yields pA = q( 13261 +
5320




In the monopoly case, Firm A maximizes its profit by setting its wholesale price to
aA = 67.39 in stage I. Ensuing retail prices are given by p
Triopoly
A = 56.94, p
Triopoly
B =
50.14, and pTriopolyD = 75.07 and firms make profits p
Triopoly
A = 15.61, p
Triopoly
B = 14.05,
and pTriopolyD = 0.37. Note that under this timing model p
Triopoly
A exceeds the foreclo-
sure profit pForeclosureA , because Firm A internalizes the retailer’s reaction to its own
prices. Therefore, Firm A finds it always profitable to make a viable wholesale offer
to Firm D.
Although foreclosure does not constitute an equilibrium under no regulation, Nash
prices of Firm A still violate the margin squeeze condition. Taking into account
this condition, constrained maximization of Firm A’s profit in stage II yields prices






782 a). The optimal wholesale price in stage I is given by
aMSR = 70.14 and respective retail prices are pMSRA = 70.14, p
MSR
B = 54.90, p
MSR
D = 80.72.
Firms’ profits amount to pMSRA = 16.24, p
MSR
B = 16.84, and p
MSR
D = 0.70. Note that
margin squeeze regulation leads to unambiguously higher prices and increased profits
compared to the no regulation outcome, given this timing model.
In the case of wholesale competition, the Bertrand logic, as laid out in Timing Model (1),
applies equally with regard to the integrated firms’ behavior in stage I. Moreover, the
competitive outcome is unique, because one of the integrated firms will always find




TABLE A.5: Theoretical predictions for Timing Model (2).
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation
Wholesale monopoly aA = 67.39 aA = 70.14
pA = 56.94 pA = 70.14
pB = 50.15 pB = 54.90
pD = 75.07 pD = 80.72
Wholesale competition aA = aB = 0.00 aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = pD = 30.30 pA = pB = pD = 30.30
Given the theoretical prediction, margin squeeze regulation does not affect the market
outcome under wholesale competition in Timing Model (2), because equilibrium prices
in the unregulated outcome do not violate the margin squeeze constraint. See Table A.5
for a summary of results.
Timing Model (3): In the case of an unregulated monopolistic wholesale provider, si-
multaneous setting of all prices (wholesale and retail) leads to foreclosure as the unique
equilibrium. Consider, in contrast, a situation in which Firm D makes positive profit,
i.e., aA < pD. Obviously, Firm A can then increase its profit by setting aA = pD. How-
ever, Firm D would in turn increase its retail price pD as long as it is able to obtain a
positive demand (qD > 0). Consequently, this reverse Bertrand logic gives rise to fore-
closure as the unique equilibrium.
In the case of margin squeeze regulation, Firm A solves ∂pA
∂pA
= 0 and ∂pA
∂aA
= 0 simulta-
neously subject to the constraint aA  pA, while Firm B and Firm D solve first order
conditions ∂pB
∂pB = 0 and
∂pD





pMSRB = 50.49, and p
MSR
D = 77.80 leading to profits p
MSR
A = 15.08, p
MSR




If both integrated firms are active in the wholesale market, the same rationale as un-
der Timing Model (1) applies, i.e., the competitive as well as the foreclosure outcome
constitute an equilibrium. On the one hand, if both firms choose a wholesale price that
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TABLE A.6: Theoretical predictions for Timing Model (3).
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation
Wholesale monopoly aA = 100.00 aA = 67.61
pA = 55.56 pA = 67.61
pB = 55.56 pB = 50.49
pD = 100.00 pD = 77.80
Wholesale competition aA = aB = 100.00 aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = 55.56 pA = pB = pD = 30.30
pD = 100.00
or:
aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = pD = 30.30
forecloses Firm D, there is no unilateral deviation that increases an integrated firm’s
profit, because the business stealing effect outweighs the wholesale revenue effect. On
the other hand, in the case of the competitive outcome, an integrated firm is unable to
establish the foreclosure outcome unilaterally.
If wholesale competition is combined with margin squeeze regulation, the foreclosure
equilibrium disappears—as under Timing Model (1)—and the competitive outcome
constitutes the unique equilibrium. These results are summarized in Table A.6.
Timing Model (4): Like in Timing Model (2), the retailer as a follower maximizes
its profit given the previously set wholesale price(s) and retail prices of the integrated






2 a). In stage I, integrated firms maximize profits simultaneously taking
into account the reaction by Firm D in stage II. Optimal prices are given by aTriopolyA =
pTriopolyA = 51.25, p
Triopoly
B = 46.09, and consequently p
Triopoly
D = 64.67. Accordingly, firms
obtain profits pTriopolyA = 15.07, p
Triopoly
B = 11.86, and p
Triopoly
D = 1.14. Again, considering
the retailer as a follower allows the integrated firms to internalize Firm D’s reaction to
their own prices which makes foreclosure relatively less profitable.
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TABLE A.7: Theoretical predictions for Timing Model (4).
No regulation Margin squeeze regulation
Wholesale monopoly aA = 51.25 aA = 51.25
pA = 51.25 pA = 51.25
pB = 46.09 pB = 46.09
pD = 64.68 pD = 64.68
Wholesale competition aA = aB = 0.00 aA = aB = 0.00
pA = pB = pD = 30.30 pA = pB = pD = 30.30
The margin squeeze condition is non-binding, because Firm A’s equilibrium prices in
the case of an unregulated wholesale monopoly do not constitute a margin squeeze.
Therefore, the theoretical prediction is the same as under an unregulated wholesale
monopoly.
Having ruled out foreclosure as an equilibrium in the case of a wholesale monopoly, the
same rationale holds under unregulated wholesale competition, because an integrated
firm has always an incentive to deviate in the upstream market and charge the monop-
olistic wholesale price. Thus, as argued above, the competitive outcome remains as the
unique equilibrium.
In consequence, under wholesale competition the margin squeeze regulation does
not affect the theoretical prediction and the outcome is identical to the unregulated
wholesale competition scenario, i.e., aCompetitiveA = a
Competitive
B = 0, p
Competitive
k = 30.30, and
p
Competitive
k = 5.79, 8k 2 {A, B, D}. See Table A.7 for a summary of results.
A.4 Coopetition in online advertising markets
Prices and profits of special-interest CP given social login adoption decisions
Scenario (b,b) – None of the CPs adopts the social login: In this case market shares are
given by DbA = D
b
B = 1/2 and equilibrium profits, which equal equilibrium prices,
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are obtained by simultaneously solving (7.3) and (7.4). Note that neG(s)(D
b
s ,d,aG(s)) ⌘
nG(s)(Dbs ,d,0,aG(s)) and nes(Dbs ,d,as) = ns(Dbs ,d,as,0), i.e. view-throughs under exclu-
sive advertising can be calculated by assuming a rival CP with targeting rate a = 0.
Thus, for the base scenario (b,b), conditions (7.3) and (7.4) can be stated as
nG(s)(Dbs ,d,as,aG(s))  Pb,bG + ns(D
b
s ,d,as,aG(s))  Pb,bs = neG(s)(D
b
s ,d,aG(s))  Pb,bG
nG(s)(Dbs ,d,as,aG(s))  Pb,bG + ns(D
b
s ,d,as,aG(s))  Pb,bs = nes(Dbs ,d,as)  Pb,bs .








s · (2 (1   abG) + d (2abG   as)).
Scenario (l,b) – CP s adopts the social login, but its rival does not: If CP s adopts the social
login, but its special-interest rival  s does not, it gains a relative advantage with regard
to the base utility that users derive from consuming its services, i.e. uls = ub + q with
q   0. In consequence, it is able to increase its market share, as demand is now given by




2t . Moreover, CP s’s targeting
rate is increased to als = min{fsabs ,1} with fs   1. On the other hand, adoption of
the social login also increases the targeting rate of CP G for the mass of consumers
that consume services of CP s, i.e. alG(s) = min{fGa
b
G(s),1} with fG   1. Note that the
targeting rate of CP G with respect to users that consume services of the rival CP  s is
unaffected, i.e. alG( s) = a
b
G. Solving (7.3) and (7.4) analogous to scenario (b,b) yields










2   d als   2alG (1   d)
 
.
Scenario (b,l) – CP s does not adopt the social loing, but its rival does: This case is symmetric
to case (l,b), but CP s is now put at a disadvantage with regard to competition between
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the special-interest outlets as its rival benefits from consumers’ increased valuation for
its services due to the adoption of the social login. Whereas this diminishes its mar-
ket share to Dls = t q2t , its own advertising rate together with the targeting rate of the





s and alG(s) = a
b











2 (1   abG)  d (abs   2abG)
 
.
Note that Pb,ls is symmetric to Pl,bs with regard to the market share t+q2t , given that
targeting rates differ by the factor fk.
Scenario (l,l) – Both CPs adopt the social login: If both CPs adopt the social login, users of
both outlets benefit from an increased base utility when consuming the services of their
respective CP, i.e., uls = ub + q. However, due to symmetry, CPs do not gain any com-
petitive advantage and the surplus is appropriated exclusively by consumers. Thus,
market shares are symmetric and identical to the base scenario (b,b), Dls = Dbs = 12 .









G(s). Solving (7.3) and (7.4) analo-








s · (2 (1   alG) + d (2alG   als)).
Prices and profits of the general-interest CP given social login adoption
decisions
Scenario (b,b) – None of the CPs adopts the social login: If none of the CPs adopts the
social login, the targeting rates that determine the general-interest CP’s advertising
profit are given by the initial and symmetric targeting rates of special-interest CPs A
251
Appendix A Theoretical Analyses











G for users of both CP A and B. Solving (7.3) and (7.4) as shown for
the profit-maximization of special-interest CPs yields CP G’s equilibrium price of
pb,bG(s) = a
b











resulting in an equilibrium profit of Pb,bG = 2p
b,b
G(s).
Scenarios (l,b) and (b,l) – One CP adopts the login, the rival does not: If one special-interest
CP adopts the social login, assume CP A, whereas the other special-interest CP does
not, assume CP B, targeting rates are asymmetrically affected by the social login. The
mass of users DA, i.e., users that choose to visit CP A, can now be targeted at both out-
lets CP A and CP G with targeting rates aA = alA = fsa
b
s and aG(A) = alG(A) = fGa
b
G(s),
respectively. In contrast, the targeting ability does not change with regard to DB, i.e.,
users that choose to visit CP B. Thus CP B and CP G can target these users accord-
ing to their initial targeting rates aB = abs and aG(B) = abG(s), respectively. Solving (7.3)












G(t   q)((abG   2abs )d   abG + 2)(d   1)
2t
,








G (d   1) ( 
1
2
(d   1) (f2G t + f2G q + t   q)abG + ((fs fG + 1)t+
q (fs fG   1))abs d + t( fG   1)t   q (fG   1)).
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Scenario (l,l) – Both CPs adopt the social login: If both special-interest CPs adopt the social
login, targeting rates are again symmetric with regard to CP A and CP B, but are now
increased by fs for special-interest CPs and fG for the general-interest CP, respectively.





G(s). Solving (7.3) and (7.4) as shown for the profit-maximization of special-
interest CPs yields CP G’s equilibrium price of














Critical threshold for adoption of the social login (CP s): Given CP s’s rationale to
adopt the login Dl,b b,b = Pl,bs   Pb,bs > 0, comparative statics with respect to the exoge-
nous model parameters demonstrate the following effects.










((fG fs   1)t + q fG fs)(d   1)d abs
 
< 0.
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d (( abs fs2d + (d fG abG(s)   fG a
b
G(s) + 1)fs
+ ( abG(s) + a
b
s )d + a
b
G(s)   1)t + q fs (d fG a
b
G(s)   fs a
b
s d   fG abG(s) + 1))
 
< 0.




= 0 and reorder with respect to
a
b
G(s). As it is assumed that a
b








zeroing. It is easy to show that the effect of d on abG(s),0 is positive. Therefore, d = 0 is
used to calculate a lower bound for abG(s),0. As a
l
G(s) < 1, solving a
b
G(s),0   1/fG = 0 with
respect to t yields the unique solution t = 0. Any t > 0 yields abG(s),0   1/fG > 0, which
contradicts the assumption alG(s) = a
b
G(s) · fG < 1.










s (t + q)(fG d a
b
G(s)   d a
b
s fs   fG abG(s) + 1)
 
> 0.










s (2fG d a
b
G(s)   d a
b











(( 1/2abs fs2d + (1/2 + fG (d   1/2)abG(s))fs + ( d + 1/2)a
b
G(s)





To show that the above condition is satisfied, solve ∂fs
∂d
= 0 and reorder with respect to












, which is always satisfied under the assumption fG > 1.
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Critical threshold for social login offer (CP G): Given CP G’s rationale to offer the
login Ul,l b,b = Pl,lG   P
b,b
G , comparative statics yield that parameters q and t do not
affect CP G’s profit. The effects of the remaining parameters are as follows.








2   fs fG abs + abs   abG(s))d   a
b
G(s) fG










. The effect is unambigu-
ously negative under the assumption fG > 1 , f2G   1 > 0.
CP G’s increase in targeting rate fG:
∂Ul,l b,b
∂fG
=  2 ((d   1)fG abG(s)   fs a
b
s d + 1) (d   1)abG(s) > 0.





= 2abG(s) (d   1) (fs fG   1)d < 0.




= 0 and reorder with respect to
a
b
G(s). Given the assumptions a
l
G(s) < 1 and fG > 1, it is easy to show that the unique
zeroing is outside of the relevant parameter range.
CP s’s increase in targeting rate fs:
∂Ul,l b,b
∂fs
= 2abG(s) (d   1)a
b
s d fG < 0.
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+ (1 + ( 2fs d + fs)abs )fG   1 + (2d   1)abs )abG(s) < 0.
The above condition is satisfied under the assumption fG > 1.
Critical threshold for profitability of the social login (CP s): Given CP s’s condition
for profitability Dl,l b,b = Pl,ls   Pb,bs , comparative statics yields similar effects to the
comparative statics on CP s’s rationale to adopt the login (with the exceptions of q and
t) as the threshold for profitability is a special case of the latter. Parameters q and t
do not have an impact on profitability. The effects of the remaining parameters are as
follows.





= abs d (fG fs   1)(d   1) < 0.
CP G’s increase in targeting rate fG:
∂Dl,l b,b
∂fG
= abG(s) (d   1)a
b
s fs d < 0.





= d ( abs fs2 + fG abG(s) fs + a
b
s   abG(s)d   fG a
b
G(s) fs + fs + a
b
G(s)   1) < 0.
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CP s’s increase in targeting rate fs:
∂Dl,l b,b
∂fs
= d abs (fG d a
b
G(s)   fs a
b















B.1 Oligopoly competition in continuous time
TABLE B.1: Average degrees of tacit collusion over the entire time horizon across treatments.







DB2 12 0.832 0.806 0.916 0.951
(0.249) (0.302) (0.124) (0.075)
DB3 12 0.605 0.611 0.737 0.827
(0.324) (0.301) (0.216) (0.134)
DC2 12 0.627 0.437 0.907 0.965
(0.550) (1.030) (0.138) (0.064)
DC3 12 0.397 0.249 0.759 0.880
(0.484) (0.702) (0.193) (0.112)
RB2 12 0.769 0.712 0.884 0.928
(0.343) (0.453) (0.172) (0.113)
RB3 11 0.539 0.491 0.693 0.774
(0.306) (0.324) (0.204) (0.144)
RC2 12 0.789 0.688 0.947 0.980
(0.259) (0.344) (0.065) (0.021)
RC3 13 0.386 0.186 0.754 0.870
(0.473) (0.745) (0.189) (0.119)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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B.2 Wholesale competition and Open Access regulation
Integrated firms’ profit under unregulated wholesale monopoly
In order to investigate the effect of the access provider role in the case of a wholesale
monopoly the following quantile regression is ran based on observations at the firm
level:
pijt = b0 + bPeriod · t + bFirm A · Firm A + eijt,
where pijt denotes the profit of integrated firm i in market cohort j and period t. The
dummy variable Firm A denotes whether the integrated firm represents the monopo-
listic wholesale provider.
TABLE B.2: Quantile regression of integrated firms’ profit pi in the case of a wholesale
monopoly.









Clustered standard errors (by market cohort) in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Margin squeeze regulation in the case of a wholesale monopoly
TABLE B.3: Quantile regression of wholesale market prices am, retail market prices ym, inte-
grated firms’ average profits pAB, retailer’s profits pD and consumer surplus fCS
in the case of a wholesale monopoly.
Baseline: Wholesale Monopoly & No Regulation (WM-NR).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am ym pAB pD fCS
Margin squeeze 8.286 9.928 2.661 0.165  0.083
regulation (15.569) (8.354) (1.786) (0.784) (0.083)
Period 0.006 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ >  0.001 >  0.001⇤
(0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 60.290⇤⇤⇤ 59.911⇤⇤⇤ 15.112⇤⇤⇤ 1.287⇤ 0.338⇤⇤⇤
(11.192) (7.423) (1.991) (0.703) (0.096)
Observations 55,200 55,200 55,200 55,200 55,200
Clustered standard errors (by market cohort) in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Pairwise treatment effects
TABLE B.4: Pairwise treatment effects on the wholesale market price am.
No Regulation Margin Squeeze Regulation
Wholesale Monopoly 73.573 ⇠ 72.572
^⇤ ⇠
Wholesale Competition 86.085 >⇤ 83.082
_⇤⇤⇤ _⇤⇤
WC /w Price Commitment 40.540 ⇠ 49.049
^⇤⇤⇤ ^⇤⇤
Wholesale Monopoly 73.573 72.572
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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TABLE B.5: Pairwise treatment effects on the retail market price ym.
No Regulation Margin Squeeze Regulation
Wholesale Monopoly 65.499 ⇠ 83.124
^⇤⇤ ^⇤⇤
Wholesale Competition 88.407 ⇠ 92.281
_⇤⇤⇤ _⇤⇤⇤
WC /w Price Commitment 49.560 <⇤ 67.415
^⇤⇤ ⇠
Wholesale Monopoly 65.499 83.124
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
TABLE B.6: Pairwise treatment effects on the average profit of integrated firms pAB.
No Regulation Margin Squeeze Regulation
Wholesale Monopoly 16.383 ⇠ 20.750
^⇤⇤ ⇠
Wholesale Competition 22.434 ⇠ 22.802
_⇤⇤⇤ _⇤⇤⇤
WC /w Price Commitment 12.243 <⇤ 15.866
^⇤⇤⇤ ⇠
Wholesale Monopoly 16.383 20.750
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
TABLE B.7: Pairwise treatment effects on the retailer’s profit pD.
No Regulation Margin Squeeze Regulation
Wholesale Monopoly 0.899 ⇠ 1.028
⇠ ^⇤⇤
Wholesale Competition 0.258 <⇤⇤⇤ 2.339
^⇤⇤⇤ ⇠
WC /w Price Commitment 2.491 ⇠ 2.322
⇠ _⇤⇤⇤
Wholesale Monopoly 0.899 1.028
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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TABLE B.8: Pairwise treatment effects on consumer surplus fCS.
No Regulation Margin Squeeze Regulation
Wholesale Monopoly 0.292 ⇠ 0.153
_⇤ _⇤⇤
Wholesale Competition 0.097 ⇠ 0.062
^⇤⇤⇤ ^⇤⇤⇤
WC /w Price Commitment 0.461 >⇤⇤ 0.298
_⇤⇤⇤ _⇤
Wholesale Monopoly 0.292 0.153
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Analysis based on mean values
TABLE B.9: Average market prices, profits and consumer surplus per treatment.
Treatment Markets N am ym pAB pD fCS
WM-NR 12 28,800 72.193 68.841 17.476 1.437 0.277
WC-MSR 11 26,400 72.368 74.253 18.808 1.366 0.230
WC-NR 9 21,600 76.960 78.092 19.611 1.441 0.197
WC-MSR 10 24,000 69.758 83.170 20.220 2.789 0.154
WCPC-NR 10 24,000 47.813 54.949 13.579 2.518 0.421
WCPC-MSR 12 28,800 52.429 67.187 16.277 3.165 0.306
Total 64 153,600 64.998 70.830 17.600 2.129 0.266
Averages are based on minutes [5,25] of the game phase.
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FIGURE B.1: Period averages of wholesale (dashed) and retail (solid) market prices. Graphs are



































































B.2 Wholesale competition and Open Access regulation
Linear regression of market performance indicators
Xjt = b0 + bPeriod · t + bWC · WC
+ bWCPC · WCPC
+ bMSR · MSR
+ bWCxMSR · WC · MSR
+ bWCPCxMSR · WCPC · MSR
+ ej,t
TABLE B.10: Linear regression of wholesale market prices am, retail market prices ym, inte-
grated firms’ average profits pAB, retailer’s profits pD and consumer surplus
fCS.
Baseline: Wholesale Monopoly under No Regulation (WM-NR).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Covariate am ym pAB pD fCS
Wholesale 4.768 9.251 2.135 0.004  0.080
Competition (WC) (9.504) (7.990) (2.075) (0.587) (0.074)
WC w/ Price -24.380⇤⇤⇤  13.892⇤  3.897⇤ 1.082⇤⇤⇤ 0.144⇤
Competition (WC) (9.130) (7.645) (1.973) (0.406) (0.073)
Margin Squeeze 0.175 5.412 1.333  0.071  0.047
Regulation (MSR) (8.100) (6.624) (1.692) (0.383) (0.062)
WC x MSR -7.377  0.334  0.724 1.419⇤ 0.004
(12.972) (10.884) (2.800) (0.755) (0.102)
WCPC x MSR 4.441 6.826 1.365 0.718  0.067
(12.501) (10.339) (2.668) (0.573) (0.099)
Period 0.004⇤⇤ 0.003⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ >  0.001 >  0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Constant 65.707⇤⇤⇤ 62.550⇤⇤⇤ 15.929⇤⇤⇤ 1.539⇤⇤⇤ 0.336⇤⇤⇤
(5.886) (4.647) (1.175) (0.344) (0.043)
Observations 153,600 153,600 153,600 153,600 153,600
Clustered standard errors (by market cohort) in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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B.3 Number effects and tacit collusion in oligopolies
Meta-regressions of tacit collusion in oligopoly experiments that vary the
number of competing firms
The use of multilevel regression models in meta-analyses has a shortcoming: The im-
plicit weights associated to each observation, i.e., each treatment in a study, are of equal
magnitude. However, each of these values stems from an experiment designed to pre-
dict a true effect. In other words, the averages of the degree of tacit collusion in each
treatment of a study (i.e., the sample means) used in the analysis here are estimators
of the true degree of tacit collusion (i.e., the population mean) in duopolies, triopolies,
and quadropolies, respectively. Consequently, one might argue that the standard error
of each sample mean should be considered as an indication of a sample mean’s reli-
ability. Meta-regression, a method vastly used in medical research (see, e.g., Higgins
and Thompson, 2002), does exactly this by using the within-treatment standard errors
as the standard deviations of the normal error terms in the model. More specifically,
a random-effects meta-regression model is estimated which allows for between-study
variance not explained by the covariates, i.e., the dummies for the number of firms.1
This yields a weighted regression in which the inverse of the sum of the estimated
between-study variance and the estimates’ within-treatment variances are the individ-
ual weights associated to each treatment.
Table B.11 depicts the estimates of meta-regression models with the same dependent
and independent variables as in the multilevel mixed-effects regressions. Note that
the number of observations in the meta-regressions is lower than in the correspond-
ing mixed-effects models, because standard errors of treatment averages could not be
1The estimates reported in Table B.11 are derived with the metareg command of the statistical software
package Stata in its version 12. See Harbord and Higgins (2008) for further information on the com-
mand.
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TABLE B.11: Meta-regression of tacit collusion on number of competitors and competition
model on the basis of most comparable treatments.












Baseline: Bertrand triopoly. Standard errors in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
gathered from all studies.2 For this reason, the treatment Easy in Bosch-Domènech and
Vriend (2003) cannot be considered in the meta-regressions.
Asymmetric market power and tacit collusion
Above and beyond number effects, asymmetry is expected to hinder coordination
among firms as most of the economic literature suggests that symmetry is a driver of
the ability to collude (see, e.g., Ivaldi et al., 2003; Fonseca and Normann, 2008). The
hypothesis is thus that the degrees of tacit collusion based on Nash as well as Wal-
rasian prices and profits are significantly lower in markets with asymmetric firms than
in markets with symmetric firms, everything else being equal.
Although there is only a single difference in the parametrization between each asymme-
try treatment and its symmetry counterpart, the necessary adjustment of D according to








































i=1 (x   x)
2 = 1xJPM xE SE(x) with N as the number of independent observations
for the corresponding treatment.
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TABLE B.12: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on (a)symmetry of
firms in triopolies.











Baseline: Symmetric Bertrand triopoly. Standard errors in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
the number of firms in the market impedes a simultaneous analysis of asymmetry and
the number of firms. In other words, the treatment dummy between asymmetric tri-
opolies and quadropolies is not the same as the one between symmetric triopolies and
quadropolies. Therefore, in order to assess the effect of the specific type of asymmetry
implemented here, i.e., providing a single firm with a 50% higher Nash profit than its
competitors, requires separate investigations of triopolies and quadropolies.
Tables B.12 and B.13 depict estimates of multilevel mixed-effects linear regression mod-
els of tacit collusion on symmetry and asymmetry of firms whilst controlling for het-




k,t = b0 + xk
+ bAsymmetry · Asymmetry
+ (bPeriod + bPeriod,k) · t
+ ek,t,
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TABLE B.13: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on (a)symmetry of
firms in quadropolies.











Baseline: Symmetric Bertrand quadropoly. Standard errors in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
in triopolies and quadropolies, respectively. For maximum comparability, only the
Bertrand treatments are included in the analysis for which there is data with both sym-
metric and asymmetric firms. In line with the hypothesis, the degree of tacit collu-
sion is 18 pp (13 pp) lower in quadropolies with asymmetric compared to symmetric
firms relative to the Nash (Walrasian) equilibrium. The degree of tacit collusion is not
significantly lower with asymmetry in triopolies, although the average effect size of
asymmetry is similar to the effect found for quadropolies. Given the lower number of
observations this points to a lack of statistical power in the analysis of triopolies.
Prominent theories of fairness and equity in the behavioral sciences (e.g., Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) suggest that cooperation is harder to sus-
tain in asymmetric than in symmetric games, which is in line with the finding here. In
an effort to assess whether social preferences in fact account for the effect of asymmetry
on tacit collusion, subjects’ social value orientation is measured using the Murphy et al.
(2011) questionnaire, which is filled out by every participant directly after the oligopoly
experiment at the end of a session, with the exception of one session with twelve partic-
ipants in May 2016. Remember that incumbent firms are provided with higher market
power than entrants in the asymmetry treatments. A comparison of the continuous so-
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cial value orientation index reveals no differences between incumbents and entrants or
subjects in triopolies and quadropolies. Among the four idealized social orientations
of altruistic, prosocial, individualistic, and competitive behavior, the average partici-
pant is on the verge of prosocial and individualistic behavior. This finding is further
corroborated in a categorical analysis which matches subjects to a single category. Ac-
cording to the classification, 43% of subjects are prosocials, 46% are individualists, and
none are altruists or of competitive type—the remaining 11% cannot be assigned due to
incomplete questionnaires. Again social orientations are not significantly different be-
tween subjects acting as firms of different types or participating in different treatments.
Furthermore, social value orientations are neither correlated with the degree of tacit
collusion connected to price decisions nor with subjects’ total profit in the experiment.
In sum, these findings suggest that social orientations cannot explain why asymmetric
firms collude less than symmetric firms.
The experimental evidence for quadropolies suggests that asymmetry fosters competi-
tion between firms in a market considerably and significantly. Put into context, the ef-
fect size of implementing asymmetry in a quadropoly by increasing the market power
of a single firm is comparable to the number effect on tacit collusion between markets
with two and three firms as well as between markets with three and four firms.
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Supplementary tables and figures
TABLE B.14: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions of tacit collusion on number of com-
petitors and competition model on the basis of all treatments.











Groups (s) 9 9
Groups (m) 10 10
Observations 23 23
Baseline: Bertrand triopoly. Standard errors in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
TABLE B.15: Inter-study average degrees of tacit collusion and one-tailed matched-samples
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the basis of all treatments.
Studies jNash jWalras
2 vs. 3
Duopoly 7 0.110 0.480
Triopoly 7  0.079 0.260
p value 7 0.009 0.009
2 vs. 4
Duopoly 6 0.302 0.452
Quadropoly 6 0.025 0.204
p value 6 0.014 0.014
3 vs. 4
Triopoly 3 0.035 0.196
Quadropoly 3 0.049 0.174
p value 3 0.946 0.500
271
Appendix B Statistical Analyses







0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 60





For each experiment, the instructions of only one exemplary treatment are reported in
the following. The instructions for the other treatments are identical except for text pas-
sages that describe the specifics of the particular treatment. Note that the experimen-
tal instructions are translated from German and are only translations for information;
they are not intended to be used in the lab. The instructions in the original language
are carefully polished in grammar, style, comprehensibility, and avoidance of strategic
guidance.
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C.1 Oligopoly competition in continuous time
The following experimental instructions have been used for the RB3 treatment.
Preliminary remarks
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation. In this
experiment you can earn an amount of money that depends on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Please address the person in charge of the experi-
ment in case of questions. Please do not talk to the other participants during the entire
experiment. Throughout the experiment we will use the currency Euro and its subunit
cent. The Euro that you will have earned by the end of the experiment will be paid to
you in cash.
Experimental structure




Each firm is represented by one participant of the experiment. Throughout the experi-
ment the same firms compete with each other. Which firm you represent is randomly
chosen at the beginning of the experiment. Each firm offers a good that is demanded
by consumers. There are no cost for producing these goods. You choose the price at
which you want to sell your good. The quantity demanded of your good is determined
by your price. Thereby, the following holds:
  The higher your price, the lower the quantity demanded of your good. Thereby, the
quantity demanded of your good can fall to zero.
  The higher a price of the other firms, the higher the quantity demanded of your good.
Thereby, only prices of firms selling a positive quantity are relevant.
Your profit is calculated by multiplying your price with the quantity demanded of your
good.
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Experimental procedure
The experiment is composed of two stages. At stage one you choose your initial price.
Before making the final decision, you can test how a price combination affects the quan-
tities and profits of all firms. After all firms made their final decision by pressing the
button “Finalize decision”, the second stage of the experiment begins. The second stage
lasts exactly 30 minutes. During this time all decisions are made in real-time and with-
out any interruptions. Your price decision is valid until you change your price. Every
decision of a firm is immediately visible for all other firms.
Software display
FIGURE C.1: Display of the experimental software.
Figure C.1 depicts the display of the experimental software. To distinguish the firms,
their information is colored as follows:
  Firm A: BLUE
  Firm B: GREEN
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  Firm C: ORANGE
In the following, the individual parts of the display will be explained bottom up.
Decision and testing environment
On the left side you can set your price by using the slider of the firm. Please be aware
that you can use all sliders during the first stage of the experiment and only the slider
of your own firm during the second stage. During the second stage the sliders show
the current prices of the other firms.
Prices
On the left side the history of all firms’ prices as well as the average price is visualized.
On the right side the current prices are displayed.
Quantities
On the left side the history of all firms’ quantities is visualized. On the right side the
current quantities are displayed.
Profits
On the left side the history of all firms’ profits is visualized. On the right side the current
profits are displayed. Please be aware that current profits are scaled to the profit you
would earn if the current combination of all prices would be held for 30 seconds. As
soon as one firm changes its price, the profits are recalculated. Your current profit is
added to your account proportionally several times per second.
Status of the experiment
On the left side it is displayed which firm you represent. Figure C.1 shows this for firm
A as an example. During the first stage there is a button “Finalize decision” in the mid-
dle of the display. Please press it when you are ready to finalize your decision. On the
right side your current account balance and the remaining duration of the experiment
is displayed. Your current account balance is the sum of all realized profits.
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Concluding remarks
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked some comprehension questions on the
screen with regard to the understanding of the rules and the course of the experiment.
Please enter the respective answers into your computer. Afterwards, the experiment
will start automatically and it will be displayed which firm you represent.
In case of any questions, please remain seated and give the person in charge of the
experiment a hand signal. Please wait until the person in charge of the experiment has
arrived at your seat. Talk as quietly as possible when asking your question. Please
remain seated after the end of the experiment as well and wait for further instructions
from the person in charge of the experiment.
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C.2 Wholesale competition and Open Access regulation
The following experimental instructions have been used for the WCPC   MSR treatment.
Preliminary remarks
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation.In this ex-
periment you can earn an amount of money that depends on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Please address the person in charge of the experi-
ment in case of questions. Please do not talk to the other participants during the entire
experiment. Throughout the experiment we will use the currency Euro and its subunits
cent. At the beginning of the experiment your account balance is EUR 5.00. At the end
of the experiment, the final account balance will be paid to you in cash.
During the experiment you represent a firm which is selling a good to consumers. Next
to you, there are two other firms which are competing with you. All your decisions
are made in real time, thus, they are immediately effective and visible to all other
firms. Over the entire time horizon of the experiment, you play together with the same
firms.
Experimental structure




Firm A and Firm B are represented by participants of the experiment. Firm C acts
computerized. Which firm you represent is randomly chosen at the beginning of the




Figure C.2 visualizes the structure of the experiment. Each of the three firms offers
a retail product on the retail market and chooses its retail price. In order to produce
the retail product each firm needs a wholesale product. Only Firm A and Firm B offer
the wholesale product in the wholesale market and choose their respective wholesale
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prices. Firm C has to buy the wholesale product from one of the two other firms in
order to be able to offer its retail product.

















The wholesale products of Firm A and Firm B are equal. Thereby, the following holds:
  Firm C chooses automatically the cheaper wholesale product to satisfy its demand.
  If Firm A and Firm B offer the identical wholesale price, Firm C chooses the wholesale
product from the firm which had previously offered the lower price.
  If Firm A and Firm B offer the identical wholesale price at the beginning, Firm C
chooses randomly from which firm it purchases the wholesale product.
There are no handling costs for the wholesale product. The prices of the wholesale
products range from 0 to 100.
Retail market
The retail products differ between firms. The demand of your retail product depends
on your retail price and the retail prices of the other firms. Thereby, the following holds
under the assumption that the other retail prices remain unchanged:
  If you increase your retail price, the demand of your retail product decreases.
  If one of the other firms increases its retail price, the demand of your retail products
increases.
  If all firms increase their retail price, the total demand of all retail products decreases.
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If your retail price is located below the average of all three retail prices, the demand of
your retail product increases. If your retail price is located above the average of all three
retail prices, the demand of your retail product decreases. The extent of the deviation of
your retail price from the average of all three retail prices determines the magnitude of
this effect. If your retail price is above the average of all three retail prices, the demand
of your retail product may fall to zero. Firm C chooses its profit-maximizing retail price
in reaction to the effective wholesale price and the retail prices chosen by Firm A and
Firm B.
There are no handling costs for the retail product. The prices of the retail products
range from 0 to 100.
Profits
The profits of the three firms depend on the retail and wholesale prices. The calculations
for the profits of Firm A and Firm B depend on Firm C’s decision which firm to choose
as its wholesale provider.
If Firm C chooses to purchase its wholesale product from Firm A, the following holds
for the profits of each firm:
Pro f itA = Retail PriceA · DemandA + Wholesale PriceA · DemandC
Pro f itB = Retail PriceB · DemandB
Pro f itC = (Retail PriceC   Wholesale priceA) · DemandC
If Firm C chooses to purchase its wholesale product from Firm B, the following holds
for the profits of each firm:
Pro f itA = Retail PriceA · DemandA
Pro f itB = Retail PriceB · DemandB + Wholesale PriceB · DemandC
Pro f itC = (Retail PriceC   Wholesale PriceB) · DemandC
Experimental procedure
The experiment is composed of two stages. At the first stage, as Firm A or Firm B, you
choose your initial retail price and your initial wholesale price. Before making your
final decision, you can test how a price combination affects the profits of all three firms.
This does not influence your account balance. After all firms have made their initial
price decision and have confirmed their decisions with a click on “apply initial prices”,
the second stage of the experiment starts.
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The second stage lasts exactly 30 minutes. During this period of time, all decisions are
made in real time and without any interruptions. Your price decision remains effective
until you change your price. Note that subsequent to a change of your wholesale price,
the price cannot be changed again for the next 30 seconds. Furthermore, please be
aware that your wholesale price can not be located above your retail price.
Software display
FIGURE C.3: Display of the experimental software.
Figure C.3 depicts the display of the exeriment software. In order to distinguish the
firms, their labels are colored as follows:
  Firm A: BLUE
  Firm B: GREEN
  Firm C: ORANGE
In the following, the individual sections of the display will be explained from the bot-
tom up:
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Experimental progress
On the left-hand side, it is denoted whether you represent Firm A or Firm B. The figure
illustrates this exemplarily for Firm A. On the right-hand side, your current account
balance as well as the remaining duration of the experiment is displayed. Your current
account balance consists of the initial balance of EUR 5.00 and the additionally earned
profits during the experiment.
Current profits and profit history
On the right-hand side, the current profits of all firms are displayed. Note that current
profits are scaled to the profit you would earn, if the current combination of all prices
would be held over the entire 30 minutes of the experiment. As soon as one of the
prices changes, the current profits are recalculated. On the left-hand side, the history of
the current profits is displayed.
Current prices and price history
On the right-hand side, the current prices of all three firms are displayed. The effective
wholesale price is always the lower wholesale price of both wholesale prices. On the
left-hand side, the history of your retail price, the average retail price of all three firms
and the effective wholesale price is displayed.
Wholesale prices and current profits in the wholesale market
On the left-hand side, Firm A and Firm B choose their wholesale prices. Be aware that
Firm C offers no wholesale product and thus cannot choose a wholesale price. The
wholesale price can be set with the corresponding slider by using the mouse or the
arrow keys on the keyboard. Note that you can move all sliders at the first stage of the
experiment and only the slider of your firm at the second stage of the experiment. The
sliders of the other firms show their current wholesale prices. On the right-hand side
the current profits in the wholesale market are displayed. Furthermore it is displayed
which firms sells its wholesale product to Firm C. Note that subsequent to a change
of your wholesale price, the price cannot be changed again for the next 30 seconds.
Furthermore, please be aware that your wholesale price can not be located above your
retail price.
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Retail prices and current profits in the retail market
On the left-hand side, all of the three firms choose their retail price. The retail price
can be set with the corresponding slider by using the mouse or the arrow keys on the
keyboard. Note that you can move all sliders at the first stage of the experiment and
only the slider of your firm at the second stage of the experiment. The sliders of the
other firms show their current retail prices. On the right-hand side, the current profits
in the retail market are displayed. Note that the displayed current profit of Firm C
already includes the costs for the wholesale product.
Concluding remarks
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked a set of comprehension questions, dis-
played on the computer screen, that cover the rules and the procedure of the experi-
ment. Please enter the respective answers. Thereupon, the experiment will start auto-
matically and it is displayed which firm you represent.
In case of any questions during the experiment, please remain seated and inform the
person in charge of the experiment by the means of a hand gesture. Please wait until the
person in charge of the experiment has arrived at your seat. Talk as quietly as possible
when asking your question. Please remain seated after the end of the experiment and
wait for further instructions from the person in charge of the experiment.
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C.3 Number effects and tacit collusion in oligopolies
The following experimental instructions have been used for the B4A treatment.
Preliminary remarks
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation. In this
experiment you can earn an amount of money that depends on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Please address the person in charge of the experi-
ment in case of questions. Please do not talk to the other participants during the entire
experiment. Throughout the experiment we will use the currency Euro and its subunit
cent. The Euro that you will have earned by the end of the experiment will be paid to
you in cash.
Experimental structure





Each firm is represented by one participant of the experiment. Throughout the experi-
ment the same firms compete with each other. Which firm you represent is randomly
chosen at the beginning of the experiment. Each firm offers a good that is demanded
by consumers. There are no cost for producing these goods. You choose the price at
which you want to sell your good. The quantity demanded of your good is determined
by your price. Thereby, the following holds:
  The higher your price, the lower the quantity demanded of your good. Thereby, the
quantity demanded of your good can fall to zero.
  The higher a price of the other firms, the higher the quantity demanded of your good.
Thereby, only prices of firms selling a positive quantity are relevant.
Please be aware that the quantity demanded of Firm A differs from the quantity de-
manded of any other firm, everything else being equal. If all firms choose the same
price, the quantity demanded of Firm A is greater than the quantity demanded of any
other single firm. Additionally, the following holds:
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  If Firm A raises its price, the quantity demanded of Firm A decreases less than the
quantity of any other firm if it raises its price.
  If another firm raises its price, the quantity demanded of Firm A increases more than
the quantity of any other firm.
Your profit is calculated by multiplying your price with the quantity demanded of your
good.
Experimental procedure
The experiment lasts 60 periods. In each period you chose your price. Before making
the final decision, you can test how a price combination affects the quantities and profits
of all firms. After all firms made their final decision by pressing the button “Finalize
decision”, quantities and profits are calculated and the next period begins.
Software display
FIGURE C.4: Display of the experimental software.
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Figure C.4 depicts the display of the experimental software. To distinguish the firms,
their information is colored as follows:
  Firm A: BLUE
  Firm B: GREEN
  Firm C: ORANGE
  Firm D: PURPLE
In the following, the individual parts of the display will be explained bottom up.
Decision and testing environment
On the left side you can set your price by using the slider of your firm. At the beginning
of a period the sliders show the prices of the firms of the previous period. Before mak-
ing the final decision, you can test the consequences of your price decision by adjusting
the sliders of the other firms to your expectations. As soon as you release a slider, the
quantities and profits that would result in the next period if the currently set prices in
the testing environment get chosen are displayed on the right side of the screen above
the sliders. On the right side you can reset the sliders to the prices of the last period by
pressing the button “Show last period results”.
Prices
On the left side the history of all firms’ prices as well as the average price is visualized.
On the right side the currently set prices in the testing environment are displayed.
Quantities
On the left side the history of all firms’ quantities is visualized. On the right side the
quantities that would result in the next period if the currently set prices in the testing
environment get chosen are displayed.
Profits
On the left side the history of all firms’ profits is visualized. On the right side the profits
that would result in the next period if the currently set prices in the testing environment
get chosen are displayed.
286
C.3 Number effects and tacit collusion in oligopolies
Status of the experiment
On the left side it is displayed which firm you represent. Figure C.4 shows this for firm
A as an example. In the middle of the display is the button “Finalize decision”. Please
press it when you are ready to finalize your decision. On the right side your current
account balance and the current period of the experiment is displayed. Your current
account balance is the sum of all realised profits.
Concluding remarks
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked some comprehension questions on the
screen with regard to the understanding of the rules and the course of the experiment.
Please enter the respective answers into your computer. Afterwards, the experiment
will start automatically and it will be displayed which firm you represent.
In case of any questions, please remain seated and give the person in charge of the
experiment a hand signal. Please wait until the person in charge of the experiment has
arrived at your seat. Talk as quietly as possible when asking your question. Please
remain seated after the end of the experiment as well and wait for further instructions
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